the science of right-第14章

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alternative　will　be　clear　from　what　follows。

　　Suppose　I　conclude　a　contract　about　a　thing　that　I　wish　to

acquire…　such　as　a　horse…　and　that　I　take　it　immediately　into　my

stable；　or　otherwise　into　my　possession；　then　it　is　mine　（vi　pacti

re　initi）；　and　my　right　is　a　right　in　the　thing。　But　if　I　leave　it

in　the　hands　of　the　seller　without　arranging　with　him　specially　in

whose　physical　possession　or　holding　（detentio）　this　thing　shall　be

before　my　taking　possession　of　it　（apprehensio）；　and　consequently；

before　the　actual　change　of　possession；　the　horse　is　not　yet　mine；　and

the　right　which　I　acquire　is　only　a　right　against　a　particular　person…

namely；　the　seller　of　the　horse…　to　be　put　into　possession　of　the

object　（poscendi　traditionem）　as　the　subjective　condition　of　any　use

of　it　at　my　will。　My　right　is　thus　only　a　personal　right　to　demand

from　the　seller　the　performance　of　his　promise　（praestatio）　to　put

me　into　possession　of　the　thing。　Now；　if　the　contract　does　not　contain

the　condition　of　delivery　at　the　same　time…　as　a　pactum　re　initum…　and

consequently　an　interval　of　time　intervenes　between　the　conclusion

of　the　contract　and　the　taking　possession　of　the　object　of

acquisition；　I　cannot　obtain　possession　of　it　during　this　interval

otherwise　than　by　exercising　the　particular　juridical　activity

called　a　possessory　act　（actum　possessorium）；　which　constitutes　a

special　contract。　This　act　consists　in　my　saying；　〃I　will　send　to

fetch　the　horse；〃　to　which　the　seller　has　to　agree。　For　it　is　not

self…evident　or　universally　reasonable　that　any　one　will　take　a

thing　destined　for　the　use　of　another　into　his　charge　at　his　own　risk。

On　the　contrary；　a　special　contract　is　necessary　for　this　arrangement；

according　to　which　the　alienator　of　a　thing　continues　to　be　its

owner　during　a　certain　definite　time；　and　must　bear　the　risk　of

whatever　may　happen　to　it；　while　the　acquirer　can　only　be　regarded

by　the　seller　as　the　owner　when　he　has　delayed　to　enter　into

possession　beyond　the　date　at　which　he　agreed　to　take　delivery。

Prior　to　the　possessory　act；　therefore；　all　that　is　acquired　by　the

contract　is　only　a　personal　right；　and　the　acceptor　can　acquire　an

external　thing　only　by　delivery。





　　　　　　SECTION　III。　Principles　of　Personal　Right　that　is　Real

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in　Kind。　（Jus　Realiter　Personale）。

　　　　　　　　　　22。　Nature　of　Personal　Right　of　a　Real　Kind。



　　Personal　right　of　a　real　kind　is　the　right　to　the　possession　of　an

external　object　as　a　thing；　and　to　the　use　of　it　as　a　person。　The　mine

and　thine　embraced　under　this　right　relate　specially　to　the　family　and

household；　and　the　relations　involved　are　those　of　free　beings　in

reciprocal　real　interaction　with　each　other。　Through　their　relations

and　influence　as　persons　upon　one　another；　in　accordance　with　the

principle　of　external　freedom　as　the　cause　of　it；　they　form　a

society　composed　as　a　whole　of　members　standing　in　community　with　each

other　as　persons；　and　this　constitutes　the　household。　The　mode　in

which　this　social　status　is　acquired　by　individuals；　and　the　functions

which　prevail　within　it；　proceed　neither　by　arbitrary　individual

action　（facto）；　nor　by　mere　contract　（pacto）；　but　by　law　（lege）。　And

this　law　as　being　not　only　a　right；　but　also　as　constituting

possession　in　reference　to　a　person；　is　a　right　rising　above　all

mere　real　and　personal　right。　It　must；　in　fact；　form　the　right　of

humanity　in　our　own　person；　and；　as　such；　it　has　as　its　consequence

a　natural　permissive　law；　by　the　favour　of　which　such　acquisition

becomes　possible　to　us。



　　　　　　　　　　　　23。　What　is　acquired　in　the　household。



　　The　acquisition　that　is　founded　upon　this　law　is；　as　regards　its

objects；　threefold。　The　man　acquires　a　wife；　the　husband　and　wife

acquire　children；　constituting　a　family；　and　the　family　acquire

domestics。　All　these　objects；　while　acquirable；　are　inalienable；　and

the　right　of　possession　in　these　objects　is　the　most　strictly　personal

of　all　rights。



　　　　　　　　The　Rights　of　the　Family　as　a　Domestic　Society



　　　　　　　　　Title　I。　Conjugal　Right。　（Husband　and　Wife）

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　24。　The　Natural　Basis　of　Marriage。



