the science of right-第23章

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according　to　which　I　may　take　and　vindicate　the　object　as　mine

wherever　I　may　find　it；　without　being　responsible　for　the　way　in　which

the　Seller　had　come　into　possession　of　it。

　　It　is　therefore　only　in　behoof　of　the　requirements　of　juridical

decision　in　a　court　（in　favorem　justitae　distributivae）　that　the　right

in　respect　of　a　thing　is　regarded；　not　as　personal；　which　it　is　in

itself；　but　as　real；　because　it　can　thus　be　most　easily　and

certainly　adjudged；　and　it　is　thus　accepted　and　dealt　with　according

to　a　pure　principle　a　priori。　Upon　this　principle；　various　statutory

laws　come　to　be　founded　which　specially　aim　at　laying　down　the

conditions　under　which　alone　a　mode　of　acquisition　shall　be

legitimate；　so　that　the　judge　may　be　able　to　assign　every　one　his

own　as　easily　and　certainly　as　possible。　Thus；　in　the　brocard；

〃Purchase　breaks　hire；〃　what　by　the　nature　of　the　subject　is　a　real

right…　namely　the　hire…　is　taken　to　hold　as　a　merely　personal　right；

and；　conversely；　as　in　the　case　referred　to　above；　what　is　in　itself

merely　a　personal　right　is　held　to　be　valid　as　a　real　right。　And

this　is　done　only　when　the　question　arises　as　to　the　principles　by

which　a　court　of　justice　in　the　civil　state　is　to　be　guided；　in

order　to　proceed　with　all　possible　safety　in　delivering　judgement　on

the　rights　of　individuals。



　　　　　　40。　IV。　Acquisition　of　Security　by　the　Taking　of　an　Oath。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Cautio　Juratoria）。



