on liberty-第37章

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least　the　rank　of　non　commissioned　officers；　there　are　in　every



popular　insurrection　several　persons　competent　to　take　the　lead；　and



improvise　some　tolerable　plan　of　action。　What　the　French　are　in



military　affairs；　the　Americans　are　in　every　kind　of　civil　business；



let　them　be　left　without　a　government；　every　body　of　Americans　is　able



to　improvise　one；　and　to　carry　on　that　or　any　other　public　business



with　a　sufficient　amount　of　intelligence；　order；　and　decision。　This　is



what　every　free　people　ought　to　be：　and　a　people　capable　of　this　is



certain　to　be　free；　it　will　never　let　itself　be　enslaved　by　any　man　or



body　of　men　because　these　are　able　to　seize　and　pull　the　reins　of



the　central　administration。　No　bureaucracy　can　hope　to　make　such　a



people　as　this　do　or　undergo　anything　that　they　do　not　like。　But　where



everything　is　done　through　the　bureaucracy；　nothing　to　which　the



bureaucracy　is　really　adverse　can　be　done　at　all。　The　constitution



of　such　countries　is　an　organisation　of　the　experience　and　practical



ability　of　the　nation　into　a　disciplined　body　for　the　purpose　of



governing　the　rest；　and　the　more　perfect　that　organisation　is　in



itself；　the　more　successful　in　drawing　to　itself　and　educating　for



itself　the　persons　of　greatest　capacity　from　all　ranks　of　the



community；　the　more　complete　is　the　bondage　of　all；　the　members　of　the



bureaucracy　included。　For　the　governors　are　as　much　the　slaves　of



their　organisation　and　discipline　as　the　governed　are　of　the



governors。　A　Chinese　mandarin　is　as　much　the　tool　and　creature　of　a



despotism　as　the　humblest　cultivator。　An　individual　Jesuit　is　to　the



utmost　degree　of　abasement　the　slave　of　his　order；　though　the　order



itself　exists　for　the　collective　power　and　importance　of　its　members。



　　It　is　not；　also；　to　be　forgotten；　that　the　absorption　of　all　the



principal　ability　of　the　country　into　the　governing　body　is　fatal；



sooner　or　later；　to　the　mental　activity　and　progressiveness　of　the



body　itself。　Banded　together　as　they　are…　working　a　system　which；



like　all　systems；　necessarily　proceeds　in　a　great　measure　by　fixed



rules…　the　official　body　are　under　the　constant　temptation　of　sinking



into　indolent　routine；　or；　if　they　now　and　then　desert　that　mill…horse



round；　of　rushing　into　some　half…examined　crudity　which　has　struck　the



fancy　of　some　leading　member　of　the　corps；　and　the　sole　check　to　these



closely　allied；　though　seemingly　opposite；　tendencies；　the　only



stimulus　which　can　keep　the　ability　of　the　body　itself　up　to　a　high



standard；　is　liability　to　the　watchful　criticism　of　equal　ability



outside　the　body。　It　is　indispensable；　therefore；　that　the　means



should　exist；　independently　of　the　government；　of　forming　such



ability；　and　furnishing　it　with　the　opportunities　and　experience



necessary　for　a　correct　judgment　of　great　practical　affairs。　If　we



would　possess　permanently　a　skilful　and　efficient　body　of



functionaries…　above　all；　a　body　able　to　originate　and　willing　to



adopt　improvements；　if　we　would　not　have　our　bureaucracy　degenerate



into　a　pedantocracy；　this　body　must　not　engross　all　the　occupations



which　form　and　cultivate　the　faculties　required　for　the　government



of　mankind。



　　To　determine　the　point　at　which　evils；　so　formidable　to　human



freedom　and　advancement；　begin；　or　rather　at　which　they　begin　to



predominate　over　the　benefits　attending　the　collective　application



of　the　force　of　society；　under　its　recognised　chiefs；　for　the



removal　of　the　obstacles　which　stand　in　the　way　of　its　well…being；



to　secure　as　much　of　the　advantages　of　centralised　power　and



intelligence　as　can　be　had　without　turning　into　governmental



channels　too　great　a　proportion　of　the　general　activity…　is　one　of



the　most　difficult　and　complicated　questions　in　the　art　of　government。



It　is；　in　a　great　measure；　a　question　of　detail；　in　which　many　and



