the writings-6-第10章

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within　the　fortifications　and　city　of　Washington；　shall　form　the

Third　Army　Corps；　and　be　under　his　command。



3d。　　The　Army　of　Virginia　shall　operate　in　such　manner　as；　while

protecting　western　Virginia　and　the　national　capital　from　danger　or

insult；　it　shall　in　the　speediest　manner　attack　and　overcome　the

rebel　forces　under　Jackson　and　Ewell；　threaten　the　enemy　in　the

direction　of　Charlottesville；　and　render　the　most　effective　aid　to

relieve　General　McClellan　and　capture　Richmond。



4th。　　When　the　Army　of　the　Potomac　and　the　Army　of　Virginia　shall　be

in　position　to　communicate　and　directly　co…operate　at　or　before

Richmond；　the　chief　command；　while　so　operating　together；　shall　be

governed；　as　in　like　cases；　by　the　Rules　and　Articles　of　War。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　FROM　SECRETARY　STANTON

TO　GENERAL　H。　W。　HALLECK。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　June　28；　1862。



MAJOR…GENERAL　HALLECK：



The　enemy　have　concentrated　in　such　force　at　Richmond　as　to　render　it

absolutely　necessary；　in　the　opinion　of　the　President；　for　you

immediately　to　detach　25；000　of　your　force　and　forward　it　by　the

nearest　and　quickest　route　by　way　of　Baltimore　and　Washington　to

Richmond。　　It　is　believed　that　the　quickest　route　would　be　by　way　of

Columbus；　Ky。；　and　up　the　Ohio　River。　　But　in　detaching　your　force

the　President　directs　that　it　be　done　in　such　a　way　as　to　enable　you

to　hold　your　ground　and　not　interfere　with　the　movement　against

Chattanooga　and　East　Tennessee。　　This　condition　being　observed；　the

forces　to　be　detached　and　the　routes　they　are　to　be　sent　are　left　to

your　own　judgment。



The　direction　to　send　these　forces　immediately　is　rendered　imperative

by　a　serious　reverse　suffered　by　General　McClellan　before　Richmond

yesterday；　the　full　extent　of　which　is　not　yet　known。



You　will　acknowledge　the　receipt　of　this　despatch；　stating　the　day

and　hour　it　is　received；　and　inform　me　what　your　action　will　be；　so

that　we　may　take　measures　to　aid　in　river　and　railroad

transportation。



EDWIN　M。　STANTON；　Secretary　of　War。









TELEGRAMS　TO　GENERAL　A。　E。　BURNSIDE。



WASHINGTON；　June　28；　1862。



GENERAL　BURNSIDE：



I　think　you　had　better　go；　with　any　reinforcements　you　can　spare；　to

General　McClellan。



A。　LINCOLN。









WAR　DEPARTMENT；　June；　28；　1862



MAJOR…GENERAL　BURNSIDE；　Newbern：



We　have　intelligence　that　General　McClellan　has　been　attacked　in

large　force　and　compelled　to　fall　back　toward　the　James　River。　　We

are　not　advised　of　his　exact　condition；　but　the　President　directs

that　you　shall　send　him　all　the　reinforcements　from　your　command　to

the　James　River　that　you　can　safely　do　without　abandoning　your　own

position。　　Let　it　be　infantry　entirely；　as　he　said　yesterday　that　he

had　cavalry　enough。



EDWIN　M。　STANTON；

Secretary　of　War。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　G。　B。　McCLELLAN。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　WASHINGTON　CITY；　　June　28；　1862。



