the science of right-第2章

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As　right　in　general　has　for　its　object　only　what　is　external　in

actions；　strict　right；　as　that　with　which　nothing　ethical　is

intermingled；　requires　no　other　motives　of　action　than　those　that

are　merely　external；　for　it　is　then　pure　right　and　is　unmixed　with　any

prescriptions　of　virtue。　A　strict　right；　then；　in　the　exact　sense　of

the　term；　is　that　which　alone　can　be　called　wholly　external。　Now

such　right　is　founded；　no　doubt；　upon　the　consciousness　of　the

obligation　of　every　individual　according　to　the　law；　but　if　it　is　to

be　pure　as　such；　it　neither　may　nor　should　refer　to　this　consciousness

as　a　motive　by　which　to　determine　the　free　act　of　the　will。　For　this

purpose；　however；　it　founds　upon　the　principle　of　the　possibility　of

an　external　compulsion；　such　as　may　coexist　with　the　freedom　of

every　one　according　to　universal　laws。　Accordingly；　then；　where　it

is　said　that　a　creditor　has　a　right　to　demand　from　a　debtor　the

payment　of　his　debt；　this　does　not　mean　merely　that　he　can　bring　him

to　feel　in　his　mind　that　reason　obliges　him　to　do　this；　but　it　means

that　he　can　apply　an　external　compulsion　to　force　any　such　one　so　to

pay；　and　that　this　compulsion　is　quite　consistent　with　the　freedom

of　all；　including　the　parties　in　question；　according　to　a　universal

law。　Right　and　the　title　to　compel；　thus　indicate　the　same　thing。



　　The　law　of　right；　as　thus　enunciated；　is　represented　as　a　reciprocal

compulsion　necessarily　in　accordance　with　the　freedom　of　every　one；

under　the　principle　of　a　universal　freedom。　It　is　thus；　as　it　were；

a　representative　construction　of　the　conception　of　right；　by

exhibiting　it　in　a　pure　intuitive　perception　a　priori；　after　the

analogy　of　the　possibility　of　the　free　motions　of　bodies　under　the

physical　law　of　the　equality　of　action　and　reaction。　Now；　as　in　pure

mathematics；　we　cannot　deduce　the　properties　of　its　objects

immediately　from　a　mere　abstract　conception；　but　can　only　discover

them　by　figurative　construction　or　representation　of　its

conceptions；　so　it　is　in　like　manner　with　the　principle　of　right。　It

is　not　so　much　the　mere　formal　conception　of　right；　but　rather　that　of

a　universal　and　equal　reciprocal　compulsion　as　harmonizing　with　it；

and　reduced　under　general　laws；　that　makes　representation　of　that

conception　possible。　But　just　as　those　conceptions　presented　in

dynamics　are　founded　upon　a　merely　formal　representation　of　pure

mathematics　as　presented　in　geometry；　reason　has　taken　care　also　to

provide　the　understanding　as　far　as　possible　with　intuitive

presentations　a　priori　in　behoof　of　a　construction　of　the　conception

of　right。　The　right　in　geometrical　lines　（rectum）　is　opposed；　as　the

straight；　to　that　which　is　curved　and　to　that　which　is　oblique。　In　the

first　opposition；　there　is　involved　an　inner　quality　of　the　lines　of

such　a　nature　that　there　is　only　one　straight　or　right　line　possible

between　two　given　points。　In　the　second　case；　again；　the　positions

of　two　intersecting　or　meeting　lines　are　of　such　a　nature　that　there

can　likewise　be　only　one　line　called　the　perpendicular；　which　is　not

more　inclined　to　the　one　side　than　the　other；　and　it　divides　space

on　either　side　into　two　equal　parts。　After　the　manner　of　this　analogy；

the　science　of　right　aims　at　determining　what　every　one　shall　have

as　his　own　with　mathematical　exactness；　but　this　is　not　to　be　expected

in　the　ethical　science　of　virtue；　as　it　cannot　but　allow　a　certain

latitude　for　exceptions。　But；　without　passing　into　the　sphere　of

ethics；　there　are　two　cases…　known　as　the　equivocal　right　of　equity

and　necessity…　which　claim　a　juridical　decision；　yet　for　which　no

one　can　be　found　to　give　such　a　decision；　and　which；　as　regards

their　relation　to　rights；　belong；　as　it　were；　to　the　〃Intermundia〃

of　Epicurus。　These　we　must　at　the　outset　take　apart　from　the　special

exposition　of　the　science　of　right；　to　which　we　are　now　about　to

advance；　and　we　may　consider　them　now　by　way　of　supplement　to　these

introductory　explanations；　in　order　that　their　uncertain　conditions

may　not　exert　a　disturbing　influence　on　the　fixed　principles　of　the

proper　doctrine　of　right。





　　　　　　　　　　F。　Supplementary　Remarks　on　Equivocal　Right。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Jus　Aequivocum）。