various　considerations　must　be　kept　in　view；　and　no　absolute　rule



can　be　laid　down。　But　I　believe　that　the　practical　principle　in



which　safety　resides；　the　ideal　to　be　kept　in　view；　the　standard　by



which　to　test　all　arrangements　intended　for　overcoming　the　difficulty；



may　be　conveyed　in　these　words：　the　greatest　dissemination　of　power



consistent　with　efficiency；　but　the　greatest　possible　centralisation



of　information；　and　diffusion　of　it　from　the　centre。　Thus；　in



municipal　administration；　there　would　be；　as　in　the　New　England



States；　a　very　minute　division　among　separate　officers；　chosen　by



the　localities；　of　all　business　which　is　not　better　left　to　the



persons　directly　interested；　but　besides　this；　there　would　be；　in　each



department　of　local　affairs；　a　central　superintendence；　forming　a



branch　of　the　general　government。　The　organ　of　this　superintendence



would　concentrate；　as　in　a　focus；　the　variety　of　information　and



experience　derived　from　the　conduct　of　that　branch　of　public



business　in　all　the　localities；　from　everything　analogous　which　is



done　in　foreign　countries；　and　from　the　general　principles　of



political　science。　This　central　organ　should　have　a　right　to　know



all　that　is　done；　and　its　special　duty　should　be　that　of　making　the



knowledge　acquired　in　one　place　available　for　others。　Emancipated　from



the　petty　prejudices　and　narrow　views　of　a　locality　by　its　elevated



position　and　comprehensive　sphere　of　observation；　its　advice　would



naturally　carry　much　authority；　but　its　actual　power；　as　a　permanent



institution；　should；　I　conceive；　be　limited　to　compelling　the　local



officers　to　obey　the　laws　laid　down　for　their　guidance。　In　all



things　not　provided　for　by　general　rules；　those　officers　should　be



left　to　their　own　judgment；　under　responsibility　to　their



constituents。　For　the　violation　of　rules；　they　should　be　responsible



to　law；　and　the　rules　themselves　should　be　laid　down　by　the



legislature；　the　central　administrative　authority　only　watching　over



their　execution；　and　if　they　were　not　properly　carried　into　effect；



appealing；　according　to　the　nature　of　the　case；　to　the　tribunals　to



enforce　the　law；　or　to　the　constituencies　to　dismiss　the　functionaries



who　had　not　executed　it　according　to　its　spirit。



　　Such；　in　its　general　conception；　is　the　central　superintendence



which　the　Poor　Law　Board　is　intended　to　exercise　over　the



administrators　of　the　Poor　Rate　throughout　the　country。　Whatever



powers　the　Board　exercises　beyond　this　limit　were　right　and



necessary　in　that　peculiar　case；　for　the　cure　of　rooted　habits　of



maladministration　in　matters　deeply　affecting　not　the　localities



merely；　but　the　whole　community；　since　no　locality　has　a　moral　right



to　make　itself　by　mismanagement　a　nest　of　pauperism；　necessarily



overflowing　into　other　localities；　and　impairing　the　moral　and



physical　condition　of　the　whole　labouring　community。　The　powers　of



administrative　coercion　and　subordinate　legislation　possessed　by　the



Poor　Law　Board　（but　which；　owing　to　the　state　of　opinion　on　the



subject；　are　very　scantily　exercised　by　them）；　though　perfectly



justifiable　in　a　case　of　first…rate　national　interest；　would　be　wholly



out　of　place　in　the　superintendence　of　interests　purely　local。　But　a



central　organ　of　information　and　instruction　for　all　the　localities



would　be　equally　valuable　in　all　departments　of　administration。　A



government　cannot　have　too　much　of　the　kind　of　activity　which　does　not



impede；　but　aids　and　stimulates；　individual　exertion　and



development。　The　mischief　begins　when；　instead　of　calling　forth　the



activity　and　powers　of　individuals　and　bodies；　it　substitutes　its



own　activity　for　theirs；　when；　instead　of　informing；　advising；　and；



upon　occasion；　denouncing；　it　makes　them　work　in　fetters；　or　bids　them



stand　aside　and　does　their　work　instead　of　them。　The　worth　of　a　State；



in　the　long　run；　is　the　worth　of　the　individuals　composing　it；