　　The　domestic　relations　are　founded　on　marriage；　and　marriage　is

founded　upon　the　natural　reciprocity　or　intercommunity　（commercium）　of

the　sexes。*　This　natural　union　of　the　sexes　proceeds　according　to

the　mere　animal　nature　（vaga　libido；　venus　vulgivaga；　fornicatio）；

or　according　to　the　law。　The　latter　is　marriage　（matrimonium）；　which

is　the　union　of　two　persons　of　different　sex　for　life…long

reciprocal　possession　of　their　sexual　faculties。　The　end　of

producing　and　educating　children　may　be　regarded　as　always　the　end

of　nature　in　implanting　mutual　desire　and　inclination　in　the　sexes；

but　it　is　not　necessary　for　the　rightfulness　of　marriage　that　those

who　marry　should　set　this　before　themselves　as　the　end　of　their　union；

otherwise　the　marriage　would　be　dissolved　of　itself　when　the

production　of　children　ceased。



　　*Commercium　sexuale　est　usus　membrorum　et　facultatum　sexualium

alterius。　This　〃usus〃　is　either　natural；　by　which　human　beings　may

reproduce　their　own　kind；　or　unnatural；　which；　again；　refers　either　to

a　person　of　the　same　sex　or　to　an　animal　of　another　species　than

man。　These　transgressions　of　all　law；　as　crimina　carnis　contra

naturam；　are　even　〃not　to　be　named〃；　and；　as　wrongs　against　all

humanity　in　the　person；　they　cannot　be　saved；　by　any　limitation　or

exception　whatever；　from　entire　reprobation。



　　And　even　assuming　that　enjoyment　in　the　reciprocal　use　of　the　sexual

endowments　is　an　end　of　marriage；　yet　the　contract　of　marriage　is

not　on　that　account　a　matter　of　arbitrary　will；　but　is　a　contract

necessary　in　its　nature　by　the　law　of　humanity。　In　other　words；　if　a

man　and　a　woman　have　the　will　to　enter　on　reciprocal　enjoyment　in

accordance　with　their　sexual　nature；　they　must　necessarily　marry

each　other；　and　this　necessity　is　in　accordance　with　the　juridical

laws　of　pure　reason。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　25。　The　Rational　Right　of　Marriage。



　　For；　this　natural　commercium…　as　a　usus　membrorum　sexualium

alterius…　is　an　enjoyment　for　which　the　one　person　is　given　up　to

the　other。　In　this　relation　the　human　individual　makes　himself　a

res；　which　is　contrary　to　the　right　of　humanity　in　his　own　person。

This；　however；　is　only　possible　under　the　one　condition；　that　as　the

one　person　is　acquired　by　the　other　as　a　res；　that　same　person　also

equally　acquires　the　other　reciprocally；　and　thus　regains　and

reestablishes　the　rational　personality。　The　acquisition　of　a　part　of

the　human　organism　being；　on　account　of　its　unity；　at　the　same　time

the　acquisition　of　the　whole　person；　it　follows　that　the　surrender　and

acceptation　of；　or　by；　one　sex　in　relation　to　the　other；　is　not　only

permissible　under　the　condition　of　marriage；　but　is　further　only

really　possible　under　that　condition。　But　the　personal　right　thus

acquired　is；　at　the　same　time；　real　in　kind；　and　this　characteristic

of　it　is　established　by　the　fact　that　if　one　of　the　married　persons

run　away　or　enter　into　the　possession　of　another；　the　other　is

entitled；　at　any　time；　and　incontestably；　to　bring　such　a　one　back

to　the　former　relation；　as　if　that　person　were　a　thing。



　　　　　　　　　　　　26。　Monogamy　and　Equality　in　Marriage。



　　For　the　same　reasons；　the　relation　of　the　married　persons　to　each

other　is　a　relation　of　equality　as　regards　the　mutual　possession　of

their　persons；　as　well　as　of　their　goods。　Consequently　marriage　is

only　truly　realized　in　monogamy；　for　in　the　relation　of　polygamy　the

person　who　is　given　away　on　the　one　side；　gains　only　a　part　of　the　one

to　whom　that　person　is　given　up；　and　therefore　becomes　a　mere　res。　But

in　respect　of　their　goods；　they　have　severally　the　right　to　renounce

the　use　of　any　part　of　them；　although　only　by　a　special　contract。



　　From　the　principle　thus　stated；　it　also　follows　that　concubinage

is　as　little　capable　of　being　brou