　　Only　one　ground　can　be　assigned　on　which　it　could　be　held　that　men

are　bound　in　the　juridical　relation　to　believe　and　to　confess　that

there　are　gods；　or　that　there　is　a　God。　It　is　that　they　may　be　able　to

swear　an　oath；　and　that　thus　by　the　fear　of　an　all…seeing　Supreme

Power；　whose　revenge　they　must　solemnly　invoke　upon　themselves　in　case

their　utterance　should　be　false；　they　may　be　constrained　to　be

truthful　in　statement　and　faithful　in　promising。　It　is　not　morality

but　merely　blind　superstition　that　is　reckoned　upon　in　this　process；

for　it　is　evident　it　implies　that　no　certainty　is　to　be　expected

from　a　mere　solemn　declaration　in　matters　of　right　before　a　court；

although　the　duty　of　truthfulness　must　have　always　appeared

self…evident　to　all；　in　a　matter　which　concerns　the　holiest　that　can

be　among　men…　namely；　the　right　of　man。　Hence　recourse　has　been　had　to

a　motive　founded　on　mere　myths　and　fables　as　imaginary　guarantees。

Thus　among　the　Rejangs；　a　heathen　people　in　Sumatra；　it　is　the　custom…

according　to　the　testimony　of　Marsden…　to　swear　by　the　bones　of

their　dead　relatives；　although　they　have　no　belief　in　a　life　after

death。　In　like　manner　the　negroes　of　Guinea　swear　by　their　fetish；　a

bird's　feather；　which　they　imprecate　under　the　belief　that　it　will

break　their　neck。　And　so　in　other　cases。　The　belief　underlying　these

oaths　is　that　an　invisible　power…　whether　it　has　understanding　or　not…

by　its　very　nature　possesses　magical　power　that　can　be　put　into　action

by　such　invocations。　Such　a　belief…　which　is　commonly　called　religion；

but　which　ought　to　be　called　superstition…　is；　however；

indispensable　for　the　administration　of　justice；　because；　without

referring　to　it；　a　court　of　justice　would　not　have　adequate　means　to

ascertain　facts　otherwise　kept　secret；　and　to　determine　rights。　A

law　making　an　oath　obligatory　is　therefore　only　given　in　behoof　of　the

judicial　authority。

　　But　then　the　question　arises　as　to　what　the　obligation　could　be

founded　upon　that　would　bind　any　one　in　a　court　of　justice　to　accept

the　oath　of　another　person　as　a　right　and　valid　proof　of　the　truth

of　his　statements　which　are　to　put　an　end　to　all　dispute。　In　other

words；　what　obliges　me　juridically　to　believe　that　another　person　when

taking　an　oath　has　any　religion　at　all；　so　that　I　should　subordinate

or　entrust　my　right　to　his　oath？　And；　on　like　grounds；　conversely；　can

I　be　bound　at　all　to　take　an　oath？　It　is　evident　that　both　these

questions　point　to　what　is　in　itself　morally　wrong。

　　But　in　relation　to　a　court　of　justice…　and　generally　in　the　civil

state…　if　it　be　assumed　there　are　no　other　means　of　getting　to　the

truth　in　certain　cases　than　by　an　oath；　it　must　be　adopted。　In

regard　to　religion；　under　the　supposition　that　every　one　has　it；　it

may　be　utilized　as　a　necessary　means　（in　causu　necessitatis）；　in

behoof　of　the　legitimate　procedure　of　a　court　of　justice。　The　court

uses　this　form　of　spiritual　compulsion　（tortura　spiritualis）　as　an

available　means；　in　conformity　with　the　superstitious　propensity　of

mankind；　for　the　ascertainment　of　what　is　concealed；　and　therefore

holds　itself　justified　in　so　doing。　The　legislative　power；　however；　is

fundamentally　wrong　in　assigning　this　authority　to　the　judicial　power；

because　even　in　the　civil　state　any　compulsion　with　regard　to　the

taking　of　oaths　is　contrary　to　the　inalienable　freedom　of　man。



　　Official　oaths；　which　are　usually　promissory；　being　taken　on

entering　upon　an　office；　to　the　effect　that　the　individual　has　sincere

intention　to　administer　his　functions　dutifully；　might　well　be　changed

into　assertory　oaths；　to　be　taken　at　the　end　of　a　year　or　more　of

actual　administration；　the　official　swearing　to　the　faithfulness　of

his　discharge　of　duty　during　that　time。　This　would　bring　the

conscience　more　into　action　than　the　promissory　oath；　which　always

gives　room　for　the　internal　pretext　that；　with　the　best　intention；　the

difficulties　that　arose　during　the　administration　of　the　official

function　were　not　foreseen。　And；　further；　violations　of　duty；　under

the　prospect　of　their　being　summed　up　by　future　censors；　would　give

rise　to　more　anxiety　as　to　censure　than　when　they　are　merely

represented；　one　after　the　other；　and　forgotten。

　　As　regards　an　oath　taken　concerning　a　matter　of　belief　（de

credulitate）；　it　is　evident　that　no　such　oath　can　be　demanded　by　a

court。　1。　For；　first；　it　contains　in　itself　a　contradiction。　Such

belief；　as　intermediate　between　opinion　and　knowledge；　is　a　thing　on

which　one　might　venture　to　lay　a　wager　but　not　to　swear　an　oath。　2。

And；　second；　the　judge　who　imposes　an　oath　of　belief；　in　order　to

ascertain　anything　pertinent　to　his　own　purpose　or　even　to　the

common　good；　commits　a　great　offence　against　the　conscientiousness

of　the　party　taking　such　an　oath。　This　he　does　in　regard　both　to　the

levity　of　mind；　which　he　thereby　helps　to　engender；　and　to　the

stings　of　conscience　which　a　man　must　feel　who　to…day　regards　a

subject　from　a　certain　point　of　view；　but　who　will　very　probably

to…morrow　find　it　quite　improbable　from　another　point　of　view。　Any

one；　therefore；　who　is　compelled　to　take　such　an　oath；　is　subjected　to

an　injury。



　　　　　　　　Transition　from　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the　State

　　　　　　　　　　　of　Nature　to　the　Mine　and　Thine　in　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Juridical　State　Generally。



　　　　　　　　　41。　Public　Justice　as　Related　to　the　Natural

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　and　the　Civil　State。



　　The　juridical　state　is　that　relation　of　men　to　one　another　which

contains　the　conditions　under　which　it　is　alone　possible　for　every　one

to　obtain　the　right　that　is　his　due。　The　formal　principle　of　the

possibility　of　actually　participating　in　such　right；　viewed　in

accordance　with　the　idea　of　a　universally　legislative　will；　is

public　justice。　Public　justice　may　be　considered　in　relation　either　to

the　possibility；　or　actuality；　or　necessity　of　the　possession　of

objects…　regarded　as　the　matter　of　the　activity　of　the　will…　according

to　laws。　It　may　thus　be　divided　into　protective　justice　（justitia

testatrix）；　commutative　justice　（justitia　commutativa）；　and

distributive　justice　（justitia　distributiva）；　in　the　first　mode　of

justice；　the　law　declares　merely　what　relation　is　internally　right

in　respect　of　form　（lex　justi）；　in　the　second；　it　declares　what　is

likewise　externally　in　accord　with　a　law　in　respect　of　the　object；　and

what　possession　is　rightful　（lex　juridica）；　and　in　the　third；　it

declares　what　is　right；　and　what　is　just；　and　to　wha