the writings-6-第26章
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glorious cause； and I say this with no malice in my heart towards
those who have done otherwise。 May our children and children's
children； for a thousand generations； continue to enjoy the benefits
conferred upon us by a united country； and have cause yet to rejoice
under these glorious institutions； bequeathed to us by WASHINGTON and
his compeers。 Now； my friends； soldiers and citizens； I can only say
once more…farewell。
TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL HALLECK
TO GENERAL G。 B。 McCLELLAN。；
WASHINGTON； D。 C。； October 6； 1862。
MAJOR…GENERAL McCLELLAN：
I am instructed to telegraph you as follows： The President directs
that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy； or drive him
south。 Your army must move now； while the roads are good。 If you
cross the river between the enemy and Washington； and cover the
latter by your operation； you can be reinforced by thirty thousand
men。 If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah； not more than
twelve or fifteen thousand can be sent you。 The President advises
the interior line between Washington and the enemy； but does not
order it。 He is very desirous that your army move as soon as
possible。 You will immediately report what line you adopt； and when
you intend to cross the river； also to what point the reinforcements
are to be sent。 It is necessary that the plan of your operations be
positively determined on； before orders are given for building
bridges and repairing railroads。 I am directed to add that the
Secretary of War and the General…in…chief fully concur with the
President in these directions。
H。 W。 HALLECK； General…in…Chief。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL McCLELLAN。
EXECUTIVE MANSION； WASHINGTON； October 7； 1862。
MAJOR…GENERAL McCLELLAN； Hdqs。 Army of the Potomac：
You wish to see your family and I wish to oblige you。 It might be
left to your own discretion； certainly so； if Mrs。 M。 could meet you
here at Washington。
A。 LINCOLN。
TO T。 H。 CLAY。
WAR DEPARTMENT； October 8； 1862。
THOMAS H。 CLAY； Cincinnati； Ohio：
You cannot have reflected seriously when you ask that I shall order
General Morgan's command to Kentucky as a favor because they have
marched from Cumberland Gap。 The precedent established by it would
evidently break up the whole army。 Buell's old troops； now in
pursuit of Bragg； have done more hard marching recently； and； in
fact； if you include marching and fighting； there are scarcely any
old troops east or west of the mountains that have not done as hard
service。 I sincerely wish war was an easier and pleasanter business
than it is； but it does not admit of holidays。 On Morgan's command；
where it is now sent； as I understand； depends the question whether
the enemy will get to the Ohio River in another place。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL U。 S。 GRANT。
WASHINGTON； D。C。； October 8； 1862
MAJOR…GENERAL GRANT：
I congratulate you and all concerned in your recent battles and
victories。 How does it all sum up？ I especially regret the death of
General Hackleman； and am very anxious to know the condition of
General Oglesby； who is an intimate personal friend。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J。 T。 BOYLE。
WAR DEPARTMENT； October 11；1862。 4 P。M。
GENERAL BOYLE； Louisville； Kentucky：
Please send any news you have from General Buell to…day。
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J。 T。 BOYLE。
WAR DEPARTMENT； October 12； 1862。 4。10 P。M。
GENERAL BOYLE； Louisville； Kentucky：
We are anxious to hear from General Buell's army。 We have heard
nothing since day before yesterday。 Have you anything？
A。 LINCOLN。
TELEGRAM TO GENERAL CURTIS。
WASHINGTON； D。 C。； October 12； 1862。
MAJOR…GENERAL CURTIS； Saint Louis； Missouri：
Would the completion of the railroad some distance further in the
direction of Springfield； Mo。； be of any military advantage to you？
Please answer。
A。 LINCOLN。
TO GENERAL G。 B。 McCLELLAN。
EXECUTIVE MANSION； WASHINGTON；
October 13； 1862。
MY DEAR SIR …You remember my speaking to you of what I called your
over…cautiousness。 Are you not over…cautious when you assume that
you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing？ Should you not
claim to be at least his equal in prowess； and act upon the claim？
As I understand； you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot
subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's
Ferry to that point be put in working order。 But the enemy does now
subsist his army at Winchester； at a distance nearly twice as great
from railroad transportation as you would have to do； without the
railroad last named。 He now wagons from Culpepper Court…House； which
is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's
Ferry。 He is certainly not more than half as well provided with
wagons as you are。 I certainly should be pleased for you to have the
advantage of the railroad from Harper's Perry to Winchester； but it
wastes an the remainder of autumn to give it to you； and； in fact；
ignores the question of time； which cannot and must not be ignored。
Again； one of the standard maxims of war； as you know； is 〃to operate
upon the enemy's communications as much as possible； without exposing
your own。〃 You seem to act as if this applies against you； but
cannot apply in your favor。 Change positions with the enemy； and
think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within
the next twenty…four hours？ You dread his going into Pennsylvania。
But if he does so in full force； he gives up his communications to
you absolutely； and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin
him； if he does so with less than full force； fall upon and beat what
is left behind all the easier。
Exclusive of the water line； you are now nearer to Richmond than the
enemy is； by the route that you can and he must take。 Why can you
not reach there before him； unless you admit that he is more than
your equal on a march？ His route is the arc of a circle； while yours
is the chord。 The roads are as good on yours as on his。
You know I desired； but did not order； you to cross the Potomac below
instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge。 My idea was； that
this would at once menace the enemy's communications； which I would
seize if he would permit。 If he should move northward； I would
follow him closely； holding his communications。 If he should prevent
our seizing his communications； and move toward Richmond； I would
press closely to him； fight him if a favorable opportunity should
present； and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside
track。 I say try；〃 if we never try； we shall never succeed。 If he
makes a stand at Winchester； moving neither north or south； I would
fight him there； on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears
the wastage of coming to us； we never can when we bear the wastage of
going to him。 This proposition is a simple truth； and is too
important to be lost sight of for a moment。 In coming to us he
tenders us an advantage which we should not waive。 We should not so
operate as to merely drive him away。 As we must beat him somewhere
or fail finally； we can do it； if at all； easier near to us than far
away。 If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is； we never can； he
again being within the entrenchments of Richmond。
＇And； indeed； the enemy was let back into Richmond and it took
another two years and thousands of dead for McClelland cowardiceif
that was all that it was。 I still suspect； and I think the evidence
is overwhelming that he was； either secretly a supporter of the
South； or； what is more likely； a politician readying for a different
campaign： that of the Presidency of the United States。＇
Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside t
