on liberty-第27章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




　　But　with　regard　to　the　merely　contingent；　or；　as　it　may　be　called；



constructive　injury　which　a　person　causes　to　society；　by　conduct　which



neither　violates　any　specific　duty　to　the　public；　nor　occasions



perceptible　hurt　to　any　assignable　individual　except　himself；　the



inconvenience　is　one　which　society　can　afford　to　bear；　for　the　sake　of



the　greater　good　of　human　freedom。　If　grown　persons　are　to　be　punished



for　not　taking　proper　care　of　themselves；　I　would　rather　it　were　for



their　own　sake；　than　under　pretence　of　preventing　them　from



impairing　their　capacity　or　rendering　to　society　benefits　which



society　does　not　pretend　it　has　a　right　to　exact。　But　I　cannot　consent



to　argue　the　point　as　if　society　had　no　means　of　bringing　its　weaker



members　up　to　its　ordinary　standard　of　rational　conduct；　except



waiting　till　they　do　something　irrational；　and　then　punishing　them；



legally　or　morally；　for　it。　Society　has　had　absolute　power　over　them



during　all　the　early　portion　of　their　existence：　it　has　had　the



whole　period　of　childhood　and　nonage　in　which　to　try　whether　it



could　make　them　capable　of　rational　conduct　in　life。　The　existing



generation　is　master　both　of　the　training　and　the　entire　circumstances



of　the　generation　to　come；　it　cannot　indeed　make　them　perfectly　wise



and　good；　because　it　is　itself　so　lamentably　deficient　in　goodness　and



wisdom；　and　its　best　efforts　are　not　always；　in　individual　cases；



its　most　successful　ones；　but　it　is　perfectly　well　able　to　make　the



rising　generation；　as　a　whole；　as　good　as；　and　a　little　better　than；



itself。　If　society　lets　any　considerable　number　of　its　members　grow　up



mere　children；　incapable　of　being　acted　on　by　rational　consideration



of　distant　motives；　society　has　itself　to　blame　for　the



consequences。　Armed　not　only　with　all　the　powers　of　education；　but



with　the　ascendency　which　the　authority　of　a　received　opinion　always



exercises　over　the　minds　who　are　least　fitted　to　judge　for　themselves；



and　aided　by　the　natural　penalties　which　cannot　be　prevented　from



falling　on　those　who　incur　the　distaste　or　the　contempt　of　those　who



know　them；　let　not　society　pretend　that　it　needs；　besides　all　this；



the　power　to　issue　commands　and　enforce　obedience　in　the　personal



concerns　of　individuals；　in　which；　on　all　principles　of　justice　and



policy；　the　decision　ought　to　rest　with　those　who　are　to　abide　the



consequences。



　　Nor　is　there　anything　which　tends　more　to　discredit　and　frustrate



the　better　means　of　influencing　conduct　than　a　resort　to　the　worse。　If



there　be　among　those　whom　it　is　attempted　to　coerce　into　prudence　or



temperance　any　of　the　material　of　which　vigorous　and　independent



characters　are　made；　they　will　infallibly　rebel　against　the　yoke。　No



such　person　will　ever　feel　that　others　have　a　right　to　control　him



in　his　concerns；　such　as　they　have　to　prevent　him　from　injuring　them



in　theirs；　and　it　easily　comes　to　be　considered　a　mark　of　spirit　and



courage　to　fly　in　the　face　of　such　usurped　authority；　and　do　with



ostentation　the　exact　opposite　of　what　it　enjoins；　as　in　the　fashion



of　grossness　which　succeeded；　in　the　time　of　Charles　II。；　to　the



fanatical　moral　intolerance　of　the　Puritans。　With　respect　to　what　is



said　of　the　necessity　of　protecting　society　from　the　bad　example　set



to　others　by　the　vicious　or　the　self…indulgent；　it　is　true　that　bad



example　may　have　a　pernicious　effect；　especially　the　example　of



doing　wrong　to　others　with　impunity　to　the　wrong…doer。　But　we　are



now　speaking　of　conduct　which；　while　it　does　no　wrong　to　others；　is



supposed　to　do　great　harm　to　the　agent　himself：　and　I　do　not　see　how



those　who　believe　this　can　think　otherwise　than　that　the　example；　on



the　whole；　must　be　more　salutary　than　hurtful；　since；　if　it　displays



the　misconduct；　it　displays　also　the　painful　or　degrading　consequences



