战争与和平(上)-第361章

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as　he　can　from　his　opponent；　and　often　supposing　he　is　running　away　from　him；　walks　straight　into　his　arms。
At　first　Napoleon’s　army　made　its　whereabouts　known—that　was　in　the　early　period　of　the　retreat　along　the　Kaluga　road—but　afterwards；　when　they　had　taken　to　the　Smolensk　road；　they　ran　holding　the　tongue　of　the　bell；　and　often　supposing　they　were　running　away；　ran　straight　towards　the　Russians。
Owing　to　the　rapidity　of　the　flight　of　the　French；　and　of　the　Russians　after　them；　and　the　consequent　exhaustion　of　the　horses；　the　chief　means　of　keeping　a　close　watch　on　the　enemy’s　position—by　means　of　charges　of　cavalry—was　out　of　the　question。　Moreover；　in　consequence　of　the　frequent　and　rapid　changes　of　position　of　both　armies；　what　news　did　come　always　came　too　late。　If　information　arrived　on　the　second　that　the　army　of　the　enemy　had　been　in　a　certain　place　on　the　first；　by　the　third；　when　the　information　could　be　acted　upon；　the　army　was　already　two　days’　march　further；　and　in　quite　a　different　position。
One　army　fled；　the　other　pursued。　From　Smolensk；　there　were　a　number　of　different　roads　for　the　French　to　choose　from；　and　one　would　have　thought　that；　as　they　stayed　there　four　days；　the　French　might　have　found　out　where　the　enemy　was；　have　thought　out　some　advantageous　plan；　and　undertaken　something　new。　Yet；　after　a　halt　of　four　days；　the　crowds　of　them　ran　back；　again　not　to　right　or　to　left；　but；　with　no　man？uvres　or　plans；　along　their　old　road—the　worst　one—by　Krasnoe　and　Orsha；　along　their　beaten　track。
Expecting　the　enemy　in　their　rear　and　not　in　front；　the　French　ran；　straggling　out；　and　getting　separated　as　far　as　twenty…four　hours’　march　from　one　another。　In　front　of　all　fled　the　Emperor；　then　the　kings；　then　the　dukes。　The　Russian　army；　supposing　Napoleon　would　take　the　road　to　the　right　beyond　the　Dnieper—the　only　sensible　course—turned　also　to　the　right；　and　came　out　on　the　high　road　at　Krasnoe。　And　here；　just　as　in　the　game　of　blindman；　the　French　came　bearing　straight　down　on　our　vanguard。　Seeing　the　enemy　unexpectedly；　the　French　were　thrown　into　confusion；　stopped　short　from　the　suddenness　of　the　fright；　but　then　ran　on　again；　abandoning　their　own　comrades　in　their　rear。　Then　for　three　days；　the　separate　parts　of　the　French　army　passed；　as　it　were；　through　the　lines　of　the　Russian　army：　first　the　viceroy’s　troops；　then　Davoust’s；　and　then　Ney’s。　They　all　abandoned　one　another；　abandoned　their　heavy　baggage；　their　artillery；　and　half　their　men；　and　fled；　making　semicircles　to　the　right　to　get　round　the　Russians　by　night。
Ney　was　the　last；　because　in　spite；　or　perhaps　in　consequence；　of　their　miserable　position；　with　a　child’s　impulse　to　beat　the　floor　that　has　bruised　it；　he　lingered　to　demolish　the　walls　of　Smolensk；　which　had　done　nobody　any　harm。　Ney；　who　was　the　last　to　pass　with　his　corps　of　ten　thousand；　reached　Napoleon　at　Orsha　with　only　a　thousand　men；　having　abandoned　all　the　rest；　and　all　his　cannons；　and　made　his　way　by　stealth　at　night；　under　cover　of　the　woods；　across　the　Dnieper。
From　Orsha　they　fled　on　along　the　road　to　Vilna；　still　playing　the　same　game　of　blindman　with　the　pursuing　army。　At　Berezina　again；　they　were　thrown　into　confusion；　many　were　drowned；　many　surrendered；　but　those　that　got　across　the　river；　fled　on。
Their　chief　commander　wrapped　himself　in　a　fur　cloak；　and　getting　into　a　sledge；　galloped　off　alone；　deserting　his　companions。　Whoever　could；　ran　away　too；　and　those　who　could　not—surrendered　or　died。


