战争与和平(上)-第362章

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e　have　surrounded　them　with　forces　numerically　superior？　How　could　that　have　come　to　pass？　History　（what　passes　by　that　name）　answers　these　questions　by　saying　that　that　came　to　pass　because　Kutuzov；　and　Tormasov；　and　Tchitchagov；　and　this　general　and　that　failed　to　carry　out　certain　man？uvres。
But　why　did　they　fail　to　carry　them　out？　And　how　was　it；　if　they　really　were　responsible　for　not　attaining　the　aim　set　before　them；　that　they　were　not　tried　and　punished　for　their　shortcomings？　But　even　if　we　admit　that　Kutuzov　and　Tchitchagov　and　the　others　were　responsible　for　the　non…success　of　the　Russians；　it　is　still　impossible　to　understand　why；　in　the　position　the　Russian　troops　were　in　at　Krasnoe　and　the　Berezina；　on　both　occasions　with　numerically　superior　forces；　the　French　army　and　marshals　were　not　taken　prisoners；　if　that　really　was　the　aim　of　the　Russians。
The　explanation　of　this　phenomenon　given　by　the　Russian　military　historians—that　Kutuzov　hindered　the　attack—is　insufficient；　because　we　know　that　Kutuzov　was　not　able　to　restrain　the　troops　from　attacking　at　Vyazma　and　Tarutino。　Why　was　it　that　the　Russian　army；　that　with　inferior　forces　gained　a　victory　at　Borodino　over　the　enemy　in　full　strength；　was　unsuccessful　at　Krasnoe　and　the　Berezina；　when　fighting　in　superior　numbers　against　the　undisciplined　crowds　of　the　French？
If　the　aim　of　the　Russians　really　was　to　cut　off　Napoleon　and　his　marshals；　and　to　take　them　prisoners；　and　that　aim　was　not　only　frustrated；　but　all　attempts　at　attaining　it　were　every　time　defeated　in　the　most　shameful　way；　this　last　period　of　the　war　is　quite　correctly　represented　by　the　French　as　a　series　of　victories　for　them；　and　quite　incorrectly　represented　by　the　Russians　as　redounding　to　our　glory。
The　Russian　military　historians；　so　far　as　they　recognise　the　claims　of　logic；　are　forced　to　this　conclusion；　and　in　spite　of　their　lyric　eulogies　of　Russian　gallantry　and　devotion；　and　all　the　rest　of　it；　they　are　reluctantly　obliged　to　admit　that　the　retreat　of　the　French　from　Moscow　was　a　series　of　victories　for　Napoleon　and　of　defeats　for　Kutuzov。
But　putting　patriotic　vanity　entirely　aside；　one　cannot　but　feel　that　there　is　an　inherent　discrepancy　in　this　conclusion；　seeing　that　the　series　of　French　victories　led　to　their　complete　annihilation；　while　the　series　of　Russian　defeats　was　followed　by　the　destruction　of　their　enemy；　and　the　deliverance　of　their　country。
The　source　of　this　discrepancy　lies　in　the　fact　that　historians；　studying　events　in　the　light　of　the　letters　of　the　sovereigns　and　of　generals；　of　narratives；　reports；　projects；　and　so　on；　have　assumed　quite　falsely　that　the　plan　of　that　period　of　the　campaign　of　1812　was　to　cut　off　and　capture　Napoleon　and　his　marshals　and　his　army。
Such　a　plan　never　was；　and　could　not　have　been；　the　aim　of　the　Russian　army；　because　it　had　no　meaning；　and　its　attainment　was　utterly　out　of　the　question。
There　was　no　object　in　such　a　plan。　In　the　first　place；　because　Napoleon’s　army　was　flying　in　disorder　at　its　utmost　possible　speed　out　of　Russia；　that　is　to　say；　doing　the　very　thing　that　every　Russian　most　desired。　What　object　was　there　in　conducting　all　sorts　of　operations　against　the　French　when　they　were　running　away　as　fast　as　they　could　already？　Secondly；　it　would　have　been　idle　to　stop　men　on　the　road；　whose　whole　energies　were　bent　on　flight。　Thirdly；　it　would　have　been　absurd　to　lose　men　in　destroying　the　French　army　when　it　was　already；　without　external　interference；　perishing　at　such　a　rate　that；　without　any　obstruction　of　their　road；　not　more　than　one　hundredth　of　its　original　number　succeeded　in　crossing　the　frontier　in　December。
Fourthly；　it　was　absurd　to　desire　to　take　prisoners　the　Emperor；　kings；　and　dukes；　since　the　possession　of　such　prisoners　would　have　greatly　enhanced　the　difficulty　of　the　Russian　position；　as　was　recognised　by　the　most　clear…sighted　diplomatists　of　the　time　（J。　Maistre　and　others）。　Still　more　absurd　would　have　been　the　desire　to　capture　the　French　army　when　it　had　dwindled　to　one…half　before　reaching　Krasnoe；　and　a　division　of　convoys　had　to　be　given　up　to　guard　a　corps　of　prisoners；　while　the　Russian　soldiers　themselves　had　not　always　full　rations；　and　the　prisoners　they　did　take　died　of　hunger。
