on liberty-第12章

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opinion　to　be　rejected　wisely　and　considerately；　though　it　may　still



be　rejected　rashly　and　ignorantly；　for　to　shut　out　discussion　entirely



is　seldom　possible；　and　when　it　once　gets　in；　beliefs　not　grounded



on　conviction　are　apt　to　give　way　before　the　slightest　semblance　of　an



argument。　Waiving；　however；　this　possibility…　assuming　that　the　true



opinion　abides　in　the　mind；　but　abides　as　a　prejudice；　a　belief



independent　of；　and　proof　against；　argument…　this　is　not　the　way　in



which　truth　ought　to　be　held　by　a　rational　being。　This　is　not



knowing　the　truth。　Truth；　thus　held；　is　but　one　superstition　the　more；



accidentally　clinging　to　the　words　which　enunciate　a　truth。



　　If　the　intellect　and　judgment　of　mankind　ought　to　be　cultivated；　a



thing　which　Protestants　at　least　do　not　deny；　on　what　can　these



faculties　be　more　appropriately　exercised　by　any　one；　than　on　the



things　which　concern　him　so　much　that　it　is　considered　necessary　for



him　to　hold　opinions　on　them？　If　the　cultivation　of　the



understanding　consists　in　one　thing　more　than　in　another；　it　is　surely



in　learning　the　grounds　of　one's　own　opinions。　Whatever　people



believe；　on　subjects　on　which　it　is　of　the　first　importance　to　believe



rightly；　they　ought　to　be　able　to　defend　against　at　least　the　common



objections。　But；　some　one　may　say；　〃Let　them　be　taught　the　grounds



of　their　opinions。　It　does　not　follow　that　opinions　must　be　merely



parroted　because　they　are　never　heard　controverted。　Persons　who



learn　geometry　do　not　simply　commit　the　theorems　to　memory；　but



understand　and　learn　likewise　the　demonstrations；　and　it　would　be



absurd　to　say　that　they　remain　ignorant　of　the　grounds　of



geometrical　truths；　because　they　never　hear　any　one　deny；　and



attempt　to　disprove　them。〃　Undoubtedly：　and　such　teaching　suffices



on　a　subject　like　mathematics；　where　there　is　nothing　at　all　to　be



said　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　question。　The　peculiarity　of　the



