the science of right-第33章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



view　of　such　an　alternative；　I　say　that　the　man　of　honour　would　choose

death；　and　the　knave　would　choose　servitude。　This　would　be　the

effect　of　their　human　nature　as　it　is；　for　the　honourable　man　values

his　honour　more　highly　than　even　life　itself；　whereas　a　knave

regards　a　life；　although　covered　with　shame；　as　better　in　his　eyes

than　not　to　be。　The　former　is；　without　gainsaying；　less　guilty　than

the　other；　and　they　can　only　be　proportionately　punished　by　death

being　inflicted　equally　upon　them　both；　yet　to　the　one　it　is　a　mild

punishment　when　his　nobler　temperament　is　taken　into　account；

whereas　it　is　a　hard　punishment　to　the　other　in　view　of　his　baser

temperament。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　were　they　all　equally　condemned

to　penal　servitude　for　life；　the　honourable　man　would　be　too

severely　punished；　while　the　other；　on　account　of　his　baseness　of

nature；　would　be　too　mildly　punished。　In　the　judgement　to　be

pronounced　over　a　number　of　criminals　united　in　such　a　conspiracy；　the

best　equalizer　of　punishment　and　crime　in　the　form　of　public　justice

is　death。　And　besides　all　this；　it　has　never　been　heard　of　that　a

criminal　condemned　to　death　on　account　of　a　murder　has　complained　that

the　sentence　inflicted　on　him　more　than　was　right　and　just；　and　any

one　would　treat　him　with　scorn　if　he　expressed　himself　to　this

effect　against　it。　Otherwise　it　would　be　necessary　to　admit　that；

although　wrong　and　injustice　are　not　done　to　the　criminal　by　the

law；　yet　the　legislative　power　is　not　entitled　to　administer　this　mode

of　punishment；　and　if　it　did　so；　it　would　be　in　contradiction　with

itself。

　　However　many　they　may　be　who　have　committed　a　murder；　or　have　even

commanded　it；　or　acted　as　art　and　part　in　it；　they　ought　all　to　suffer

death；　for　so　justice　wills　it；　in　accordance　with　the　idea　of　the

juridical　power；　as　founded　on　the　universal　laws　of　reason。　But　the

number　of　the　accomplices　（correi）　in　such　a　deed　might　happen　to　be

so　great　that　the　state；　in　resolving　to　be　without　such　criminals；

would　be　in　danger　of　soon　also　being　deprived　of　subjects。　But　it

will　not　thus　dissolve　itself；　neither　must　it　return　to　the　much

worse　condition　of　nature；　in　which　there　would　be　no　external

justice。　Nor；　above　all；　should　it　deaden　the　sensibilities　of　the

people　by　the　spectacle　of　justice　being　exhibited　in　the　mere　carnage

of　a　slaughtering　bench。　In　such　circumstances　the　sovereign　must

always　be　allowed　to　have　it　in　his　power　to　take　the　part　of　the

judge　upon　himself　as　a　case　of　necessity…　and　to　deliver　a

judgement　which；　instead　of　the　penalty　of　death；　shall　assign　some

other　punishment　to　the　criminals　and　thereby　preserve　a　multitude

of　the　people。　The　penalty　of　deportation　is　relevant　in　this

connection。　Such　a　form　of　judgement　cannot　be　carried　out　according

to　a　public　law；　but　only　by　an　authoritative　act　of　the　royal

prerogative；　and　it　may　only　be　applied　as　an　act　of　grace　in

individual　cases。

　　Against　these　doctrines；　the　Marquis　Beccaria　has　given　forth　a

different　view。　Moved　by　the　compassionate　sentimentality　of　a

humane　feeling；　he　has　asserted　that　all　capital　punishment　is　wrong

in　itself　and　unjust。　He　has　put　forward　this　view　on　the　ground

that　the　penalty　of　death　could　not　be　contained　in　the　original　civil

contract；　for；　in　that　case；　every　one　of　the　people　would　have　had　to

consent　to　lose　his　life　if　be　murdered　any　of　his　fellow　citizens。

But；　it　is　argued；　such　a　consent　is　impossible；　because　no　one　can

thus　dispose　of　his　own　life。　All　this　is　mere　sophistry　and

perversion　of　right。　No　one　undergoes　punishment　because　he　has　willed

to　be　punished；　but　because　he　has　willed　a　punishable　action；　for

it　is　in　fact　no　punishment　when　any　one　experiences　what　he　wills；

and　it　is　impossible　for　any　one　to　will　to　be　punished。　To　say；　〃I

will　to　be　punished；　if　I　murder　any　one；〃　can　mean　nothing　more　than；