　　With　every　right；　in　the　strict　acceptation　（jus　strictum）；　there　is

conjoined　a　right　to　compel。　But　it　is　possible　to　think　of　other

rights　of　a　wider　kind　（jus　latum）　in　which　the　title　to　compel　cannot

be　determined　by　any　law。　Now　there　are　two　real　or　supposed　rights　of

this　kind…　equity　and　the　right　of　necessity。　The　first　alleges　a

right　that　is　without　compulsion；　the　second　adopts　a　compulsion

that　is　without　right。　This　equivocalness；　however；　can　be　easily

shown　to　rest　on　the　peculiar　fact　that　there　are　cases　of　doubtful

right；　for　the　decision　of　which　no　judge　can　be　appointed。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I。　Equity。



　　Equity　（aequitas）；　regarded　objectively；　does　not　properly

constitute　a　claim　upon　the　moral　duty　of　benevolence　or　beneficence

on　the　part　of　others；　but　whoever　insists　upon　anything　on　the　ground

of　equity；　founds　upon　his　right　to　the　same。　In　this　case；　however；

the　conditions　are　awanting　that　are　requisite　for　the　function　of　a

judge　in　order　that　be　might　determine　what　or　what　kind　of

satisfaction　can　be　done　to　this　claim。　When　one　of　the　partners　of

a　mercantile　company；　formed　under　the　condition　of　equal　profits；

has；　however；　done　more　than　the　other　members；　and　in　consequence　has

also　lost　more；　it　is　in　accordance　with　equity　that　he　should

demand　from　the　company　more　than　merely　an　equal　share　of　advantage

with　the　rest。　But；　in　relation　to　strict　right…　if　we　think　of　a

judge　considering　his　case…　he　can　furnish　no　definite　data　to

establish　how　much　more　belongs　to　him　by　the　contract；　and　in　case　of

an　action　at　law；　such　a　demand　would　be　rejected。　A　domestic　servant；

again；　who　might　be　paid　his　wages　due　to　the　end　of　his　year　of

service　in　a　coinage　that　became　depreciated　within　that　period；　so

that　it　would　not　be　of　the　same　value　to　him　as　it　was　when　he

entered　on　his　engagement；　cannot　claim　by　right　to　be　kept　from

loss　on　account　of　the　unequal　value　of　the　money　if　he　receives　the

due　amount　of　it。　He　can　only　make　an　appeal　on　the　ground　of　equity；…

a　dumb　goddess　who　cannot　claim　a　bearing　of　right；…　because　there　was

nothing　bearing　on　this　point　in　the　contract　of　service；　and　a

judge　cannot　give　a　decree　on　the　basis　of　vague　or　indefinite

conditions。

　　Hence　it　follows；　that　a　court　of　equity；　for　the　decision　of

disputed　questions　of　right；　would　involve　a　contradiction。　It　is　only

where　his　own　proper　rights　are　concerned；　and　in　matters　in　which

he　can　decide；　that　a　judge　may　or　ought　to　give　a　hearing　to

equity。　Thus；　if　the　Crown　is　supplicated　to　give　an　indemnity　to

certain　persons　for　loss　or　injury　sustained　in　its　service；　it　may

undertake　the　burden　of　doing　so；　although；　according　to　strict　right；

the　claim　might　be　rejected　on　the　ground　of　the　pretext　that　the

parties　in　question　undertook　the　performance　of　the　service

occasioning　the　loss；　at　their　own　risk。

　　The　dictum　of　equity　may　be　put　thus：　〃The　strictest　right　is　the

greatest　wrong〃　（summum　jus　summa　injuria）。　But　this　evil　cannot　be

obviated　by　the　forms　of　right；　although　it　relates　to　a　matter　of

right；　for　the　grievance　that　it　gives　rise　to　can　only　be　put

before　a　〃court　of　conscience〃　（forum　poli）；　whereas　every　question　of

right　must　be　taken　before　a　civil　court　（forum　soli）。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　II。　The　Right　of　Necessity。



　　The　so…called　right　of　necessity　（jus　necessitatis）　is　the

supposed　right　or　title；　in　case　of　the　danger　of　losing　my　own

life；　to　take　away　the　life　of　another　who　has；　in　fact；　done　me　no

harm。　It　is　evident　that；　viewed　as　a　doctrine　of　right；　this　must

involve　a　contradiction；　For　this　is　not　the　case　of　a　wrongful

aggressor　making　an　unjust　a