on liberty-第3章

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of　an　impatient　dislike　of　superiority。　Another　grand　determining



principle　of　the　rules　of　conduct；　both　in　act　and　forbearance；



which　have　been　enforced　by　law　or　opinion；　has　been　the　servility



of　mankind　towards　the　supposed　preferences　or　aversions　of　their



temporal　masters　or　of　their　gods。　This　servility；　though



essentially　selfish；　is　not　hypocrisy；　it　gives　rise　to　perfectly



genuine　sentiments　of　abhorrence；　it　made　men　burn　magicians　and



heretics。　Among　so　many　baser　influences；　the　general　and　obvious



interests　of　society　have　of　course　had　a　share；　and　a　large　one；　in



the　direction　of　the　moral　sentiments：　less；　however；　as　a　matter　of



reason；　and　on　their　own　account；　than　as　a　consequence　of　the



sympathies　and　antipathies　which　grew　out　of　them：　and　sympathies



and　antipathies　which　had　little　or　nothing　to　do　with　the　interests



of　society；　have　made　themselves　felt　in　the　establishment　of



moralities　with　quite　as　great　force。



　　The　likings　and　dislikings　of　society；　or　of　some　powerful　portion



of　it；　are　thus　the　main　thing　which　has　practically　determined　the



rules　laid　down　for　general　observance；　under　the　penalties　of　law



or　opinion。　And　in　general；　those　who　have　been　in　advance　of



society　in　thought　and　feeling；　have　left　this　condition　of　things



unassailed　in　principle；　however　they　may　have　come　into　conflict　with



it　in　some　of　its　details。　They　have　occupied　themselves　rather　in



inquiring　what　things　society　ought　to　like　or　dislike；　than　in



questioning　whether　its　likings　or　dislikings　should　be　a　law　to



individuals。　They　preferred　endeavouring　to　alter　the　feelings　of



mankind　on　the　particular　points　on　which　they　were　themselves



heretical；　rather　than　make　common　cause　in　defence　of　freedom；　with



heretics　generally。　The　only　case　in　which　the　higher　ground　has



been　taken　on　principle　and　maintained　with　consistency；　by　any　but　an



individual　here　and　there；　is　that　of　religious　belief：　a　case



instructive　in　many　ways；　and　not　least　so　as　forming　a　most



striking　instance　of　the　fallibility　of　what　is　called　the　moral



sense：　for　the　odium　theologicum；　in　a　sincere　bigot；　is　one　of　the



most　unequivocal　cases　of　moral　feeling。　Those　who　first　broke　the



yoke　of　what　called　itself　the　Universal　Church；　were　in　general　as



little　willing　to　permit　difference　of　religious　opinion　as　that



church　itself。　But　when　the　heat　of　the　conflict　was　over；　without



giving　a　complete　victory　to　any　party；　and　each　church　or　sect　was



reduced　to　limit　its　hopes　to　retaining　possession　of　the　ground　it



already　occupied；　minorities；　seeing　that　they　had　no　chance　of



becoming　majorities；　were　under　the　necessity　of　pleading　to　those



whom　they　could　not　convert；　for　permission　to　differ。　It　is



accordingly　on　this　battle　field；　almost　solely；　that　the　rights　of



the　individual　against　society　have　been　asserted　on　broad　grounds



of　principle；　and　the　claim　of　society　to　exercise　authority　over



dissentients　openly　controverted。　The　great　writers　to　whom　the



world　owes　what　religious　liberty　it　possesses；　have　mostly　asserted



freedom　of　conscience　as　an　indefeasible　right；　and　denied



absolutely　that　a　human　being　is　accountable　to　others　for　his



religious　belief。　Yet　so　natural　to　mankind　is　intolerance　in　whatever



they　really　care　about；　that　religious　freedom　has　hardly　anywhere



been　practically　realised；　except　where　religious　indifference；



which　dislikes　to　have　its　peace　disturbed　by　theological　quarrels；



has　added　its　weight　to　the　scale。　In　the　minds　of　almost　all



religious　persons；　even　in　the　most　tolerant　countries；　the　duty　of



toleration　is　admitted　with　tacit　reserves。　One　person　will　bear



with　dissent　in　matters　of　church　government；　but　not　of　dogma；



another　can　tolerate　everybody；　short　of　a　Papist　or　a　Unitarian；



