on liberty-第15章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
from reason; and; as a discipline to the mind; they were in every
respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the
intellects of the 〃Socratici viri〃; but the modern mind owes far
more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the present
modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree
supplies the place either of the one or of the other。 A person who
derives all his instruction from teachers or books; even if he
escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram; is
under no compulsion to hear both sides; accordingly it is far from a
frequent accomplishment; even among thinkers; to know both sides;
and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his
opinion is what he intends as a reply to antagonists。
It is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative
logic… that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in
practice; without establishing positive truths。 Such negative
criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result; but as
a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the
name; it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again
systematically trained to it; there will be few great thinkers; and
a low general average of intellect; in any but the mathematical and
physical departments of speculation。 On any other subject no one's
opinions deserve the name of knowledge; except so far as he has either
had forced upon him by others; or gone through of himself; the same
mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an
active controversy with opponents。 That; therefore; which when absent;
it is so indispensable; but so difficult; to create; how worse than
absurd it is to forego; when spontaneously offering itself! If there
are any persons who contest a received opinion; or who will do so if
law or opinion will let them; let us thank them for it; open our minds
to listen to them; and rejoice that there is some one to do for us
what we otherwise ought; if we have any regard for either the
certainty or the vitality of our convictions; to do with much
greater labour for ourselves。
It still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which
make diversity of opinion advantageous; and will continue to do so
until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement
which at present seems at an incalculable distance。 We have hitherto
considered only two possibilities: that the received opinion may be
false; and some other opinion; consequently; true; or that; the
received opinion being true; a conflict with the opposite error is
essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth。 But
there is a commoner case than either of these; when the conflicting
doctrines; instead of being one true and the other false; share the
truth between them; and the nonconforming opinion is needed to
supply the remainder of the truth; of which the received doctrine
embodies only a part。 Popular opinions; on subjects not palpable to
sense; are often true; but seldom or never the whole truth。 They are a
part of the truth; sometimes a greater; sometimes a smaller part;
but exaggerated; distorted; and disjointed from the truths by which
they ought to be accompanied and limited。 Heretical opinions; on the
other hand; are generally some of these suppressed and neglected
truths; bursting the bonds which kept them down; and either seeking
reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion; or
fronting it as enemies; and setting themselves up; with similar
exclusiveness; as the whole truth。 The latter case is hitherto the
most frequent; as; in the human mind; one…sidedness has always been
the rule; and many…sidedness the exception。 Hence; even in revolutions
of opinion; one part of the truth usually sets while another rises。
Even progress; which ought to superadd; for the most part only
substitutes; one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement
consisting chiefly in this; that the new fragment of truth is more
wanted; more adapted to the needs of the time; than that which it
displaces。 Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions;
even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies
somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits; ought
to be considered precious; with whatever amount of error and confusion
that truth may be blended。 No sober judge of human affairs will feel
bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths
which we should otherwise have overlooked; overlook some of those
which we see。 Rather; he will think that so long as popular truth is
one…sided; it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth
should have one…sided assertors too; such being usually the most
energetic; and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the
fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole。
Thus; in the eighteenth century; when nearly all the instructed; and
all those of the uninstructed who were led by them; were lost in
admiration of what is called civilisation; and of the marvels of
modern science; literature; and philosophy; and while greatly
overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and
those of ancient times; indulged the belief that the whole of the
difference was in their own favour; with what a salutary shock did the
paradoxes of Rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst;
dislocating the compact mass of one…sided opinion; and forcing its
elements to recombine in a better form and with additional
ingredients。 Not that the current opinions were on the whole farther
from the truth than Rousseau's were; on the contrary; they were nearer
to it; they contained more of positive truth; and very much less of
error。 Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau's doctrine; and has
floated down the stream of opinion along with it; a considerable
amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted; and
these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided。
The superior worth of simplicity of life; the enervating and
demoralising effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial
society; are ideas which have never been entirely absent from
cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote; and they will in time produce
their due effect; though at present needing to be asserted as much
as ever; and to be asserted by deeds; for words; on this subject; have
nearly exhausted their power。
In politics; again; it is almost a commonplace; that a party of
order or stability; and a party of progress or reform; are both
necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one
or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a
party equally of order and of progress; knowing and distinguishing
what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away。 Each
of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies
of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other
that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity。 Unless
opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy; to property and
to equality; to cooperation and to competition; to luxury and to
abstinence; to sociality and individuality; to liberty and discipline;
and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life; are
expressed with equal freedom; and enforced and defended with equal
talent and energy; there is no chance of both elements obtaining their
due; one scale is sure to go up; and the other down。 Truth; in the
great practical concerns of life; is so much a question of the
reconciling and combining of opposites; that very few have minds
sufficiently capacious and impartial to ma