on liberty-第6章

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first　place；　the　prosecutions　were　not　persisted　in；　and；　in　the



second；　they　were　never；　properly　speaking；　political　prosecutions。



The　offence　charged　was　not　that　of　criticising　institutions；　or　the



acts　or　persons　of　rulers；　but　of　circulating　what　was　deemed　an



immoral　doctrine；　the　lawfulness　of　Tyrannicide。



　　If　the　arguments　of　the　present　chapter　are　of　any　validity；　there



ought　to　exist　the　fullest　liberty　of　professing　and　discussing；　as



a　matter　of　ethical　conviction；　any　doctrine；　however　immoral　it　may



be　considered。　It　would；　therefore；　be　irrelevant　and　out　of　place



to　examine　here；　whether　the　doctrine　of　Tyrannicide　deserves　that



title。　I　shall　content　myself　with　saying　that　the　subject　has　been　at



all　times　one　of　the　open　questions　of　morals；　that　the　act　of　a



private　citizen　in　striking　down　a　criminal；　who；　by　raising　himself



above　the　law；　has　placed　himself　beyond　the　reach　of　legal　punishment



or　control；　has　been　accounted　by　whole　nations；　and　by　some　of　the



best　and　wisest　of　men；　not　a　crime；　but　an　act　of　exalted　virtue；　and



that；　right　or　wrong；　it　is　not　of　the　nature　of　assassination；　but　of



civil　war。　As　such；　I　hold　that　the　instigation　to　it；　in　a　specific



case；　may　be　a　proper　subject　of　punishment；　but　only　if　an　overt



act　has　followed；　and　at　least　a　probable　connection　can　be



established　between　the　act　and　the　instigation。　Even　then；　it　is



not　a　foreign　government；　but　the　very　government　assailed；　which



alone；　in　the　exercise　of　self…defence；　can　legitimately　punish



attacks　directed　against　its　own　existence。







　　It　is　necessary　to　consider　separately　these　two　hypotheses；　each　of



which　has　a　distinct　branch　of　the　argument　corresponding　to　it。　We



can　never　be　sure　that　the　opinion　we　are　endeavouring　to　stifle　is



a　false　opinion；　and　if　we　were　sure；　stifling　it　would　be　an　evil



still。







　　First：　the　opinion　which　it　is　attempted　to　suppress　by　authority



may　possibly　be　true。　Those　who　desire　to　suppress　it；　of　course



deny　its　truth；　but　they　are　not　infallible。　They　have　no　authority　to



decide　the　question　for　all　mankind；　and　exclude　every　other　person



from　the　means　of　judging。　To　refuse　a　hearing　to　an　opinion；



because　they　are　sure　that　it　is　false；　is　to　assume　that　their



certainty　is　the　same　thing　as　absolute　certainty。　All　silencing　of



discussion　is　an　assumption　of　infallibility。　Its　condemnation　may



be　allowed　to　rest　on　this　common　argument；　not　the　worse　for　being



common。



　　Unfortunately　for　the　good　sense　of　mankind；　the　fact　of　their



fallibility　is　far　from　carrying　the　weight　in　their　practical



judgment　which　is　always　allowed　to　it　in　theory；　for　while　every



one　well　knows　himself　to　be　fallible；　few　think　it　necessary　to



take　any　precautions　against　their　own　fallibility；　or　admit　the



supposition　that　any　opinion；　of　which　they　feel　very　certain；　may



be　one　of　the　examples　of　the　error　to　which　they　acknowledge



themselves　to　be　liable。　Absolute　princes；　or　others　who　are



accustomed　to　unlimited　deference；　usually　feel　this　complete



confidence　in　their　own　opinions　on　nearly　all　subjects。　People　more



happily　situated；　who　sometimes　hear　their　opinions　disputed；　and



are　not　wholly　unused　to　be　set　right　when　they　are　wrong；　place　the



same　unbounded　reliance　only　on　such　of　their　opinions　as　are　shared



by　all　who　surround　them；　or　to　whom　they　habitually　defer；　for　in



proportion　to　a　man's　want　of　confidence　in　his　own　solitary　judgment；



does　he　usually　repose；　with　implicit　trust；　on　the　infallibility　of



〃the　world〃　in　general。　And　the　world；　to　each　individual；　means　the



part　of　it　with　which　he　comes　in　contact；　his　party；　his　sect；　his



church；　his　class　of　society；　the　man　may　be　called；　by　comparison；



almost　liberal　and　large…minded　to　whom　it　means　anything　so