which；　if　the　conduct　is　justly　censured；　must　be　supposed　to　be　in



all　or　most　cases　attendant　on　it。



　　But　the　strongest　of　all　the　arguments　against　the　interference　of



the　public　with　purely　personal　conduct　is　that；　when　it　does



interfere；　the　odds　are　that　it　interferes　wrongly；　and　in　the　wrong



place。　On　questions　of　social　morality；　of　duty　to　others；　the　opinion



of　the　public；　that　is；　of　an　overruling　majority；　though　of　wrong；　is



likely　to　be　still　oftener　right；　because　on　such　questions　they　are



only　required　to　judge　of　their　own　interests；　of　the　manner　in



which　some　mode　of　conduct；　if　allowed　to　be　practised；　would　effect



themselves。　But　the　opinion　of　a　similar　majority；　imposed　as　a　law　on



the　minority；　on　questions　of　self…regarding　conduct；　is　quite　as



likely　to　be　wrong　as　right；　for　in　these　cases　public　opinion



means；　at　the　best；　some　people's　opinion　of　what　is　good　or　bad　for



other　people；　while　very　of　it　does　not　even　mean　that；　the　public；



with　the　most　perfect　indifference；　passing　over　the　pleasure　or



convenience　of　those　whose　conduct　they　censure；　and　considering



only　their　own　preference。　There　are　many　who　consider　as　an　injury　to



themselves　any　conduct　which　they　have　a　distaste　for；　and　resent　it



as　an　outrage　to　their　feelings；　as　a　religious　bigot；　when　charged



with　disregarding　the　religious　feelings　of　others；　has　been　known



to　retort　that　they　disregard　his　feelings；　by　persisting　in　their



abominable　worship　or　creed。　But　there　is　no　parity　between　the



feeling　of　a　person　for　his　own　opinion；　and　the　feeling　of　another



who　is　offended　at　his　holding　it；　no　more　than　between　the　desire



of　a　thief　to　take　a　purse；　and　the　desire　of　the　right　owner　to



keep　it。　And　a　person's　taste　is　as　much　his　own　peculiar　concern　as



his　opinion　or　his　purse。　It　is　easy　for　any　one　to　imagine　an　ideal



public　which　leaves　the　freedom　and　choice　of　individuals　in　all



uncertain　matters　undisturbed；　and　only　requires　them　to　abstain



from　modes　of　conduct　which　universal　experience　has　condemned。　But



where　has　there　been　seen　a　public　which　set　any　such　limit　to　its



censorship？　or　when　does　the　public　trouble　itself　about　universal



experience？　In　its　interferences　with　personal　conduct　it　is　seldom



thinking　of　anything　but　the　enormity　of　acting　or　feeling　differently



from　itself；　and　this　standard　of　judgment；　thinly　disguised；　is



held　up　to　mankind　as　the　dictate　of　religion　and　philosophy；　by



nine…tenths　of　all　moralists　and　speculative　writers。　These　teach　that



things　are　right　because　they　are　right；　because　we　feel　them　to　be



so。　They　tell　us　to　search　in　our　own　minds　and　hearts　for　laws　of



conduct　binding　on　ourselves　and　on　all　others。　What　can　the　poor



public　do　but　apply　these　instructions；　and　make　their　own　personal



feelings　of　good　and　evil；　if　they　are　tolerably　unanimous　in　them；



obligatory　on　all　the　world？



　　The　evil　here　pointed　out　is　not　one　which　exists　only　in　theory；



and　it　may　perhaps　be　expected　that　I　should　specify　the　instances



in　which　the　public　of　this　age　and　country　improperly　invests　its　own



preferences　with　the　character　of　moral　laws。　I　am　not　writing　an



essay　on　the　aberrations　of　existing　moral　feeling。　That　is　too



weighty　a　subject　to　be　discussed　parenthetically；　and　by　way　of



illustration。　Yet　examples　are　necessary　to　show　that　the　principle



I　maintain　is　of　serious　and　practical　moment；　and　that　I　am　not



endeavouring　to　erect　a　barrier　against　imaginary　evils。　And　it　is　not



difficult　to　show；　by　abundant　instances；　that　to　extend　the　bounds　of



what　may　be　called　moral　police；　until　it　encroaches　on　the　most



unquestionably　legitimate　liberty　of　the　individual；　is　one　of　the



most　universal　of　all　human　propensities。



　　As　a　first　instance；　consider　the　antipathies　which　men　cherish　on



no　better　grounds　than　that　persons　whose　religious　opinions　are



different　from　theirs　do