the science of right-第6章

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continues；　this　cannot　be　done　by　juridical　means　（de　jure）；　because　a

public　law　does　not　yet　exist。

　　And　although　a　piece　of　ground　should　be　regarded　as　free；　or

declared　to　be　such；　so　as　to　be　for　the　public　use　of　all　without

distinction；　yet　it　cannot　be　said　that　it　is　thus　free　by　nature

and　originally　so；　prior　to　any　juridical　act。　For　there　would　be　a

real　relation　already　incorporated　in　such　a　piece　of　ground　by　the

very　fact　that　the　possession　of　it　was　denied　to　any　particular

individual；　and　as　this　public　freedom　of　the　ground　would　be　a

prohibition　of　it　to　every　particular　individual；　this　presupposes　a

common　possession　of　it　which　cannot　take　effect　without　a　contract。　A

piece　of　ground；　however；　which　can　only　become　publicly　free　by

contract；　must　actually　be　in　the　possession　of　all　those　associated

together；　who　mutually　interdict　or　suspend　each　other；　from　any

particular　or　private　use　of　it。



　　This　original　community　of　the　soil　and　of　the　things　upon　it

（communio　fundi　originaria）；　is　an　idea　which　has　objective　and

practical　juridical　reality　and　is　entirely　different　from　the　idea　of

a　primitive　community　of　things；　which　is　a　fiction。　For　the　latter

would　have　had　to　be　founded　as　a　form　of　society；　and　must　have　taken

its　rise　from　a　contract　by　which　all　renounced　the　right　of　private

possession；　so　that　by　uniting　the　property　owned　by　each　into　a

whole；　it　was　thus　transformed　into　a　common　possession。　But　had

such　an　event　taken　place；　history　must　have　presented　some　evidence

of　it。　To　regard　such　a　procedure　as　the　original　mode　of　taking

possession；　and　to　hold　that　the　particular　possessions　of　every

individual　may　and　ought　to　be　grounded　upon　it；　is　evidently　a

contradiction。

　　Possession　（possessio）　is　to　be　distinguished　from　habitation　as

mere　residence　（sedes）；　and　the　act　of　taking　possession　of　the　soil

in　the　intention　of　acquiring　it　once　for　all；　is　also　to　be

distinguished　from　settlement　or　domicile　（incolatus）；　which　is　a

continuous　private　possession　of　a　place　that　is　dependent　on　the

presence　of　the　individual　upon　it。　We　have　not　here　to　deal　with

the　question　of　domiciliary　settlement；　as　that　is　a　secondary

juridical　act　which　may　follow　upon　possession；　or　may　not　occur　at

all；　for　as　such　it　could　not　involve　an　original　possession；　but　only

a　secondary　possession　derived　from　the　consent　of　others。

　　Simple　physical　possession；　or　holding　of　the　soil；　involves　already

certain　relations　of　right　to　the　thing；　although　it　is　certainly

not　sufficient　to　enable　me　to　regard　it　as　mine。　Relative　to

others；　so　far　as　they　know；　it　appears　as　a　first　possession　in

harmony　with　the　law　of　external　freedom；　and；　at　the　same　time；　it　is

embraced　in　the　universal　original　possession　which　contains　a

priori　the　fundamental　principle　of　the　possibility　of　a　private

possession。　Hence　to　disturb　the　first　occupier　or　holder　of　a　portion

of　the　soil　in　his　use　of　it　is　a　lesion　or　wrong　done　to　him。　The

first　taking　of　possession　has　therefore　a　title　of　right　（titulus

possessionis）　in　its　favour；　which　is　simply　the　principle　of　the

original　common　possession；　and　the　saying　that　〃It　is　well　for

those　who　are　in　possession〃　（beati　possidentes）；　when　one　is　not

bound　to　authenticate　his　possession；　is　a　principle　of　natural

right　that　establishes　the　juridical　act　of　taking　possession；　as　a

ground　of　acquisition　upon　which　every　first　possessor　may　found。

　　It　has　been　shown　in　the　Critique　of　Pure　Reason　that　in　theoretical

principles　a　priori；　an　intuitional　perception　a　priori　must　be

supplied　in　connection　with　any　given　conception；　and；　consequently；

were　it　a　question　of　a　purely　theoretical　principle；　something

would　have　to　be　added　to　the　conception　of　the　possession　of　an

object　to　make　it　real。　But　in　respect　of　the　practical　principle

under　consideration；　the　procedure　is　just　the　converse　of　the

