战争与和平(上)-第280章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


and　events　will　not　wait。　It　is　suggested　to　him；　let　us　suppose；　on　the　28th　to　move　towards　the　Kaluga　road；　but　at　that　moment　an　adjutant　gallops　up　from　Miloradovitch　to　inquire　whether　to　join　battle　at　once　with　the　French　or　to　retire。　He　must　be　given　instructions　at　once；　at　the　instant。　And　the　order　to　retire　hinders　us　from　turning　to　the　Kaluga　road。　And　then　after　the　adjutant　comes　the　commissariat　commissioner　to　inquire　where　the　stores　are　to　be　taken；　and　the　ambulance　director　to　ask　where　the　wounded　are　to　be　moved　to；　and　a　courier　from　Petersburg　with　a　letter　from　the　Tsar；　not　admitting　the　possibility　of　abandoning　Moscow；　and　the　commander’s　rival；　who　is　trying　to　cut　the　ground　from　under　his　feet　（and　there　are　always　more　than　one　such）　proposes　a　new　project；　diametrically　opposed　to　the　plan　of　marching　upon　the　Kaluga　road。　The　commander’s　own　energies；　too；　require　sleep　and　support。　And　a　respectable　general；　who　has　been　overlooked　when　decorations　were　bestowed；　presents　a　complaint；　and　the　inhabitants　of　the　district　implore　protection；　and　the　officer　sent　to　inspect　the　locality　comes　back　with　a　report　utterly　unlike　that　of　the　officer　sent　on　the　same　commission　just　previously；　and　a　spy；　and　a　prisoner；　and　a　general　who　has　made　a　reconnaissance；　all　describe　the　position　of　the　enemy’s　army　quite　differently。　Persons　who　forget；　or　fail　to　comprehend；　those　inevitable　conditions　under　which　a　commander　has　to　act；　present　to　us；　for　instance；　the　position　of　the　troops　at　Fili；　and　assume　that　the　commander…in…chief　was　quite　free　on　the　1st　of　September　to　decide　the　question　whether　to　abandon　or　to　defend　Moscow；　though；　with　the　position　of　the　Russian　army；　only　five　versts　from　Moscow；　there　could　no　longer　be　any　question　on　the　subject。　When　was　that　question　decided？　At　Drissa；　and　at　Smolensk；　and　most　palpably　of　all　on　August　the　24th　at　Shevardino；　and　on　the　26th　at　Borodino；　and　every　day　and　hour　and　minute　of　the　retreat　from　Borodino　to　Fili。


Chapter　3
THE　RUSSIAN　ARMY；　retreating　from　Borodino；　halted　at　Fili。　Yermolov；　who　had　been　inspecting　the　position；　rode　up　to　the　commander…in…chief。
“There　is　no　possibility　of　fighting　in　this　position；”　he　said。
Kutuzov　looked　at　him　in　wonder；　and　made　him　repeat　the　words　he　had　just　uttered。　When　he　had　done　so；　he　put　out　his　hand　to　him。
“Give　me　your　hand；”　he　said；　and　turning　it　so　as　to　feel　his　pulse；　he　said：　“You　are　not　well；　my　dear　boy。　Think　what　you　are　saying。”
Kutuzov　could　not　yet　take　in　the　idea　of　its　being　possible　to　retreat；　abandoning　Moscow　without　a　battle。
On　the　Poklonnaya　Hill；　six　versts　from　Dorogomilovsky　gate；　Kutuzov　got　out　of　his　carriage　and　sat　down　on　a　bench　by　the　side　of　the　road。　A　great　crowd　of　generals　gathered　about　him。　Count　Rastoptchin；　who　had　come　out　from　Moscow；　joined　them。　All　this　brilliant　company　broke　up　into　several　circles；　and　talked　among　themselves　of　the　advantages　and　disadvantages　of　the　position；　of　the　condition　of　the　troops；　of　the　plans　proposed；　of　the　situation　of　Moscow—in　fact；　of　military　questions　generally。　All　felt　that　though　they　had　not　been　summoned　for　the　purpose；　it　was　really；　if　not　ostensibly；　a　military　council。　All　conversation　was　confined　to　public　questions。　If　any　one　did　repeat　or　inquire　any　piece　of　personal　news；　it　was　in　a　whisper；　and　the　talk　passed　at　once　back　to　general　topics。　There　was　not　a　jest；　not　a　laugh；　not　even　a　smile；　to　be　seen　among　all　these　men。　They　was　all　making　an　obvious　effort　to　rise　to　the　level　of　the　situation。　And　all　the　groups；　while　talking　among　themselves；　tried　to　keep　close　to　the　commander…in…chief；　whose　bench　formed　the　centre　of　the　whole　crowd；　and　tried　to　talk　so　that　he　might　hear　them。　The　commander…in…chief　listened；　and　sometimes　asked　what　had　been　said　near　him；　but　did　not　himself　enter　into　conversation　or　express　any　opinion。　For　the　most　part；　after　listening　to　the　talk　of　some　group；　he　turned　away　with　an　air　of　disappointment；　as　though　they　were　not　speaking　of　anything　he　cared　to　hear　about　at　all。　