on liberty-第4章

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visiting　him　with　any　evil　in　case　he　do　otherwise。　To　justify　that；



the　conduct　from　which　it　is　desired　to　deter　him　must　be　calculated



to　produce　evil　to　some　one　else。　The　only　part　of　the　conduct　of



any　one；　for　which　he　is　amenable　to　society；　is　that　which　concerns



others。　In　the　part　which　merely　concerns　himself；　his　independence



is；　of　right；　absolute。　Over　himself；　over　his　own　body　and　mind；



the　individual　is　sovereign。



　　It　is；　perhaps；　hardly　necessary　to　say　that　this　doctrine　is



meant　to　apply　only　to　human　beings　in　the　maturity　of　their



faculties。　We　are　not　speaking　of　children；　or　of　young　persons



below　the　age　which　the　law　may　fix　as　that　of　manhood　or　womanhood。



Those　who　are　still　in　a　state　to　require　being　taken　care　of　by



others；　must　be　protected　against　their　own　actions　as　well　as　against



external　injury。　For　the　same　reason；　we　may　leave　out　of



consideration　those　backward　states　of　society　in　which　the　race



itself　may　be　considered　as　in　its　nonage。　The　early　difficulties　in



the　way　of　spontaneous　progress　are　so　great；　that　there　is　seldom　any



choice　of　means　for　overcoming　them；　and　a　ruler　full　of　the　spirit　of



improvement　is　warranted　in　the　use　of　any　expedients　that　will　attain



an　end；　perhaps　otherwise　unattainable。　Despotism　is　a　legitimate　mode



of　government　in　dealing　with　barbarians；　provided　the　end　be　their



improvement；　and　the　means　justified　by　actually　effecting　that　end。



Liberty；　as　a　principle；　has　no　application　to　any　state　of　things



anterior　to　the　time　when　mankind　have　become　capable　of　being



improved　by　free　and　equal　discussion。　Until　then；　there　is　nothing



for　them　but　implicit　obedience　to　an　Akbar　or　a　Charlemagne；　if



they　are　so　fortunate　as　to　find　one。　But　as　soon　as　mankind　have



attained　the　capacity　of　being　guided　to　their　own　improvement　by



conviction　or　persuasion　（a　period　long　since　reached　in　all　nations



with　whom　we　need　here　concern　ourselves）；　compulsion；　either　in　the



direct　form　or　in　that　of　pains　and　penalties　for　non…compliance；　is



no　longer　admissible　as　a　means　to　their　own　good；　and　justifiable



only　for　the　security　of　others。



　　It　is　proper　to　state　that　I　forego　any　advantage　which　could　be



derived　to　my　argument　from　the　idea　of　abstract　right；　as　a　thing



independent　of　utility。　I　regard　utility　as　the　ultimate　appeal　on　all



ethical　questions；　but　it　must　be　utility　in　the　largest　sense；



grounded　on　the　permanent　interests　of　a　man　as　a　progressive　being。



Those　interests；　I　contend；　authorise　the　subjection　of　individual



spontaneity　to　external　control；　only　in　respect　to　those　actions　of



each；　which　concern　the　interest　of　other　people。　If　any　one　does　an



act　hurtful　to　others；　there　is　a　prima　facie　case　for　punishing



him；　by　law；　or；　where　legal　penalties　are　not　safely　applicable；　by



general　disapprobation。　There　are　also　many　positive　acts　for　the



benefit　of　others；　which　he　may　rightfully　be　compelled　to　perform；



such　as　to　give　evidence　in　a　court　of　justice；　to　bear　his　fair　share



in　the　common　defence；　or　in　any　other　joint　work　necessary　to　the



interest　of　the　society　of　which　he　enjoys　the　protection；　and　to



perform　certain　acts　of　individual　beneficence；　such　as　saving　a



fellow　creature's　life；　or　interposing　to　protect　the　defenceless



against　ill…usage；　things　which　whenever　it　is　obviously　a　man's



duty　to　do；　he　may　rightfully　be　made　responsible　to　society　for　not



doing。　A　person　may　cause　evil　to　others　not　only　by　his　actions　but



by　his　inaction；　and　in　either　case　he　is　justly　accountable　to　them



for　the　injury。　The　latter　case；　it　is　true；　requires　a　much　more



cautious　exercise　of　compulsion　than　the　former。　To　make　any　one



answerable　for　doing　evil　to　others　is　the　rule；　to　make　him



answerable　for　not　preventing　evil　is；　comparatively　speaking；　the



