the science of right-第25章

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Civitatis）。



　　　　　　　　　44。　Origin　Of　the　Civil　Union　and　Public　Right。



　　It　is　not　from　any　experience　prior　to　the　appearance　of　an　external

authoritative　legislation　that　we　learn　of　the　maxim　of　natural

violence　among　men　and　their　evil　tendency　to　engage　in　war　with

each　other。　Nor　is　it　assumed　here　that　it　is　merely　some　particular

historical　condition　or　fact；　that　makes　public　legislative　constraint

necessary；　for　however　well…disposed　or　favourable　to　right　men　may　be

considered　to　be　of　themselves；　the　rational　idea　of　a　state　of

society　not　yet　regulated　by　right；　must　be　taken　as　our

starting…point。　This　idea　implies　that　before　a　legal　state　of　society

can　be　publicly　established；　individual　men；　nations；　and　states；

can　never　be　safe　against　violence　from　each　other；　and　this　is

evident　from　the　consideration　that　every　one　of　his　own　will

naturally　does　what　seems　good　and　right　in　his　own　eyes；　entirely

independent　of　the　opinion　of　others。　Hence；　unless　the　institution　of

right　is　to　be　renounced；　the　first　thing　incumbent　on　men　is　to

accept　the　principle　that　it　is　necessary　to　leave　the　state　of

nature；　in　which　every　one　follows　his　own　inclinations；　and　to　form　a

union　of　all　those　who　cannot　avoid　coming　into　reciprocal

communication；　and　thus　subject　themselves　in　common　to　the　external

restraint　of　public　compulsory　laws。　Men　thus　enter　into　a　civil

union；　in　which　every　one　has　it　determined　by　law　what　shall　be

recognized　as　his；　and　this　is　secured　to　him　by　a　competent

external　power　distinct　from　his　own　individuality。　Such　is　the

primary　obligation；　on　the　part　of　all　men；　to　enter　into　the

relations　of　a　civil　state　of　society。

　　The　natural　condition　of　mankind　need　not；　on　this　ground；　be

represented　as　a　state　of　absolute　injustice；　as　if　there　could　have

been　no　other　relation　originally　among　men　but　what　was　merely

determined　by　force。　But　this　natural　condition　must　be　regarded；　if

it　ever　existed；　as　a　state　of　society　that　was　void　of　regulation

by　right　（status　justitiae　vacuus）；　so　that　if　a　matter　of　right

came　to　be　in　dispute　（jus　controversum）；　no　competent　judge　was　found

to　give　an　authorized　legal　decision　upon　it。　It　is　therefore

reasonable　that　any　one　should　constrain　another　by　force；　to　pass

from　such　a　nonjuridical　state　of　life　and　enter　within　the

jurisdiction　of　a　civil　state　of　society。　For；　although　on　the　basis

of　the　ideas　of　right　held　by　individuals　as　such；　external　things　may

be　acquired　by　occupancy　or　contract；　yet　such　acquisition　is　only

provisory　so　long　as　it　has　not　yet　obtained　the　sanction　of　a

public　law。　Till　this　sanction　is　reached；　the　condition　of　possession

is　not　determined　by　any　public　distributive　justice；　nor　is　it

secured　by　any　power　exercising　public　right。



　　If　men　were　not　disposed　to　recognize　any　acquisition　at　all　as

rightful…　even　in　a　provisional　way…　prior　to　entering　into　the

civil　state；　this　state　of　society　would　itself　be　impossible。　For　the

laws　regarding　the　mine　and　thine　in　the　state　of　nature；　contain

formally　the　very　same　thing　as　they　prescribe　in　the　civil　state；

when　it　is　viewed　merely　according　to　rational　conceptions：　only

that　in　the　forms　of　the　civil　state　the　conditions　are　laid　down

under　which　the　formal　prescriptions　of　the　state　of　nature　attain

realization　conformable　to　distributive　justice。　Were　there；　then；　not

even　provisionally；　an　external　meum　and　tuum　in　the　state　of

nature；　neither　would　there　be　any　juridical　duties　in　relation　to

them；　and；　consequently；　there　would　be　no　obligation　to　pass　out　of

that　state　into　another。



　　　　　　　45。　The　Form　of　the　State　and　its　Three　Powers。



　　A　state　（civitas）　is　the　union　of　a　number　of　men　under　juridical

laws。　These　laws；　as　such；　are　to　be　regarded　as　necessary　a　priori…

that　is；　as　following　of　themselves　from　the　conceptions　of　external