another　every　one　who　believes　in　revealed　religion；　a　few　extend



their　charity　a　little　further；　but　stop　at　the　belief　in　a　God　and　in



a　future　state。　Wherever　the　sentiment　of　the　majority　is　still



genuine　and　intense；　it　is　found　to　have　abated　little　of　its　claim　to



be　obeyed。



　　In　England；　from　the　peculiar　circumstances　of　our　political



history；　though　the　yoke　of　opinion　is　perhaps　heavier；　that　of　law　is



lighter；　than　in　most　other　countries　of　Europe；　and　there　is



considerable　jealousy　of　direct　interference；　by　the　legislative　or



the　executive　power；　with　private　conduct；　not　so　much　from　any　just



regard　for　the　independence　of　the　individual；　as　from　the　still



subsisting　habit　of　looking　on　the　government　as　representing　an



opposite　interest　to　the　public。　The　majority　have　not　yet　learnt　to



feel　the　power　of　the　government　their　power；　or　its　opinions　their



opinions。　When　they　do　so；　individual　liberty　will　probably　be　as　much



exposed　to　invasion　from　the　government；　as　it　already　is　from



public　opinion。　But；　as　yet；　there　is　a　considerable　amount　of　feeling



ready　to　be　called　forth　against　any　attempt　of　the　law　to　control



individuals　in　things　in　which　they　have　not　hitherto　been



accustomed　to　be　controlled　by　it；　and　this　with　very　little



discrimination　as　to　whether　the　matter　is；　or　is　not；　within　the



legitimate　sphere　of　legal　control；　insomuch　that　the　feeling；



highly　salutary　on　the　whole；　is　perhaps　quite　as　often　misplaced　as



well　grounded　in　the　particular　instances　of　its　application。　There



is；　in　fact；　no　recognised　principle　by　which　the　propriety　or



impropriety　of　government　interference　is　customarily　tested。　People



decide　according　to　their　personal　preferences。　Some；　whenever　they



see　any　good　to　be　done；　or　evil　to　be　remedied；　would　willingly



instigate　the　government　to　undertake　the　business；　while　others



prefer　to　bear　almost　any　amount　of　social　evil；　rather　than　add　one



to　the　departments　of　human　interests　amenable　to　governmental



control。　And　men　range　themselves　on　one　or　the　other　side　in　any



particular　case；　according　to　this　general　direction　of　their



sentiments；　or　according　to　the　degree　of　interest　which　they　feel



in　the　particular　thing　which　it　is　proposed　that　the　government



should　do；　or　according　to　the　belief　they　entertain　that　the



government　would；　or　would　not；　do　it　in　the　manner　they　prefer；　but



very　rarely　on　account　of　any　opinion　to　which　they　consistently



adhere；　as　to　what　things　are　fit　to　be　done　by　a　government。　And　it



seems　to　me　that　in　consequence　of　this　absence　of　rule　or



principle；　one　side　is　at　present　as　of　wrong　as　the　other；　the



interference　of　government　is；　with　about　equal　frequency；



improperly　invoked　and　improperly　condemned。



　　The　object　of　this　Essay　is　to　assert　one　very　simple　principle；



as　entitled　to　govern　absolutely　the　dealings　of　society　with　the



individual　in　the　way　of　compulsion　and　control；　whether　the　means



used　be　physical　force　in　the　form　of　legal　penalties；　or　the　moral



coercion　of　public　opinion。　That　principle　is；　that　the　sole　end　for



which　mankind　are　warranted；　individually　or　collectively；　in



interfering　with　the　liberty　of　action　of　any　of　their　number；　is



self…protection。　That　the　only　purpose　for　which　power　can　be



rightfully　exercised　over　any　member　of　a　civilised　community；　against



his　will；　is　to　prevent　harm　to　others。　His　own　good；　either



physical　or　moral；　is　not　a　sufficient　warrant。　He　cannot　rightfully



be　compelled　to　do　or　forbear　because　it　will　be　better　for　him　to



do　so；　because　it　will　make　him　happier；　because；　in　the　opinions　of



others；　to　do　so　would　be　wise；　or　even　right。　These　are　good



reasons　for　remonstrating　with　him；　or　reasoning　with　him；　or



persuading　him；　or　entreating　him；　but　not　for　compelling　him；　or



visiting　him　with　any　evil　in　case　he　do　otherwise。　To　justify　that；



the　conduct　from　which　it　is　d