on liberty-第17章
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that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil; detracting
greatly from the moral training and instruction which so many
well…meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote。
I much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an
exclusively religious type; and discarding those secular standards (as
for want of a better name they may be called) which heretofore
coexisted with and supplemented the Christian ethics; receiving some
of its spirit; and infusing into it some of theirs; there will result;
and is even now resulting; a low; abject; servile type of character;
which; submit itself as it may to what it deems the Supreme Will; is
incapable of rising to or sympathising in the conception of Supreme
Goodness。 I believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved
from exclusively Christian sources; must exist side by side with
Christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind; and
that the Christian system is no exception to the rule; that in an
imperfect state of the human mind the interests of truth require a
diversity of opinions。
It is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not
contained in Christianity men should ignore any of those which it does
contain。 Such prejudice; or oversight; when it occurs; is altogether
an evil; but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always
exempt; and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable
good。 The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the
whole; must and ought to be protested against; and if a reactionary
impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn; this
one…sidedness; like the other; may be lamented; but must be tolerated。
If Christians would teach infidels to be just to Christianity; they
should themselves be just to infidelity。 It can do truth no service to
blink the fact; known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance
with literary history; that a large portion of the noblest and most
valuable moral teaching has been the work; not only of men who did not
know; but of men who knew and rejected; the Christian faith。
I do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of
enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of
religious or philosophical sectarianism。 Every truth which men of
narrow capacity are in earnest about; is sure to be asserted;
inculcated; and in many ways even acted on; as if no other truth
existed in the world; or at all events none that could limit or
qualify the first。 I acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions
to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion; but is
often heightened and exacerbated thereby; the truth which ought to
have been; but was not; seen; being rejected all the more violently
because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents。 But it is not
on the impassioned partisan; it is on the calmer and more
disinterested bystander; that this collision of opinions works its
salutary effect。 Not the violent conflict between parts of the
truth; but the quiet suppression of half of it; is the formidable
evil; there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both
sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into
prejudices; and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth; by
being exaggerated into falsehood。 And since there are few mental
attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in
intelligent judgment between two sides of a question; of which only
one is represented by an advocate before it; truth has no chance but
in proportion as every side of it; every opinion which embodies any
fraction of the truth; not only finds advocates; but is so advocated
as to be listened to。
We have now recognised the necessity to the mental well…being of
mankind (on which all their other well…being depends) of freedom of
opinion; and freedom of the expression of opinion; on four distinct
grounds; which we will now briefly recapitulate。
First; if any opinion is compelled to silence; that opinion may; for
aught we can certainly know; be true。 To deny this is to assume our
own infallibility。
Secondly; though the silenced opinion be an error; it may; and
very commonly does; contain a portion of truth; and since the
general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the
whole truth; it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that
the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied。
Thirdly; even if the received opinion be not only true; but the
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be; and actually is;
vigorously and earnestly contested; it will; by most of those who
receive it; be held in the manner of a prejudice; with little
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds。 And not only this;
but; fourthly; the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of
being lost; or enfeebled; and deprived of its vital effect on the
character and conduct: the dogma becoming a mere formal profession;
inefficacious for good; but cumbering the ground; and preventing the
growth of any real and heartfelt conviction; from reason or personal
experience。
Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion; it is fit to take
some notice of those who say that the free expression of all
opinions should be permitted; on condition that the manner be
temperate; and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion。 Much might
be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are
to be placed; for if the test be offence to those whose opinions are
attacked; I think experience testifies that this offence is given
whenever the attack is telling and powerful; and that every opponent
who pushes them hard; and whom they find it difficult to answer;
appears to them; if he shows any strong feeling on the subject; an
intemperate opponent。
But this; though an important consideration in a practical point
of view; merges in a more fundamental objection。 Undoubtedly the
manner of asserting an opinion; even though it be a true one; may be
very objectionable; and may justly incur severe censure。 But the
principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible;
unless by accidental self…betrayal; to bring home to conviction。 The
gravest of them is; to argue sophistically; to suppress facts or
arguments; to misstate the elements of the case; or misrepresent the
opposite opinion。 But all this; even to the most aggravated degree; is
so continually done in perfect good faith; by persons who are not
considered; and in many other respects may not deserve to be
considered; ignorant or incompetent; that it is rarely possible; on
adequate grounds; conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as
morally culpable; and still less could law presume to interfere with
this kind of controversial misconduct。 With regard to what is commonly
meant by intemperate discussion; namely invective; sarcasm;
personality; and the like; the denunciation of these weapons would
deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them
equally to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the
employment of them against the prevailing opinion: against the
unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval;
but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of
honest zeal and righteous indignation。 Yet whatever mischief arises
from their use is greatest when they are employed against the
comparatively defenceless; and whatever unfair advantage can be
derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it; accrues
almost exclusively to received opinions。 The worst offence of this
kind which can be committed by a polemic is to stigmatise those who
hold t