Chapter　18
ONE　MIGHT　have　supposed　that　the　historians；　who　ascribe　the　actions　of　the　masses　to　the　will　of　one　man；　would　have　found　it　impossible　to　explain　the　retreat　of　the　French　on　their　theory；　considering　that　they　did　everything　possible　during　this　period　of　the　campaign　to　bring　about　their　own　ruin；　and　that　not　a　single　movement　of　that　rabble　of　men；　from　their　turning　into　the　Kaluga　road　up　to　the　flight　of　the　commander　from　his　army；　showed　the　slightest　trace　of　design。
But　no！　Mountains　of　volumes　have　been　written　by　historians　upon　this　campaign；　and　in　all　of　them　we　find　accounts　of　Napoleon’s　masterly　arrangements　and　deeply　considered　plans；　of　the　strategy　with　which　the　soldiers　were　led；　and　the　military　genius　showed　by　the　marshals。
The　retreat　from　Maley　Yaroslavets；　when　nothing　hindered　Napoleon　from　passing　through　a　country　abundantly　furnished　with　supplies；　and　the　parallel　road　was　open　to　him；　along　which　Kutuzov　afterwards　pursued　him—this　wholly　unnecessary　return　by　a　road　through　devastated　country　is　explained　to　us　as　due　to　various　sagacious　considerations。　Similar　reasons　are　given　us　for　Napoleon’s　retreat　from　Smolensk　to　Orsha。　Then　we　have　a　description　of　his　heroism　at　Krasnoe；　when　he　is　reported　to　have　prepared　to　give　battle；　and　to　take　the　command；　and　coming　forward　with　a　birch　stick　in　his　hand；　to　have　said：
“Long　enough　I　have　been　an　emperor；　it　is　time　now　to　be　a　general！”
Yet　in　spite　of　this；　he　runs　away　immediately　afterwards；　abandoning　the　divided　army　in　the　rear　to　the　hazards　of　destiny。
Then　we　have　descriptions　of　the　greatness　of　some　of　the　marshals；　especially　of　Ney—a　greatness　of　soul　that　culminated　in　his　taking　a　circuitous　route　by　the　forests　across　the　Dnieper；　and　fleeing　without　his　flags；　his　artillery；　and　nine…tenths　of　his　men　into　Orsha。
And　lastly；　the　final　departure　of　the　great　Emperor　from　his　heroic　army　is　represented　by　the　historians　as　something　great—a　stroke　of　genius。
Even　that　final　act　of　running　away—which　in　homely　language　would　be　described　as　the　lowest　depth　of　baseness；　such　as　every　child　is　taught　to　feel　ashamed　of—even　that　act　finds　justification　in　the　language　of　the　historians。
When　it　is　impossible　to　stretch　the　elastic　thread　of　historical　argument　further；　when　an　action　is　plainly　opposed　to　what　all　humanity　is　agreed　in　calling　right　and　justice；　the　historians　take　refuge　in　the　conception　of　greatness。　Greatness　would　appear　to　exclude　all　possibility　of　applying　standards　of　right　and　wrong。　For　the　great　man—nothing　is　wrong。　There　is　no　atrocity　which　could　be　made　a　ground　for　blaming　a　great　man。
“C’est　grand！”　cry　the　historians；　and　at　that　word　good　and　bad　have　ceased　to　be；　and　there　are　only　“grand”　and　not　“grand。”　“Grand”　is　equivalent　to　good；　and　not　“grand”　to　bad。　To　be　grand　is　to　their　notions　the　characteristic　of　certain　exceptional　creatures；　called　by　them　heroes。　And　Napoleon；　wrapping　himself　in　his　warm　fur　cloak　and　hurrying　home　away　from　men；　who　were　not　only　his　comrades；　but　（in　his　belief）　brought　there　by　his　doing；　feels　que　c’est　grand；　and　his　soul　is　content。
“Du　sublime　au　ridicule　il　n’y　a　qu’un　pas；”　he　says　（he　sees　something　grand　in　himself）。　And　the　whole　world　has　gone　on　for　fifty　years　repeating：　Sublime！　Grand！　Napoleon　the　Great。
“Du　sublime　au　ridicule　il　n’y　a　qu’un　pas。”
And　it　never　enters　any　one’s　head　that　to　admit　a　greatness；　immeasurable　by　the　rule　of　right　and　wrong；　is　but　to　accept　one’s　own　nothingness　and　immeasurable　littleness。
For　us；　with　the　rule　of　right　and　wrong　given　us　by　Christ；　there　is　nothing　for　which　we　have　no　standard。　And　there　is　no　greatness　where　there　is　not　simplicity；　goodness；　and　truth。


Chapter　19
WHAT　RUSSIAN　READER　has　not　known　an　irksome　feeling　of　annoyance；　dissatisfaction；　and　perplexity；　when　he　reads　the　accounts　of　the　latter　period　of　the　campaign　of　1812？　Who　has　not　asked　himself：　How　was　it　all　the　French　were　not　captured　or　cut　to　pieces；　when　all　the　three　Russian　armies　were　surrounding　them　in　superior　numbers；　when　the　French　were　a　disorderly；　starving；　and　freezing　rabble；　and　the　whole　aim　of　the　Russians　（so　history　tells　us）　was　to　check；　to　cut　off；　and　to　capture　all　the　French？
How　was　it　that　the　Russian　army；　that　with　inferior　numbers　had　fought　the　battle　of　Borodino；　failed　in　its　aim　of　capturing　the　French；　when　the　latter　were　surrounded　on　three　sides？　Can　the　French　be　so　immensely　superior　to　us　that　we　are　not　equal　to　beating　them；　when　we　have　surrounded　them　with　forces　numerically　superior？　How　could　that　have　come　to　pass？　History　（