exception。　Yet　there　are　many　cases　clear　enough　and　grave　enough　to



justify　that　exception。　In　all　things　which　regard　the　external



relations　of　the　individual；　he　is　de　jure　amenable　to　those　whose



interests　are　concerned；　and；　if　need　be；　to　society　as　their



protector。　There　are　often　good　reasons　for　not　holding　him　to　the



responsibility；　but　these　reasons　must　arise　from　the　special



expediencies　of　the　case：　either　because　it　is　a　kind　of　case　in　which



he　is　on　the　whole　likely　to　act　better；　when　left　to　his　own



discretion；　than　when　controlled　in　any　way　in　which　society　have　it



in　their　power　to　control　him；　or　because　the　attempt　to　exercise



control　would　produce　other　evils；　greater　than　those　which　it　would



prevent。　When　such　reasons　as　these　preclude　the　enforcement　of



responsibility；　the　conscience　of　the　agent　himself　should　step　into



the　vacant　judgment　seat；　and　protect　those　interests　of　others



which　have　no　external　protection；　judging　himself　all　the　more



rigidly；　because　the　case　does　not　admit　of　his　being　made　accountable



to　the　judgment　of　his　fellow　creatures。



　　But　there　is　a　sphere　of　action　in　which　society；　as　distinguished



from　the　individual；　has；　if　any；　only　an　indirect　interest；



comprehending　all　that　portion　of　a　person's　life　and　conduct　which



affects　only　himself；　or　if　it　also　affects　others；　only　with　their



free；　voluntary；　and　undeceived　consent　and　participation。　When　I



say　only　himself；　I　mean　directly；　and　in　the　first　instance；　for



whatever　affects　himself；　may　affect　others　through　himself；　and　the



objection　which　may　be　grounded　on　this　contingency；　will　receive



consideration　in　the　sequel。　This；　then；　is　the　appropriate　region



of　human　liberty。　It　comprises；　first；　the　inward　domain　of



consciousness；　demanding　liberty　of　conscience　in　the　most



comprehensive　sense；　liberty　of　thought　and　feeling；　absolute



freedom　of　opinion　and　sentiment　on　all　subjects；　practical　or



speculative；　scientific；　moral；　or　theological。　The　liberty　of



expressing　and　publishing　opinions　may　seem　to　fall　under　a



different　principle；　since　it　belongs　to　that　part　of　the　conduct　of



an　individual　which　concerns　other　people；　but；　being　almost　of　as



much　importance　as　the　liberty　of　thought　itself；　and　resting　in　great



part　on　the　same　reasons；　is　practically　inseparable　from　it。



Secondly；　the　principle　requires　liberty　of　tastes　and　pursuits；　of



framing　the　plan　of　our　life　to　suit　our　own　character；　of　doing　as　we



like；　subject　to　such　consequences　as　may　follow：　without　impediment



from　our　fellow　creatures；　so　long　as　what　we　do　does　not　harm　them；



even　though　they　should　think　our　conduct　foolish；　perverse；　or　wrong。



Thirdly；　from　this　liberty　of　each　individual；　follows　the　liberty；



within　the　same　limits；　of　combination　among　individuals；　freedom　to



unite；　for　any　purpose　not　involving　harm　to　others：　the　persons



combining　being　supposed　to　be　of　full　age；　and　not　forced　or



deceived。



　　No　society　in　which　these　liberties　are　not；　on　the　whole；



respected；　is　free；　whatever　may　be　its　form　of　government；　and　none



is　completely　free　in　which　they　do　not　exist　absolute　and



unqualified。　The　only　freedom　which　deserves　the　name；　is　that　of



pursuing　our　own　good　in　our　own　way；　so　long　as　we　do　not　attempt



to　deprive　others　of　theirs；　or　impede　their　efforts　to　obtain　it。



Each　is　the　proper　guardian　of　his　own　health；　whether　bodily；　or



mental　and　spiritual。　Mankind　are　greater　gainers　by　suffering　each



other　to　live　as　seems　good　to　themselves；　than　by　compelling　each



to　live　as　seems　good　to　the　rest。



　　Though　this　doctrine　is　anything　but　new；　and；　to　some　persons；



may　have　the　air　of　a　truism；　there　is　no　doctrine　which　stands　more



directly　opposed　to　the　general　tendency　of　existing　opinion　and



practice。　Society　has　expended　fully　as　much　effort　in　the　attempt



（according　to　its　lights）