right　generally…　and　not　as　merely　established　by　statute。　The　form　of

the　state　is　thus　involved　in　the　idea　of　the　state；　viewed　as　it

ought　to　be　according　to　pure　principles　of　right；　and　this　ideal　form

furnishes　the　normal　criterion　of　every　real　union　that　constitutes

a　commonwealth。

　　Every　state　contains　in　itself　three　powers；　the　universal　united

will　of　the　people　being　thus　personified　in　a　political　triad。

These　are　the　legislative　power；　the　executive　power；　and　the

judiciary　power。　1。　The　legislative　power　of　the　sovereignty　in　the

state　is　embodied　in　the　person　of　the　lawgiver；　2。　the　executive

power　is　embodied　in　the　person　of　the　ruler　who　administers　the

Law；　and　3。　the　judiciary　power；　embodied　in　the　person　of　the

judge；　is　the　function　of　assigning　every　one　what　is　his　own；

according　to　the　law　（potestas　legislatoria；　rectoria；　et　judiciaria）。

These　three　powers　may　be　compared　to　the　three　propositions　in　a

practical　syllogism：　the　major　as　the　sumption　laying　down　the

universal　law　of　a　will；　the　minor　presenting　the　command　applicable

to　an　action　according　to　the　law　as　the　principle　of　the　subsumption；

and　the　conclusion　containing　the　sentence；　or　judgement　of　right；

in　the　particular　case　under　consideration。



　　　　　46。　The　Legislative　Power　and　the　Members　of　the　State。



　　The　legislative　power；　viewed　in　its　rational　principle；　can　only

belong　to　the　united　will　of　the　people。　For；　as　all　right　ought　to

proceed　from　this　power；　it　is　necessary　that　its　laws　should　be

unable　to　do　wrong　to　any　one　whatever。　Now；　if　any　one　individual

determines　anything　in　the　state　in　contradistinction　to　another；　it

is　always　possible　that　he　may　perpetrate　a　wrong　on　that　other；　but

this　is　never　possible　when　all　determine　and　decree　what　is　to　be　Law

to　themselves。　Volenti　non　fit　injuria。　Hence　it　is　only　the　united

and　consenting　will　of　all　the　people…　in　so　far　as　each　of　them

determines　the　same　thing　about　all；　and　all　determine　the　same

thing　about　each…　that　ought　to　have　the　power　of　enacting　law　in

the　state。

　　The　members　of　a　civil　society　thus　united　for　the　purpose　of

legislation；　and　thereby　constituting　a　state；　are　called　its

citizens；　and　there　are　three　juridical　attributes　that　inseparably

belong　to　them　by　right。　These　are：　1。　constitutional　freedom；　as

the　right　of　every　citizen　to　have　to　obey　no　other　law　than　that　to

which　he　has　given　his　consent　or　approval；　2。　civil　equality；　as

the　right　of　the　citizen　to　recognise　no　one　as　a　superior　among　the

people　in　relation　to　himself；　except　in　so　far　as　such　a　one　is　as

subject　to　his　moral　power　to　impose　obligations；　as　that　other　has

power　to　impose　obligations　upon　him；　and　3。　political　independence；

as　the　light　to　owe　his　existence　and　continuance　in　society　not　to

the　arbitrary　will　of　another；　but　to　his　own　rights　and　powers　as　a

member　of　the　commonwealth；　and；　consequently；　the　possession　of　a

civil　personality；　which　cannot　be　represented　by　any　other　than

himself。



　　The　capability　of　voting　by　possession　of　the　suffrage　properly

constitutes　the　political　qualification　of　a　citizen　as　a　member　of

the　state。　But　this；　again；　presupposes　the　independence　or

self…sufficiency　of　the　individual　citizen　among　the　people；　as　one

who　is　not　a　mere　incidental　part　of　the　commonwealth；　but　a　member　of

it　acting　of　his　own　will　in　community　with　others。　The　last　of　the

three　qualities　involved　necessarily　constitutes　the　distinction

between　active　and　passive　citizenship；　although　the　latter　conception

appears　to　stand　in　contradiction　to　the　definition　of　a　citizen　as

such。　The　following　examples　may　serve　to　remove　this　difficulty。

The　apprentice　of　a　merchant　or　tradesman；　a　servant　who　is　not　in　the

employ　of　the　state；　a　minor　（naturaliter　vel　civiliter）；　all　women；

and；　generally；　every　one　who　is　compelled　to　maintain　himself　not

according　to　his　own　industry；　but　as　it　is　arranged　by　others　（the

state　except