on liberty-第2章

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the　French　Revolution；　the　worst　of　which　were　the　work　of　a



usurping　few；　and　which；　in　any　case；　belonged；　not　to　the　permanent



working　of　popular　institutions；　but　to　a　sudden　and　convulsive



outbreak　against　monarchical　and　aristocratic　despotism。　In　time；



however；　a　democratic　republic　came　to　occupy　a　large　portion　of　the



earth's　surface；　and　made　itself　felt　as　one　of　the　most　powerful



members　of　the　community　of　nations；　and　elective　and　responsible



government　became　subject　to　the　observations　and　criticisms　which



wait　upon　a　great　existing　fact。　It　was　now　perceived　that　such



phrases　as　〃self…government；〃　and　〃the　power　of　the　people　over



themselves；〃　do　not　express　the　true　state　of　the　case。　The　〃people〃



who　exercise　the　power　are　not　always　the　same　people　with　those



over　whom　it　is　exercised；　and　the　〃self…government〃　spoken　of　is



not　the　government　of　each　by　himself；　but　of　each　by　all　the　rest。



The　will　of　the　people；　moreover；　practically　means　the　will　of　the



most　numerous　or　the　most　active　part　of　the　people；　the　majority；



or　those　who　succeed　in　making　themselves　accepted　as　the　majority；



the　people；　consequently　may　desire　to　oppress　a　part　of　their　number；



and　precautions　are　as　much　needed　against　this　as　against　any　other



abuse　of　power。　The　limitation；　therefore；　of　the　power　of



government　over　individuals　loses　none　of　its　importance　when　the



holders　of　power　are　regularly　accountable　to　the　community；　that



is；　to　the　strongest　party　therein。　This　view　of　things；



recommending　itself　equally　to　the　intelligence　of　thinkers　and　to　the



inclination　of　those　important　classes　in　European　society　to　whose



real　or　supposed　interests　democracy　is　adverse；　has　had　no　difficulty



in　establishing　itself；　and　in　political　speculations　〃the　tyranny



of　the　majority〃　is　now　generally　included　among　the　evils　against



which　society　requires　to　be　on　its　guard。



　　Like　other　tyrannies；　the　tyranny　of　the　majority　was　at　first；



and　is　still　vulgarly；　held　in　dread；　chiefly　as　operating　through　the



acts　of　the　public　authorities。　But　reflecting　persons　perceived



that　when　society　is　itself　the　tyrant…　society　collectively　over　the



separate　individuals　who　compose　it…　its　means　of　tyrannising　are　not



restricted　to　the　acts　which　it　may　do　by　the　hands　of　its　political



functionaries。　Society　can　and　does　execute　its　own　mandates：　and　if



it　issues　wrong　mandates　instead　of　right；　or　any　mandates　at　all　in



things　with　which　it　ought　not　to　meddle；　it　practises　a　social



tyranny　more　formidable　than　many　kinds　of　political　oppression；



since；　though　not　usually　upheld　by　such　extreme　penalties；　it



leaves　fewer　means　of　escape；　penetrating　much　more　deeply　into　the



details　of　life；　and　enslaving　the　soul　itself。　Protection；　therefore；



against　the　tyranny　of　the　magistrate　is　not　enough：　there　needs



protection　also　against　the　tyranny　of　the　prevailing　opinion　and



feeling；　against　the　tendency　of　society　to　impose；　by　other　means



than　civil　penalties；　its　own　ideas　and　practices　as　rules　of



conduct　on　those　who　dissent　from　them；　to　fetter　the　development；



and；　if　possible；　prevent　the　formation；　of　any　individuality　not　in



harmony　with　its　ways；　and　compels　all　characters　to　fashion



themselves　upon　the　model　of　its　own。　There　is　a　limit　to　the



legitimate　interference　of　collective　opinion　with　individual



independence：　and　to　find　that　limit；　and　maintain　it　against



encroachment；　is　as　indispensable　to　a　good　condition　of　human



affairs；　as　protection　against　political　despotism。



　　But　though　this　proposition　is　not　likely　to　be　contested　in　general



terms；　the　practical　question；　where　to　place　the　limit…　how　to　make



the　fitting　adjustment　between　individual　independence　and　social



control…　is　a　subject　on　which　nearly　everything　remains　to　be　done。