MAJOR…GENERAL　McCLELLAN：



Save　your　army；　at　all　events。　　Will　send　reinforcements　as　fast　as

we　can。　　Of　course　they　cannot　reach　you　to…day；　to…morrow；　or　next

day。　　I　have　not　said　you　were　ungenerous　for　saying　you　needed

reinforcements。　　I　thought　you　were　ungenerous　in　assuming　that　I　did

not　send　them　as　fast　as　I　could。　　I　feel　any　misfortune　to　you　and

your　army　quite　as　keenly　as　you　feel　it　yourself。　　If　you　have　had　a

drawn　battle；　or　a　repulse；　it　is　the　price　we　pay　for　the　enemy　not

being　in　Washington。　　We　protected　Washington；　and　the　enemy

concentrated　on　you。　　Had　we　stripped　Washington；　he　would　have　been

upon　us　before　the　troops　could　have　gotten　to　you。　　Less　than　a　week

ago　you　notified　us　that　reinforcements　were　leaving　Richmond　to　come

in　front　of　us。　　It　is　the　nature　of　the　case；　and　neither　you　nor

the　government　is　to　blame。　　Please　tell　at　once　the　present

condition　and　aspect　of　things。



A。　LINCOLN









TO　SECRETARY　SEWARD。



EXECUTIVE　MANSION；　June　28；　1862



HON。　W。　H。　SEWARD。



MY　DEAR　SIR：My　view　of　the　present　condition　of　the　war　is　about　as

follows：



The　evacuation　of　Corinth　and　our　delay　by　the　flood　in　the

Chickahominy　have　enabled　the　enemy　to　concentrate　too　much　force　in

Richmond　for　McClellan　to　successfully　attack。　　In　fact　there　soon

will　be　no　substantial　rebel　force　anywhere　else。　　But　if　we　send　all

the　force　from　here　to　McClellan；　the　enemy　will；　before　we　can　know

of　it；　send　a　force　from　Richmond　and　take　Washington。　　Or　if　a　large

part　of　the　western　army　be　brought　here　to　McClellan；　they　will　let

us　have　Richmond；　and　retake　Tennessee；　Kentucky；　Missouri；　etc。

What　should　be　done　is　to　hold　what　we　have　in　the　West；　open　the

Mississippi；　and　take　Chattanooga　and　East　Tennessee　without　more。　　A

reasonable　force　should　in　every　event　be　kept　about　Washington　for

its　protection。　　Then　let　the　country　give　us　a　hundred　thousand　new

troops　in　the　shortest　possible　time；　which；　added　to　McClellan

directly　or　indirectly；　will　take　Richmond　without　endangering　any

other　place　which　we　now　hold；　and　will　substantially　end　the　war。　　I

expect　to　maintain　this　contest　until　successful；　or　till　I　die；　or

am　conquered；　or　my　term　expires；　or　Congress　or　the　country　forsake

me；　and　I　would　publicly　appeal　to　the　country　for　this　new　force

were　it　not　that　I　fear　a　general　panic　and　stampede　would　follow；　so

hard　it　is　to　have　a　thing　understood　as　it　really　is。　　I　think　the

new　force　should　be　all；　or　nearly　all；　infantry；　principally　because

such　can　be　raised　most　cheaply　and　quickly。



Yours　very　truly；



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　GENERAL　J。　A。　DIX。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　WASHINGTON；　D。C。；　　June　28；1862。



GENERAL　DIX：



Communication　with　McClellan　by　White　House　is　cut　off。　　Strain　every

nerve　to　open　communication　with　him　by　James　River；　or　any　other　way

you　can。　　Report　to　me。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　FLAG…OFFICER　L。　M。　GOLDSBOROUGH。



WASHINGTON；　D。C。；　June　28；　1862。



FLAG…OFFICER　GOLDS　BOROUGH；　Fort　Monroe：



Enemy　has　cut　McClellan's　communication　with　White　House；　and　is

driving　Stoneman　back　on　that　point。　　Do　what　you　can　for　him　with

gunboats　at　or　near　that　place。　　McClellan's　main　force　is　between

the　Chickahominy　and　the　James。　　Also　do　what　you　can　to　communicate

with　him　and　support　him　there。



A。　LINCOLN









To　GOVERNOR　MORTON。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　WASHINGTON；　D。C。

June　28；　1862。





GOVERNOR　O。　P。　MORTON；　Indianapolis；　Ind：



Your　despatch　of　to…day　is　just　received。　　I　have　no　recollection　of

either　John　R。　Cravens　or　Cyrus　M。　Allen　having　been　named　to　me　for

appointment　under　the　tax　law。　　The　latter　particularly　has　been　my

friend；　and　I　am　sorry　to　learn　that　he　is　not　yours。　　No　appointment

has　been　or　will　be　made　by　me　for　the　purpose　of　stabbing　you。



A。　LINCOLN。









TELEGRAM　TO　SECRETARY　SEWARD。



WAR　DEPARTMENT；　June　29；　1862。6　P。M。



HON。　WILLIAM　H。　SEWARD；　Astor　House；　New　York：



Not　much　more　than　when　you　left。　　Fulton　of　Baltimore　American　is

now　with　us。　　　He　left　White　House　at　11　A。M。　yesterday。　　He

conversed　fully　with　a　paymaster　who　was　with　Porter's　force　during

the　fight　of　Friday　and　fell　back　to　nearer　McClellan's　quarters　just

a　little　sooner　than　Porter　did；　seeing　the　whole　of　it；　stayed　on

the　Richmond　side　of　the　Chickahominy　over　night；　and　left　for　White

House　at　5　A。M。　Saturday。　　He　says　Porter　retired　in　perfect　order

under　protection　of　the　guns　arranged　for　the　purpose；　under　orders

and　not　from　necessity；　and　with　all　other　of　our　forces；　except　what

was　left　on　purpose　to　go　to　White　House；　was　safely　in　pontoons　over

the　Chickahominy　before　morning；　and　that　there　was　heavy　firing　on

the　Richmond　side；　begun　at　5　and　ceased　at　7　A。M。　Saturday。　　On　the

whole；　I　think　we　have　had　the　better　of　it　up　to　that　point　of　time。

What　has　happened