Some　were　discussing　the　position；　criticising　not　so　much　the　position　itself　as　the　intellectual　qualifications　of　those　who　had　selected　it。　Others　argued　that　a　blunder　had　been　made　earlier；　that　a　battle　ought　to　have　been　fought　two　days　before。　Others　talked　of　the　battle　of　Salamanca；　which　a　Frenchman；　Crosart；　wearing　a　Spanish　uniform；　was　describing　to　them。　（This　Frenchman；　who　had　just　arrived；　had　with　one　of　the　German　princes　serving　in　the　Russian　army　been　criticising　the　siege　of　Saragossa；　foreseeing　a　possibility　of　a　similar　defence　of　Moscow。）　In　the　fourth　group；　Count　Rastoptchin　was　saying　that　he；　with　the　Moscow　city　guard；　was　ready　to　die　under　the　walls　of　the　city；　but　that　still　he　could　not　but　complain　of　the　uncertainty　in　which　he　had　been　left；　and　that　had　he　known　it　earlier；　things　would　have　been　different。…　A　fifth　group　was　manifesting　the　profundity　of　their　tactical　insight　by　discussing　the　direction　the　troops　should　certainly　take　now。　A　sixth　group　were　talking　arrant　nonsense。
Kutuzov’s　face　grew　more　and　more　careworn　and　gloomy。　From　all　this　talk　Kutuzov　saw　one　thing　only：　the　defence　of　Moscow　was　a　physical　impossibility　in　the　fullest　sense　of　the　words。　It　was　so　utterly　impossible　that　even　if　some　insane　commander　were　to　give　orders　for　a　battle；　all　that　would　follow　would　be　a　muddle；　and　no　battle　would　be　fought。　There　would　be　no　battle；　because　all　the　officers　in　command；　not　merely　recognised　the　position　to　be　impossible；　but　were　only　engaged　now　in　discussing　what　was　to　be　done　after　the　inevitable　abandonment　of　that　position。　How　could　officers　lead　their　men　to　a　field　of　battle　which　they　considered　it　impossible　to　hold？　The　officers　of　lower　rank；　and　even　the　soldiers　themselves　（they　too　form　their　conclusions）；　recognised　that　the　position　could　not　be　held；　and　so　they　could　not　advance　into　battle　with　the　conviction　that　they　would　be　defeated。　That　Bennigsen　urged　the　defence　of　this　position；　and　others　still　discussed　it；　was　a　fact　that　had　no　significance　in　itself；　but　only　as　a　pretext　for　dissension　and　intrigue。　Kutuzov　knew　that。
Bennigsen　was　warmly　manifesting　his　Russian　patriotism　（Kutuzov　could　not　listen　to　him　without　wincing）；　by　insisting　on　the　defence　of　Moscow。　To　Kutuzov；　his　object　was　as　clear　as　daylight：　in　case　of　the　defence　being　unsuccessful；　to　throw　the　blame　on　Kutuzov；　who　had　brought　the　army　as　far　as　the　Sparrow　Hills　without　a　battle；　in　case　of　its　being　successful；　to　claim　the　credit；　in　case　of　it　not　being　attempted；　to　clear　himself　of　the　crime　of　abandoning　Moscow。
But　these　questions　of　intrigue　did　not　occupy　the　old　man’s　mind　now。　One　terrible　question　absorbed　him。　And　to　that　question　he　heard　no　reply　from　any　one。　The　question　for　him　now　was　this：　“Can　it　be　that　I　have　let　Napoleon　get　to　Moscow；　and　when　did　I　do　it？　When　did　it　happen？　Was　it　yesterday；　when　I　sent　word　to　Platov　to　retreat；　or　the　evening　before　when　I　had　a　nap　and　bade　Bennigsen　give　instructions？　Or　earlier　still？　…　When；　when　was　it　this　fearful　thing　happened？　Moscow　must　be　abandoned。　The　army　must　retire；　and　I　must　give　the　order　for　it。”
To　give　that　terrible　order　seemed　to　him　equivalent　to　resigning　the　command　of　the　army。　And　apart　from　the　fact　that　he　loved　power；　and　was　used　to　it　（the　honours　paid　to　Prince　Prozorovsky；　under　whom　he　had　been　serving　in　Turkey；　galled　him）；　he　was　convinced　that　he　was　destined　to　deliver　Russia；　and　had　only　for　that　cause　been　chosen　commander…in…chief　contrary　to　the　Tsar’s　wishes　by　the　will　of　the　people。　He　was　persuaded　that　in　these　difficult　circumstances　he　was　the　one　man　who　could　maintain　his　position　at　the　head　of　the　army；　that　he　was　the　only　man　in　the　world　capable　of　meeting　Napoleon　as　an　antagonist　without　panic。　And　he　was　in　terror　at　the　idea　of　having　to　resign　the　command。　But　he　must　decide　on　some　step；　he　must　cut　short　this　chatter　round　him；　which　was　beginning　to　assume　too　free　a　character。
He　beckoned　the　senior　generals　to　him。
“