theoretical　process；　so　that　all　the　conditions　of　perception　which

form　the　foundation　of　empirical　possession　must　be　abstracted　or

taken　away　in　order　to　extend　the　range　of　the　juridical　conception

beyond　the　empirical　sphere；　and　in　order　to　be　able　to　apply　the

postulate；　that　every　external　object　of　the　free　activity　of　my　will；

so　far　as　I　have　it　in　my　power；　although　not　in　the　possession　of　it；

may　be　reckoned　as　juridically　mine。

　　The　possibility　of　such　a　possession；　with　consequent　deduction　of

the　conception　of　a　nonempirical　possession；　is　founded　upon　the

juridical　postulate　of　the　practical　reason；　that　〃It　is　a　juridical

duty　so　to　act　towards　others　that　what　is　external　and　useable　may

come　into　the　possession　or　become　the　property　of　some　one。〃　And　this

postulate　is　conjoined　with　the　exposition　of　the　conception　that　what

is　externally　one's　own　is　founded　upon　a　possession；　that　is　not

physical。　The　possibility　of　such　a　possession；　thus　conceived；

cannot；　however；　be　proved　or　comprehended　in　itself；　because　it　is

a　rational　conception　for　which　no　empirical　perception　can　be

furnished；　but　it　follows　as　an　immediate　consequence　from　the

postulate　that　has　been　enunciated。　For；　if　it　is　necessary　to　act

according　to　that　juridical　principle；　the　rational　or　intelligible

condition　of　a　purely　juridical　possession　must　also　be　possible。　It

need　astonish　no　one；　then；　that　the　theoretical　aspect　of　the

principles　of　the　external　mine　and　thine　is　lost　from　view　in　the

rational　sphere　of　pure　intelligence　and　presents　no　extension　of

knowledge；　for　the　conception　of　freedom　upon　which　they　rest　does　not

admit　of　any　theoretical　deduction　of　its　possibility；　and　it　can　only

be　inferred　from　the　practical　law　of　reason；　called　the　categorical

imperative；　viewed　as　a　fact。



　　　　　7。　Application　of　the　Principle　of　the　Possibility　of

　　　　　an　External　Mine　and　Thine　to　Objects　of　Experience。



　　The　conception　of　a　purely　juridical　possession　is　not　an

empirical　conception　dependent　on　conditions　of　space　and　time；　and

yet　it　has　practical　reality。　As　such　it　must　be　applicable　to　objects

of　experience；　the　knowledge　of　which　is　independent　of　the　conditions

of　space　and　time。　The　rational　process　by　which　the　conception　of

right　is　brought　into　relation　to　such　objects　so　as　to　constitute　a

possible　external　mine　and　thine；　is　as　follows。　The　conception　of

right；　being　contained　merely　in　reason；　cannot　be　immediately　applied

to　objects　of　experience；　so　as　to　give　the　conception　of　an　empirical

possession；　but　must　be　applied　directly　to　the　mediating

conception；　in　the　understanding；　of　possession　in　general；　so　that；

instead　of　physical　holding　（detentio）　as　an　empirical

representation　of　possession；　the　formal　conception　or　thought　of

having；　abstracted　from　all　conditions　of　space　and　time；　is　conceived

by　the　mind；　and　only　as　implying　that　an　object　is　in　my　power　and　at

my　disposal　（in　potestate　mea　positum　esse）。　In　this　relation；　the

term　external　does　not　signify　existence　in　another　place　than　where　I

am；　nor　my　resolution　and　acceptance　at　another　time　than　the　moment

in　which　I　have　the　offer　of　a　thing：　it　signifies　only　an　object

different　from　or　other　than　myself。　Now　the　practical　reason　by　its

law　of　right　wills；　that　I　shall　think　the　mine　and　thine　in

application　to　objects；　not　according　to　sensible　conditions；　but

apart　from　these　and　from　the　possession　they　indicate；　because　they

refer　to　determinations　of　the　activity　of　the　will　that　are　in

accordance　with　the　laws　of　freedom。　For　it　is　only　a　conception　of

the　understanding　that　can　be　brought　under　the　rational　conception　of

right。　I　may　therefore　say　that　I　possess　a　field；　although　it　is　in

quite　a　different　place　from　that　on　which　I　actually　find　myself。　For

the　question　here　is　not　concerning　an　intellectual　relation　to　the

object；　but　I　have　the　thing　practically　in　my　power　and　at　my

disposal；　which　is　a　conc