evidence　of　mathematical　truths　is　that　all　the　argument　is　on　one



side。　There　are　no　objections；　and　no　answers　to　objections。　But　on



every　subject　on　which　difference　of　opinion　is　possible；　the　truth



depends　on　a　balance　to　be　struck　between　two　sets　of　conflicting



reasons。　Even　in　natural　philosophy；　there　is　always　some　other



explanation　possible　of　the　same　facts；　some　geocentric　theory　instead



of　heliocentric；　some　phlogiston　instead　of　oxygen；　and　it　has　to　be



shown　why　that　other　theory　cannot　be　the　true　one：　and　until　this



is　shown；　and　until　we　know　how　it　is　shown；　we　do　not　understand



the　grounds　of　our　opinion。



　　But　when　we　turn　to　subjects　infinitely　more　complicated；　to　morals；



religion；　politics；　social　relations；　and　the　business　of　life；



three…fourths　of　the　arguments　for　every　disputed　opinion　consist　in



dispelling　the　appearances　which　favour　some　opinion　different　from



it。　The　greatest　orator；　save　one；　of　antiquity；　has　left　it　on　record



that　he　always　studied　his　adversary's　case　with　as　great；　if　not



still　greater；　intensity　than　even　his　own。　What　Cicero　practised　as



the　means　of　forensic　success　requires　to　be　imitated　by　all　who　study



any　subject　in　order　to　arrive　at　the　truth。　He　who　knows　only　his　own



side　of　the　case；　knows　little　of　that。　His　reasons　may　be　good；　and



no　one　may　have　been　able　to　refute　them。　But　if　he　is　equally



unable　to　refute　the　reasons　on　the　opposite　side；　if　he　does　not　so



much　as　know　what　they　are；　he　has　no　ground　for　preferring　either



opinion。　The　rational　position　for　him　would　be　suspension　of



judgment；　and　unless　he　contents　himself　with　that；　he　is　either　led



by　authority；　or　adopts；　like　the　generality　of　the　world；　the　side　to



which　he　feels　most　inclination。　Nor　is　it　enough　that　he　should



hear　the　arguments　of　adversaries　from　his　own　teachers；　presented



as　they　state　them；　and　accompanied　by　what　they　offer　as　refutations。



That　is　not　the　way　to　do　justice　to　the　arguments；　or　bring　them　into



real　contact　with　his　own　mind。　He　must　be　able　to　hear　them　from



persons　who　actually　believe　them；　who　defend　them　in　earnest；　and



do　their　very　utmost　for　them。　He　must　know　them　in　their　most



plausible　and　persuasive　form；　he　must　feel　the　whole　force　of　the



difficulty　which　the　true　view　of　the　subject　has　to　encounter　and



dispose　of；　else　he　will　never　really　possess　himself　of　the　portion



of　truth　which　meets　and　removes　that　difficulty。



　　Ninety…nine　in　a　hundred　of　what　are　called　educated　men　are　in　this



condition；　even　of　those　who　can　argue　fluently　for　their　opinions。



Their　conclusion　may　be　true；　but　it　might　be　false　for　anything



they　know：　they　have　never　thrown　themselves　into　the　mental



position　of　those　who　think　differently　from　them；　and　considered　what



such　persons　may　have　to　say；　and　consequently　they　do　not；　in　any



proper　sense　of　the　word；　know　the　doctrine　which　they　themselves



profess。　They　do　not　know　those　parts　of　it　which　explain　and



justify　the　remainder；　the　considerations　which　show　that　a　fact　which



seemingly　conflicts　with　another　is　reconcilable　with　it；　or　that；



of　two　apparently　strong　reasons；　one　and　not　the　other　ought　to　be



preferred。　All　that　part　of　the　truth　which　turns　the　scale；　and



decides　the　judgment　of　a　completely　informed　mind；　they　are　strangers



to；　nor　is　it　ever　really　known；　but　to　those　who　have　attended



equally　and　impartially　to　both　sides；　and　endeavoured　to　see　the



reasons　of　both　in　the　strongest　light。　So　essential　is　this



discipline　to　a　real　understanding　of　moral　and　human　subjects；　that



if　opponents　of　all　important　truths　do　not　exist；　it　is　indispensable



to　imagine　them；　and　supply　them　with　the　strongest　arguments　which



the　most　skilful　devil's　advocate　can　conjure　up。



　　To　abate　the　force　of　these　considerations；　an　enemy　of　free



discussion　may　be　supposed　to　say；　that　there　is　no　necessity　for



mankind　in　general　to　know　and　understand　all　that　can　be　said　against



or　for　their　opinions　by　philosophers　and　theologians。　That　it　is



not　needful　for　common　men　to　be　able　to　expose　all　the



misstatements　or　fallacies　of　an　ingenious　opponent。　That　it　is　enough



if　there　is　always　somebody　capable　of　answering　them；　so　that　nothing



likely　to　mislead　uninstructed　persons　remains　unrefuted。　That



simple　minds；　having　been　taught　the　obvious　grounds　of　the　truths



inculcated　on　them；　may　trust　to　authority　for　the　rest；　and　being



aware　that　they　have　neither　knowledge　nor　talent　to　resolve　every



difficulty　which　can　be　raised；　may　repose　in　the　assurance　that　all



those　which　have　been　raised　have　been　or　can　be　answered；　by　those



who　are　specially　trained　to　the　task。



　　Conceding　to　this　view　of　the　subject　the　utmost　that　can　be　claimed



for　it　by　those　most　easily　satisfied　with　the　amount　of　understanding



of　truth　which　ought　to　accompany　the　belief　of　it；　even　so；　the



argument　for　free　discussion　is　no　way　weakened。　For　even　this



doctrine　acknowledges　that　mankind　ought　to　have　a　rational



assurance　that　all　objections　have　been　satisfactorily　answered；　and



how　are　they　to　be　answered　if　that　which　requires　to　be　answered　is



not　spoken？　or　how　can　the　answer　be　known　to　be　satisfactory；　if



the　objectors　have　no　opportunity　of　showing　that　it　is



unsatisfactory？　If　not　the　public；　at　least　the　philosophers　and



theologians　who　are　to　resolve　the　difficulties；　must　make



themselves　familiar　with　those　difficulties　in　their　most　puzzling



form；　and　this　cannot　be　accomplished　unless　they　are　freely　stated；



and　placed　in　the　most　advantageous　light　which　they　admit　of。　The



Catholic　Church　has　its　own　way　of　dealing　with　this　embarrassing



problem。　It　makes　a　broad　separation　between　those　who　can　be



permitted　to　receive　its　doctrines　on　conviction；　and　those　who　must



ac