the science of right-第3章

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involve　a　contradiction；　For　this　is　not　the　case　of　a　wrongful

aggressor　making　an　unjust　assault　upon　my　life；　and　whom　I　anticipate

by　depriving　him　of　his　own　（jus　inculpatae　tutelae）；　nor　consequently

is　it　a　question　merely　of　the　recommendation　of　moderation　which

belongs　to　ethics　as　the　doctrine　of　virtue；　and　not　to

jurisprudence　as　the　doctrine　of　right。　It　is　a　question　of　the

allowableness　of　using　violence　against　one　who　has　used　none

against　me。

　　It　is　clear　that　the　assertion　of　such　a　right　is　not　to　be

understood　objectively　as　being　in　accordance　with　what　a　law　would

prescribe；　but　merely　subjectively；　as　proceeding　on　the　assumption　of

how　a　sentence　would　be　pronounced　by　a　court　in　the　case。　There

can；　in　fact；　be　no　criminal　law　assigning　the　penalty　of　death　to　a

man　who；　when　shipwrecked　and　struggling　in　extreme　danger　for　his

life；　and　in　order　to　save　it；　may　thrust　another　from　a　plank　on

which　he　had　saved　himself。　For　the　punishment　threatened　by　the　law

could　not　possibly　have　greater　power　than　the　fear　of　the　loss　of

life　in　the　case　in　question。　Such　a　penal　law　would　thus　fail

altogether　to　exercise　its　intended　effect；　for　the　threat　of　an

evil　which　is　still　uncertain…　such　as　death　by　a　judicial　sentence…

could　not　overcome　the　fear　of　an　evil　which　is　certain；　as　drowning

is　in　such　circumstances。　An　act　of　violent　self…preservation；　then；

ought　not　to　be　considered　as　altogether　beyond　condemnation

（inculpabile）；　it　is　only　to　be　adjudged　as　exempt　from　punishment

（impunibile）。　Yet　this　subjective　condition　of　impunity；　by　a

strange　confusion　of　ideas；　has　been　regarded　by　jurists　as　equivalent

to　objective　lawfulness。

　　The　dictum　of　the　right　of　necessity　is　put　in　these　terms：

〃Necessity　has　no　law〃　（Necessitas　non　habet　legem）。　And　yet　there

cannot　be　a　necessity　that　could　make　what　is　wrong　lawful。

　　It　is　apparent；　then；　that　in。　judgements　relating　both　to

〃equity〃　and　〃the　right　of　necessity；〃　the　equivocations　involved

arise　from　an　interchange　of　the　objective　and　subjective　grounds　that

enter　into　the　application　of　the　principles　of　right；　when　viewed

respectively　by　reason　or　by　a　judicial　tribunal。　What　one　may　have

good　grounds　for　recognising　as　right；　in　itself；　may　not　find

confirmation　in　a　court　of　justice；　and　what　he　must　consider　to　be

wrong；　in　itself；　may　obtain　recognition　in　such　a　court。　And　the

reason　of　this　is　that　the　conception　of　right　is　not　taken　in　the　two

cases　in　one　and　the　same　sense。

DIVISION

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　DIVISION　OF　THE　SCIENCE　OF　RIGHT。





　　　　　　　　　A。　General　Division　of　the　Duties　of　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Juridical　Duties）。