comprehensive　as　his　own　country　or　his　own　age。　Nor　is　his　faith　in



this　collective　authority　at　all　shaken　by　his　being　aware　that



other　ages；　countries；　sects；　churches；　classes；　and　parties　have



thought；　and　even　now　think；　the　exact　reverse。　He　devolves　upon　his



own　world　the　responsibility　of　being　in　the　right　against　the



dissentient　worlds　of　other　people；　and　it　never　troubles　him　that



mere　accident　has　decided　which　of　these　numerous　worlds　is　the　object



of　his　reliance；　and　that　the　same　causes　which　make　him　a　Churchman



in　London；　would　have　made　him　a　Buddhist　or　a　Confucian　in　Pekin。　Yet



it　is　as　evident　in　itself；　as　any　amount　of　argument　can　make　it；



that　ages　are　no　more　infallible　than　individuals；　every　age　having



held　many　opinions　which　subsequent　ages　have　deemed　not　only　false



but　absurd；　and　it　is　as　certain　that　many　opinions　now　general　will



be　rejected　by　future　ages；　as　it　is　that　many；　once　general；　are



rejected　by　the　present。



　　The　objection　likely　to　be　made　to　this　argument　would　probably　take



some　such　form　as　the　following。　There　is　no　greater　assumption　of



infallibility　in　forbidding　the　propagation　of　error；　than　in　any



other　thing　which　is　done　by　public　authority　on　its　own　judgment



and　responsibility。　Judgment　is　given　to　men　that　they　may　use　it。



Because　it　may　be　used　erroneously；　are　men　to　be　told　that　they　ought



not　to　use　it　at　all？　To　prohibit　what　they　think　pernicious；　is　not



claiming　exemption　from　error；　but　fulfilling　the　duty　incumbent　on



them；　although　fallible；　of　acting　on　their　conscientious



conviction。　If　we　were　never　to　act　on　our　opinions；　because　those



opinions　may　be　wrong；　we　should　leave　all　our　interests　uncared



for；　and　all　our　duties　unperformed。　An　objection　which　applies　to　all



conduct　can　be　no　valid　objection　to　any　conduct　in　particular。　It



is　the　duty　of　governments；　and　of　individuals；　to　form　the　truest



opinions　they　can；　to　form　them　carefully；　and　never　impose　them



upon　others　unless　they　are　quite　sure　of　being　right。　But　when　they



are　sure　（such　reasoners　may　say）；　it　is　not　conscientiousness　but



cowardice　to　shrink　from　acting　on　their　opinions；　and　allow　doctrines



which　they　honestly　think　dangerous　to　the　welfare　of　mankind；



either　in　this　life　or　in　another；　to　be　scattered　abroad　without



restraint；　because　other　people；　in　less　enlightened　times；　have



persecuted　opinions　now　believed　to　be　true。　Let　us　take　care；　it



may　be　said；　not　to　make　the　same　mistake：　but　governments　and　nations



have　made　mistakes　in　other　things；　which　are　not　denied　to　be　fit



subjects　for　the　exercise　of　authority：　they　have　laid　on　bad　taxes；



made　unjust　wars。　Ought　we　therefore　to　lay　on　no　taxes；　and；　under



whatever　provocation；　make　no　wars？　Men；　and　governments；　must　act



to　the　best　of　their　ability。　There　is　no　such　thing　as　absolute



certainty；　but　there　is　assurance　sufficient　for　the　purposes　of　human



life。　We　may；　and　must；　assume　our　opinion　to　be　true　for　the　guidance



of　our　own　conduct：　and　it　is　assuming　no　more　when　we　forbid　bad



men　to　pervert　society　by　the　propagation　of　opinions　which　we



regard　as　false　and　pernicious。



　　I　answer；　that　it　is　assuming　very　much　more。　There　is　the



greatest　difference　between　presuming　an　opinion　to　be　true；



because；　with　every　opportunity　for　contesting　it；　it　has　not　been



refuted；　and　assuming　its　truth　for　the　purpose　of　not　permitting



its　refutation。　Complete　liberty　of　contradicting　and　disproving　our



opinion　is　the　very　condition　which　justifies　us　in　assuming　its　truth



for　purposes　of　action；　and　on　no　other　terms　can　a　being　with　human



faculties　have　any　rational　assurance　of　being　right。



　　When　we　consider　either　the　history　of　opinion；　or　the　ordinary



conduct　of　human　life；　to　what　is　it　to　be　ascribed　that　the　one　and



the　other　are　no　worse　than　they　are？　Not　certainly　to　the　inherent



force　of　the　human　unde