〃I　submit　myself　along　with　all　the　other　citizens　to　the　laws〃；　and

if　there　are　any　criminals　among　the　people；　these　laws　will　include

penal　laws。　The　individual　who；　as　a　co…legislator；　enacts　penal　law

cannot　possibly　be　the　same　person　who；　as　a　subject；　is　punished

according　to　the　law；　for；　qua　criminal；　he　cannot　possibly　be

regarded　as　having　a　voice　in　the　legislation；　the　legislator　being

rationally　viewed　as　just　and　holy。　If　any　one；　then；　enact　a　penal

law　against　himself　as　a　criminal；　it　must　be　the　pure　juridically

law…giving　reason　（homo　noumenon）；　which　subjects　him　as　one　capable

of　crime；　and　consequently　as　another　person　（homo　phenomenon）；

along　with　all　the　others　in　the　civil　union；　to　this　penal　law。　In

other　words；　it　is　not　the　people　taken　distributively；　but　the

tribunal　of　public　justice；　as　distinct　from　the　criminal；　that

prescribes　capital　punishment；　and　it　is　not　to　be　viewed　as　if　the

social　contract　contained　the　promise　of　all　the　individuals　to

allow　themselves　to　be　punished；　thus　disposing　of　themselves　and

their　lives。　For　if　the　right　to　punish　must　be　grounded　upon　a

promise　of　the　wrongdoer；　whereby　he　is　to　be　regarded　as　being

willing　to　be　punished；　it　ought　also　to　be　left　to　him　to　find

himself　deserving　of　the　punishment；　and　the　criminal　would　thus　be

his　own　judge。　The　chief　error　（proton　pseudos）　of　this　sophistry

consists　in　regarding　the　judgement　of　the　criminal　himself；

necessarily　determined　by　his　reason；　that　he　is　under　obligation　to

undergo　the　loss　of　his　life；　as　a　judgement　that　must　be　grounded

on　a　resolution　of　his　will　to　take　it　away　himself；　and　thus　the

execution　of　the　right　in　question　is　represented　as　united　in　one　and

the　same　person　with　the　adjudication　of　the　right。

　　There　are；　however；　two　crimes　worthy　of　death；　in　respect　of

which　it　still　remains　doubtful　whether　the　legislature　have　the　right

to　deal　with　them　capitally。　It　is　the　sentiment　of　honour　that

induces　their　perpetration。　The　one　originates　in　a　regard　for　womanly

honour；　the　other　in　a　regard　for　military　honour；　and　in　both　cases

there　is　a　genuine　feeling　of　honour　incumbent　on　the　individuals　as　a

duty。　The　former　is　the　crime　of　maternal　infanticide　（infanticidium

maternale）；　the　latter　is　the　crime　of　killing　a　fellow…soldier　in　a

duel　（commilitonicidium）。　Now　legislation　cannot　take　away　the　shame

of　an　illegitimate　birth；　nor　wipe　off　the　stain　attaching　from　a

suspicion　of　cowardice；　to　an　officer　who　does　not　resist　an　act

that　would　bring　him　into　contempt；　by　an　effort　of　his　own　that　is

superior　to　the　fear　of　death。　Hence　it　appears　that；　in　such

circumstances；　the　individuals　concerned　are　remitted　to　the　state

of　nature；　and　their　acts　in　both　cases　must　be　called　homicide；　and

not　murder；　which　involves　evil　intent　（homicidium　dolosum）。　In　all

instances　the　acts　are　undoubtedly　punishable；　but　they　cannot　be

punished　by　the　supreme　power　with　death。　An　illegitimate　child

comes　into　the　world　outside　of　the　law　which　properly　regulates

marriage；　and　it　is　thus　born　beyond　the　pale　or　constitutional

protection　of　the　law。　Such　a　child　is　introduced；　as　it　were；　like

prohibited　goods；　into　the　commonwealth；　and　as　it　has　no　legal

right　to　existence　in　this　way；　its　destruction　might　also　be　ignored；

nor　can　the　shame　of　the　mother；　when　her　unmarried　confinement　is

known；　be　removed　by　any　legal　ordinance。　A　subordinate　officer；

again；　on　whom　an　insult　is　inflicted；　sees　himself　compelled　by　the

public　opinion　of　his　associates　to　obtain　satisfaction；　and；　as　in

the　state　of　nature；　the　punishment　of　the　offender　can　only　be

effected　by　a　duel；　in　which　his　own　life　is　exposed　to　danger；　and

not　by　means　of　the　law　in　a　court　of　justice。　The　duel　is　therefore

adopted　as　the　means　of　demonstrating　his　courage　as　that

characteristic　upon　which　the　honour　of　his　profession　essentially

rests；　and　this　is　done　even　if　it　should　issue　in　the　killing　of

his　adversary。　But　as　such　a　result　takes　place