Any　plan　of　cutting　off　and　capturing　Napoleon　and　his　army；　however　carefully　thought　out；　would　have　been　like　the　action　of　a　gardener　who；　after　driving　out　a　herd　of　cattle　that　had　been　trampling　his　beds；　should　run　out　to　belabour　the　cattle　about　the　head。　The　only　thing　that　could　be　said　in　justification　of　his　proceeding　would　be　that　he　was　greatly　incensed。　But　the　authors　of　this　supposed　plan　cannot　plead　even　this　excuse；　since　theirs　were　not　the　gardens　that　had　been　trampled。
And；　besides　being　absurd；　to　cut　off　the　retreat　of　Napoleon’s　army　was　also　impossible。
It　was　impossible；　in　the　first　place；　because；　since　experience　shows　that　the　movement　of　columns　in　a　single　battlefield　at　five　versts’　distance　never　coincides　with　the　plan　of　their　movements；　the　probability　that　Tchitchagov；　Kutuzov；　and　Wittgenstein　would　all　reach　an　appointed　spot　in　time　was　so　remote　that　it　practically　amounted　to　impossibility。　As　Kutuzov　in　fact　regarded　it　when　he　said　that　man？uvres　planned　at　great　distances　do　not　produce　the　results　expected　of　them。
Secondly；　it　was　impossible；　because　to　paralyse　the　force　of　inertia　with　which　Napoleon’s　army　was　rebounding　back　along　its　track；　incomparably　greater　forces　were　needed　than　those　the　Russians　had　at　their　command。
Thirdly；　it　was　impossible；　because　the　military　expression；　to　cut　off；　was　really　no　meaning。　One　may　cut　off　a　slice　of　bread；　but　not　an　army。　To　cut　off　an　army—that　is；　to　bar　its　road—is　impossible；　because　there　are　always　many　places　by　which　the　men　can　make　a　circuit　to　get　out；　and　there　is　always　the　night；　during　which　nothing　can　be　done；　a　fact　of　which　the　military　strategists　might　have　been　convinced　by　the　examples　of　Krasnoe　and　Berezina。　One　can　never　take　a　prisoner　unless　he　agrees　to　be　taken；　just　as　one　can　never　catch　a　swallow；　though　of　course　it　is　possible　if　it　settles　on　one’s　hand。　One　can　take　a　prisoner　who　will　surrender；　as　the　Germans　did；　in　accordance　with　the　rules　of　strategy　and　tactics。　But　the　French　soldiers　very　wisely　did　not　feel　it　incumbent　on　them　to　do　so；　since　death　from　cold　and　hunger　awaited　them　as　much　if　taken　prisoner；　as　if　persisting　in　their　flight。
The　fourth　and　chief　reason　why　it　was　impossible　is　that　war　was　waged　in　1812　under　conditions　more　terrible　than　ever　since　the　world　has　existed；　and　the　Russian　troops　strained　every　nerve　in　the　pursuit　of　the　French；　and　could　not　have　done　more　without　perishing　themselves。
The　Russian　army　lost　in　its　march　from　Tarutino　to　Krasnoe　fifty　thousand　sick　or　stragglers；　that　is；　a　number　equal　to　the　population　of　a　large　provincial　town。　Half　of　the　army　was　lost　without　a　battle。
At　this　period　of　the　campaign　the　soldiers　were　without　boots　or　fur…lined　coats；　on　half　rations；　without　vodka；　camping　out　at　night　for　months　in　the　snow　with　fifteen　degrees　of　frost；　while　there　were　only　seven　or　eight　hours　of　daylight；　and　the　rest　was　night；　where　discipline　could　not　exert　the　same　influence；　and　men　were　put　in　peril　of　death；　not　for　a　few　hours；　as　on　the　field　of　battle；　but　for　whole　months　together　were　keeping　up　a　struggle　every　moment　with　death　from　cold　and　hunger。　And　of　this　period　of　the　campaign；　when　half　the　army　perished　in　one　month；　the　historians　tell　us　that　Miloradovitch　ought　to　have　made　an　oblique　march　in　one　direction；　and　Tormasov　in　another；　and　Tchitchagov　ought　to　have　advanced　to　this　point　（the　men　advancing　knee…deep　in　the　snow）；　and　that　so　and　so　pushed　through　and　cut　the　French　off；　and　so　on；　and　so　on。
The　Russian　soldiers　did　all　that　could　or　ought　to　have　been　done　to　attain　an　end　worthy　of　the　people；　and　half　of　them　died　in　doing　it。　They　are　not　to　blame　because　other　Russians；　sitting　in　warm　rooms　at　home；　proposed　that　they　should　do　the　impossible。
All　this　strange　discrepancy　between　the　facts　and　the　accounts　of　historians；　so　difficult　to　u