　　In　this　division　we　may　very　conveniently　follow　Ulpian；　if　his

three　formulae　are　taken　in　a　general　sense；　which　may　not　have　been

quite　clearly　in　his　mind；　but　which　they　are　capable　of　being

developed　into　or　of　receiving。　They　are　the　following：

　　1。　Honeste　vive。　〃Live　rightly。〃　juridical　rectitude；　or　honour

（honestas　juridica）；　consists　in　maintaining　one's　own　worth　as　a

man　in　relation　to　others。　This　duty　may　be　rendered　by　the

proposition：　〃Do　not　make　thyself　a　mere　means　for　the　use　of

others；　but　be　to　them　likewise　an　end。〃　This　duty　will　be　explained

in　the　next　formula　as　an　obligation　arising　out　of　the　right　of

humanity　in　our　own　person　（lex　justi）。

　　2。　Neminem　laede。　〃Do　wrong　to　no　one。〃　This　formula　may　be　rendered

so　as　to　mean：　〃Do　no　wrong　to　any　one；　even　if　thou　shouldst　be　under

the　necessity；　in　observing　this　duty；　to　cease　from　all　connection

with　others　and　to　avoid　all　society〃　（lex　juridica）。

　　3。　Suum　cuique　tribue。　〃Assign　to　every　one　what　is　his　own。〃　This

may　be　rendered；　〃Enter；　if　wrong　cannot　be　avoided；　into　a　society

with　others　in　which　every　one　may　have　secured　to　him　what　is　his

own。〃　If　this　formula　were　to　be　simply　translated；　〃Give　every　one

his　own；〃　it　would　express　an　absurdity；　for　we　cannot　give　any　one

what　he　already　has。　If　it　is　to　have　a　definite　meaning；　it　must

therefore　run　thus：　〃Enter　into　a　state　in　which　every　one　can　have

what　is　his　own　secured　against　the　action　of　every　other〃　（lex

justitiae）。



　　These　three　classical　formulae；　at　the　same　time；　represent

principles　which　suggest　a　division　of　the　system　of　juridical

duties　into　internal　duties；　external　duties；　and　those　connecting

duties　which　contain　the　latter　as　deduced　from　the　principle　of　the

former　by　subsumption。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　Universal　Division　of　Rights。



　　I。　Natural　Right　and　Positive　Right。　The　system　of　rights；　viewed　as

a　scientific　system　of　doctrines；　is　divided　into　natural　right　and

positive　right。　Natural　right　rests　upon　pure　rational　principles　a

priori；　positive　or　statutory　right　is　what　proceeds　from　the　will

of　a　legislator。

　　II。　Innate　Right　and　Acquired　Right。　The　system　of　rights　may

again　be　regarded　in　reference　to　the　implied　powers　of　dealing

morally　with　others　as　bound　by　obligations；　that　is；　as　furnishing

a　legal　title　of　action　in　relation　to　them。　Thus　viewed；　the　system

is　divided　into　innate　right　and　acquired　right。　Innate　right　is

that　right　which　belongs　to　every　one　by　nature；　independent　of　all

juridical　acts　of　experience。　Acquired　right　is　that　right　which　is

founded　upon　such　juridical　acts。

　　Innate　right　may　also　be　called　the　〃internal　mine　and　thine〃

（meum　vel　tuum　internum）　for　external　right　must　always　be　acquired。



　　　　There　is　only　one　Innate　Right；　the　Birthright　of　Freedom。



　　Freedom　is　independence　of　the　compulsory　will　of　another；　and　in　so

far　as　it　can　coexist　with　the　freedom　of　all　according　to　a　universal

law；　it　is　the　one　sole　original；　inborn　right　belonging　to　every

man　in　virtue　of　his　humanity。　There　is；　indeed；　an　innate　equality

belonging　to　every　man　which　consists　in　his　right　to　be　independent

of　being　bound　by　others　to　anything　more　than　that　to　which　he　may

also　reciprocally　bind　them。　It　is；　consequently；　the　inborn　quality

of　every　man　in　virtue　of　which　he　ought　to　be　his　own　master　by　right

（sui　juris）。　There　is；　also；　the　natural　quality　of　justness

attributable　to　a　man　as　naturally　of　unimpeachable　right　（justi）；

because　be　has　done　no　wrong　to　any　one　prior　to　his　own　juridical

actions。　And；　further；　there　is　also　the　innate　right　of　common　action

on　the　part　of　every　man；　so　that　he　may　do　towards　others　what　does

not　infringe　their　rights　or　take　away　anything　that　is　theirs

unless　they　are　willing　to　appropriate　it；　such　merely　to

communicate　thought；　to　narrate　anything；　or　to　promise　something

whether　truly　and　honestly；　or　untruly　and　dishonestly　（veriloquim　aut

falsiloquim）；　for　it　rests　entirely　upon　these　others　whether　they

will　believe　or　trust　in　it　or　not。*　　But　all　these　rights　or　titles

are　already　included　in　the　principle　of　innate　freedom；　and　are　not

really　distinguished　from　it；　even　as　dividing　members　under　a

higher　species　of　right。



　　*It　is　customary　to　designate　every　untruth　that　is　spoken

intentionally　as　such；　although　it　may　be　in　a　frivolous　manner　a　lie；

or　falsehood　（mendacium）；　because　it　may　do　harm；　at　least　in　so　far

as　any　one　who　repeats　it　in　good　faith　may　be　made　a　laughing…stock

of　to　others　on　account　of　his　easy　credulity。　But　in　the　juridical

sense；　only　that　untruth　is　called　a　lie　which　immediately　infringes

the　right　of　another；　such　as　a　false　allegation　of　a　contract

having　been　concluded；　when　the　allegation　is　put　forward　in　order

to　deprive　some　one　of　what　is　his　（falsiloquim　dolosum）。　This

distinction　of　conceptions　so　closely　allied　is　not　without

foundation；　because　on　the　occasion　of　a　simple　statement　of　one's

thoughts；　it　is　always　free　for　another　to　take　them　as　he　may；　and

yet　the　resulting　repute；　that　such　a　one　is　a　man　whose　word　cannot

be　trusted；　comes　so　close　to　the　opprobrium　of　directly　calling　him　a

liar；　that　the　bound