All　that　makes　existence　valuable　to　any　one；　depends　on　the



enforcement　of　restraints　upon　the　actions　of　other　people。　Some　rules



of　conduct；　therefore；　must　be　imposed；　by　law　in　the　first　place；　and



by　opinion　on　many　things　which　are　not　fit　subjects　for　the　operation



of　law。　What　these　rules　should　be　is　the　principal　question　in



human　affairs；　but　if　we　except　a　few　of　the　most　obvious　cases；　it　is



one　of　those　which　least　progress　has　been　made　in　resolving。　No　two



ages；　and　scarcely　any　two　countries；　have　decided　it　alike；　and　the



decision　of　one　age　or　country　is　a　wonder　to　another。　Yet　the



people　of　any　given　age　and　country　no　more　suspect　any　difficulty



in　it；　than　if　it　were　a　subject　on　which　mankind　had　always　been



agreed。　The　rules　which　obtain　among　themselves　appear　to　them



self…evident　and　self…justifying。



　　This　all　but　universal　illusion　is　one　of　the　examples　of　the



magical　influence　of　custom；　which　is　not　only；　as　the　proverb　says；　a



second　nature；　but　is　continually　mistaken　for　the　first。　The　effect



of　custom；　in　preventing　any　misgiving　respecting　the　rules　of　conduct



which　mankind　impose　on　one　another；　is　all　the　more　complete



because　the　subject　is　one　on　which　it　is　not　generally　considered



necessary　that　reasons　should　be　given；　either　by　one　person　to　others



or　by　each　to　himself。　People　are　accustomed　to　believe；　and　have　been



encouraged　in　the　belief　by　some　who　aspire　to　the　character　of



philosophers；　that　their　feelings；　on　subjects　of　this　nature；　are



better　than　reasons；　and　render　reasons　unnecessary。　The　practical



principle　which　guides　them　to　their　opinions　on　the　regulation　of



human　conduct；　is　the　feeling　in　each　person's　mind　that　everybody



should　be　required　to　act　as　he；　and　those　with　whom　he　sympathises；



would　like　them　to　act。　No　one；　indeed；　acknowledges　to　himself　that



his　standard　of　judgment　is　his　own　liking；　but　an　opinion　on　a



point　of　conduct；　not　supported　by　reasons；　can　only　count　as　one



person's　preference；　and　if　the　reasons；　when　given；　are　a　mere　appeal



to　a　similar　preference　felt　by　other　people；　it　is　still　only　many



people's　liking　instead　of　one。　To　an　ordinary　man；　however；　his　own



preference；　thus　supported；　is　not　only　a　perfectly　satisfactory



reason；　but　the　only　one　he　generally　has　for　any　of　his　notions　of



morality；　taste；　or　propriety；　which　are　not　expressly　written　in



his　religious　creed；　and　his　chief　guide　in　the　interpretation　even　of



that。　Men's　opinions；　accordingly；　on　what　is　laudable　or　blamable；



are　affected　by　all　the　multifarious　causes　which　influence　their



wishes　in　regard　to　the　conduct　of　others；　and　which　are　as　numerous



as　those　which　determine　their　wishes　on　any　other　subject。



Sometimes　their　reason…　at　other　times　their　prejudices　or



superstitions：　often　their　social　affections；　not　seldom　their



antisocial　ones；　their　envy　or　jealousy；　their　arrogance　or



contemptuousness：　but　most　commonly　their　desires　or　fears　for



themselves…　their　legitimate　or　illegitimate　self…interest。



　　Wherever　there　is　an　ascendant　class；　a　large　portion　of　the



morality　of　the　country　emanates　from　its　class　interests；　and　its



feelings　of　class　superiority。　The　morality　between　Spartans　and



Helots；　between　planters　and　negroes；　between　princes　and　subjects；



between　nobles　and　roturiers；　between　men　and　women；　has　been　for



the　most　part　the　creation　of　these　class　interests　and　feelings：



and　the　sentiments　thus　generated　react　in　turn　upon　the　moral



feelings　of　the　members　of　the　ascendant　class；　in　their　relations



among　themselves。　Where；　on　the　other　hand；　a　class；　formerly



ascendant；　has　lost　its　ascendancy；　or　where　its　ascendancy　is



unpopular；　the　prevailing　moral　sentiments　frequently　bear　the　impress



of　an　impatient　dislike　of　superiority。　Another　grand　determining



principle　of　the　rules　of　conduct；　both　in　act　and　forbearance；



which