on liberty-第33章

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interest；　however；　of　these　dealers　in　promoting　intemperance　is　a



real　evil；　and　justifies　the　State　in　imposing　restrictions　and



requiring　guarantees　which；　but　for　that　justification；　would　be



infringements　of　legitimate　liberty。



　　A　further　question　is；　whether　the　State；　while　it　permits；　should



nevertheless　indirectly　discourage　conduct　which　it　deems　contrary



to　the　best　interests　of　the　agent；　whether；　for　example；　it　should



take　measures　to　render　the　means　of　drunkenness　more　costly；　or　add



to　the　difficulty　of　procuring　them　by　limiting　the　number　of　the



places　of　sale。　On　this　as　on　most　other　practical　questions；　many



distinctions　require　to　be　made。　To　tax　stimulants　for　the　sole



purpose　of　making　them　more　difficult　to　be　obtained；　is　a　measure



differing　only　in　degree　from　their　entire　prohibition；　and　would　be



justifiable　only　if　that　were　justifiable。　Every　increase　of　cost　is　a



prohibition；　to　those　whose　means　do　not　come　up　to　the　augmented



price；　and　to　those　who　do；　it　is　a　penalty　laid　on　them　for



gratifying　a　particular　taste。　Their　choice　of　pleasures；　and　their



mode　of　expending　their　income；　after　satisfying　their　legal　and　moral



obligations　to　the　State　and　to　individuals；　are　their　own　concern；



and　must　rest　with　their　own　judgment。　These　considerations　may　seem



at　first　sight　to　condemn　the　selection　of　stimulants　as　special



subjects　of　taxation　for　purposes　of　revenue。　But　it　must　be



remembered　that　taxation　for　fiscal　purposes　is　absolutely　inevitable；



that　in　most　countries　it　is　necessary　that　a　considerable　part　of



that　taxation　should　be　indirect；　that　the　State；　therefore；　cannot



help　imposing　penalties；　which　to　some　persons　may　be　prohibitory；



on　the　use　of　some　articles　of　consumption。　It　is　hence　the　duty　of



the　State　to　consider；　in　the　imposition　of　taxes；　what　commodities



the　consumers　can　best　spare；　and　a　fortiori；　to　select　in



preference　those　of　which　it　deems　the　use；　beyond　a　very　moderate



quantity；　to　be　positively　injurious。　Taxation；　therefore；　of



stimulants；　up　to　the　point　which　produces　the　largest　amount　of



revenue　（supposing　that　the　State　needs　all　the　revenue　which　it



yields）　is　not　only　admissible；　but　to　be　approved　of。



　　The　question　of　making　the　sale　of　these　commodities　a　more　or



less　exclusive　privilege；　must　be　answered　differently；　according　to



the　purposes　to　which　the　restriction　is　intended　to　be　subservient。



All　places　of　public　resort　require　the　restraint　of　a　police；　and



places　of　this　kind　peculiarly；　because　offences　against　society　are



especially　apt　to　originate　there。　It　is；　therefore；　fit　to　confine



the　power　of　selling　these　commodities　（at　least　for　consumption　on



the　spot）　to　persons　of　known　or　vouched…for　respectability　of



conduct；　to　make　such　regulations　respecting　hours　of　opening　and



closing　as　may　be　requisite　for　public　surveillance；　and　to　withdraw



the　licence　if　breaches　of　the　peace　repeatedly　take　place　through　the



connivance　or　incapacity　of　the　keeper　of　the　house；　or　if　it



becomes　a　rendezvous　for　concocting　and　preparing　offences　against　the



law。　Any　further　restriction　I　do　not　conceive　to　be；　in　principle；



justifiable。　The　limitation　in　number；　for　instance；　of　beer　and



spirit　houses；　for　the　express　purpose　of　rendering　them　more



difficult　of　access；　and　diminishing　the　occasions　of　temptation；



not　only　exposes　all　to　an　inconvenience　because　there　are　some　by



whom　the　facility　would　be　abused；　but　is　suited　only　to　a　state　of



society　in　which　the　labouring　classes　are　avowedly　treated　as



children　or　savages；　and　placed　under　an　education　of　restraint；　to



fit　them　for　future　admission　to　the　privileges　of　freedom。　This　is



not　the　principle　on　which　the　labouring　classes　are　professedly



governed　in　any　free　country；　and　no　person　who　sets　due　value　on



freedom　will　give　his　adhesion　to　their　being　so　governed；　unless



after　all　efforts　have　been　exhausted　to　educate　them　for　freedom



and　govern　them　as　freemen；　and　it　has　been　definitively　proved　that



they　can　only　be　governed　as　children。　The　bare　statement　of　the



alternative　shows　the　absurdity　of　supposing　that　such　efforts　have



been　made　in　any　case　which　needs　be　considered　here。　It　is　only



because　the　institutions　of　this　country　are　a　mass　of



inconsistencies；　that　things　find　admittance　into　our　practice　which



belong　to　the　system　of　despotic；　or　what　is　called　paternal；



government；　while　the　general　freedom　of　our　institutions　precludes



the　exercise　of　the　amount　of　control　necessary　to　render　the



restraint　of　any　real　efficacy　as　a　moral　education。



　　It　was　pointed　out　in　an　early　part　of　this　Essay；　that　the



liberty　of　the　individual；　in　things　wherein　the　individual　is　alone



concerned；　implies　a　corresponding　liberty　in　any　number　of



individuals　to　regulate　by　mutual　agreement　such　things　as　regard　them



jointly；　and　regard　no　persons　but　themselves。　This　question



presents　no　difficulty；　so　long　as　the　will　of　all　the　persons



implicated　remains　unaltered；　but　since　that　will　may　change；　it　is



often　necessary；　even　in　things　in　which　they　alone　are　concerned；



that　they　should　enter　into　engagements　with　one　another；　and　when



they　do；　it　is　fit；　as　a　general　rule；　that　those　engagements　should



be　kept。　Yet；　in　the　laws；　probably；　of　every　country；　this　general



rule　has　some　exceptions。　Not　only　persons　are　not　held　to　engagements



which　violate　the　rights　of　third　parties；　but　it　is　sometimes



considered　a　sufficient　reason　for　releasing　them　from　an



engagement；　that　it　is　injurious　to　themselves。　In　this　and　most　other



civilised　countries；　for　example；　an　engagement　by　which　a　person



should　sell　himself；　or　allow　himself　to　be　sold；　as　a　slave；　would　be



null　and　void；　neither　enforced　by　law　nor　by　opinion。　The　ground



for　thus　limiting　his　power　of　voluntarily　disposing　of　his　own　lot　in



life；　is　apparent；　and　is　very　clearly　seen　in　this　extreme　case。



The　reason　for　not　interfering；　unless　for　the　sake　of　others；　with



a　person's　voluntary　acts；　is　consideration　for　his　liberty。　His



voluntary　choice　is　evidence　that　what　he　so　chooses　is　desirable；



or　at　least　endurable；　to　him；　and　his　good　is　on　the　whole　best



provided　for　by　allowing　him　to　take　his　own　means　of　pursuing　it。　But



by　selling　himself　for　a　slave；　be　abdicates　his　liberty；　he



foregoes　any　future　use　of　it　beyond　that　single　act。　He　therefore



defeats；　in　his　own　case；　the　very　purpose　which　is　the



justification　of　allowing　him　to　dispose　of　himself。　He　is　no　longer



free；　but　is　thenceforth　in　a　position　which　has　no　longer　the



presumption　in　its　favour；　that　would　be　afforded　by　his　voluntarily



remaining　in　it。　The　principle　of　freedom　cannot　require　that　he



should　be　free　not　to　be　free。　It　is　not　freedom　to　be　allowed　to



alienate　his　freedom。　These　reasons；　the　force　of　which　is　so



conspicuous　in　this　peculiar　case；　are　evidently　of　far　wider



application；　yet　a　limit　is　everywhere　set　to　them　by　the



necessities　of　life；　which　continually　require；　not　indeed　that　we



should　resign　our　freedom；　but　that　we　should　consent　to　this　and



the　other　limitation　of　it。　The　principle；　however；　which　demands



uncontrolled　freedom　of　action　in　all　that　concerns　only　the　agents



themselves；　requires　that　those　who　have　become　bound　to　one



another；　in　things　which　concern　no　third　party；　should　be　able　to



release　one　another　from　the　engagement：　and　even　without　such



voluntary　release　there　are　perhaps　no　contracts　or　engagements；



except　those　that　relate　to　money　or　money's　worth；　of　which　one　can



venture　to　say　that　there　ought　to　be　no　liberty　whatever　of



retractation。



　　Baron　Wilhelm　von　Humboldt；　in　the　excellent　essay　from　which　I　have



already