the science of right-第13章

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both；　and　consequently　so　far　only　as　the　will　of　both　is　declared

at　the　same　time　or　simultaneously。　Now；　such　simultaneousness　is

impossible　by　empirical　acts　of　declaration；　which　can　only　follow

each　other　in　time　and　are　never　actually　simultaneous。　For　if　I

have　promised；　and　another　person　is　now　merely　willing　to　accept；

during　the　interval　before　actual　acceptance；　however　short　it　may　be；

I　may　retract　my　offer；　because　I　am　thus　far　still　free；　and；　on

the　other　side；　the　acceptor；　for　the　same　reason；　may　likewise　hold

himself　not　to　be　bound；　up　till　the　moment　of　acceptance；　by　his

counter…declaration　following　upon　the　promise。　The　external

formalities　or　solemnities　（solemnia）　on　the　conclusion　of　a　contract…

such　as　shaking　hands　or　breaking　a　straw　（stipula）　laid　hold　of　by

two　persons…　and　all　the　various　modes　of　confirming　the

declarations　on　either　side；　prove　in　fact　the　embarrassment　of　the

contracting　parties　as　to　how　and　in　what　way　they　may　represent

declarations；　which　are　always　successive；　as　existing

simultaneously　at　the　same　moment；　and　these　forms　fail　to　do　this。

They　are；　by　their　very　nature；　acts　necessarily　following　each

other　in　time；　so　that　when　the　one　act　is；　the　other　either　is　not

yet　or　is　no　longer。

　　It　is　only　the　philosophical　transcendental　deduction　of　the

conception　of　acquisition　by　contract　that　can　remove　all　these

difficulties。　In　a　juridical　external　relation；　my　taking　possession

of　the　free…will　of　another；　as　the　cause　that　determined　it　to　a

certain　act；　is　conceived　at　first　empirically　by　means　of　the

declaration　and　counter…declaration　of　the　free…will　of　each　of　us

in　time；　as　the　sensible　conditions　of　taking　possession；　and　the

two　juridical　acts　must　necessarily　be　regarded　as　following　one

another　in　time。　But　because　this　relation；　viewed　as　juridical；　is

purely　rational　in　itself；　the　will　as　a　law…giving　faculty　of

reason　represents　this　possession　as　intelligible　or　rational

（possessio　noumenon）；　in　accordance　with　conceptions　of　freedom　and

under　abstraction　of　those　empirical　conditions。　And　now；　the　two　acts

of　promise　and　acceptance　are　not　regarded　as　following　one　another　in

time；　but；　in　the　manner　of　a　pactum　re　initum；　as　proceeding　from　a

common　will；　which　is　expressed　by　the　term　〃at　the　same　time；〃　or

〃simultaneous；〃　and　the　object　promised　（promissum）　is　represented；

under　elimination　of　empirical　conditions；　as　acquired　according　to

the　law　of　the　pure　practical　reason。



　　That　this　is　the　true　and　only　possible　deduction　of　the　idea　of

acquisition　by　contract　is　sufficiently　attested　by　the　laborious

yet　always　futile　striving　of　writers　on　jurisprudence　such　as　Moses

Mendelssohn　in　his　Jerusalem…　to　adduce　a　proof　of　its　rational

possibility。　The　question　is　put　thus：　〃Why　ought　I　to　keep　my

Promise？〃　For　it　is　assumed　as　understood　by　all　that　I　ought　to　do

so。　It　is；　however；　absolutely　impossible　to　give　any　further　proof　of

the　categorical　imperative　implied；　just　as　it　is　impossible　for　the

geometrician　to　prove　by　rational　syllogisms　that　in　order　to

construct　a　triangle　I　must　take　three　lines…　so　far　an　analytical

proposition…　of　which　three　lines　any　two　together　must　be　greater

than　the　third…　a　synthetical　proposition；　and　like　the　former　a

priori。　It　is　a　postulate　of　the　pure　reason　that　we　ought　to　abstract

from　all　the　sensible　conditions　of　space　and　time　in　reference　to　the

conception　of　right；　and　the　theory　of　the　possibility　of　such

abstraction　from　these　conditions；　without　taking　away　the　reality

of　the　possession；　just　constitutes　the　transcendental　deduction　of

the　conception　of　acquisition　by　contract。　It　is　quite　akin　to　what

was　presented　under　the　last　title；　as　the　theory　of　acquisition　by

occupation　of　the　external　object。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　20。　What　is　Acquired　by　Contract。



　　But　what　is　that；　designated　as　external；　which　I　acquire　by

contract？　As　it　is　only　the　causality　of　the　active　will　of　another；

in　respect　of　the　performance　of　something　promised　to　me；　I　do　not

immediately　acquire　thereby　an　external　thing；　but　an　act　of　the

will　in　question；　whereby　a　thing　is　brought　under　my　power　so　that

I　make　it　mine。　By　the　contract；　therefore；　I　acquire　the　promise　of

another；　as　distinguished　from　the　thing　promised；　and　yet　something

is　thereby　added　to　my　having　and　possession。　I　have　become　the　richer

in　possession　（locupletior）　by　the　acquisition　of　an　active　obligation

that　I　can　bring　to　bear　upon　the　freedom　and　capability　of　another。

This　my　right；　however；　is　only　a　personal　right；　valid　only　to　the

effect　of　acting　upon　a　particular　physical　person　and　specially

upon　the　causality　of　his　will；　so　that　he　shall　perform　something　for

me。　It　is　not　a　real　right　upon　that　moral　person；　which　is　identified

with　the　idea　of　the　united　will　of　all　viewed　a　priori；　and　through

which　alone　I　can　acquire　a　right　valid　against　every　possessor　of　the

thing。　For；　it　is　in　this　that　all　right　in　a　thing　consists。



　　The　transfer　or　transmission　of　what　is　mine　to　another　by　contract；

takes　place　according　to　the　law　of　continuity　（lex　continui）。

Possession　of　the　object　is　not　interrupted　for　a　moment　during　this

act；　for；　otherwise；　I　would　acquire　an　object　in　this　state　as　a

thing　that　had　no　possessor；　and　it　would　thus　be　acquired　originally；

which　is　contrary　to　the　idea　of　a　contract。　This　continuity；　however；

implies　that　it　is　not　the　particular　will　of　either　the　promiser　or

the　acceptor；　but　their　united　will　in　common；　that　transfers　what

is　mine　to　another。　And　hence　it　is　not　accomplished　in　such　a

manner　that　the　promiser　first　relinquishes　（derelinquit）　his

possession　for　the　benefit　of　another；　or　renounces　his　right

（renunciat）；　and　thereupon　the　other　at　the　same　time　enters　upon

it；　or　conversely。　The　transfer　（translatio）　is　therefore　an　act　in

which　the　object　belongs　for　a　moment　at　the　same　time　to　both；　just

as　in　the　parabolic　path　of　a　projectile　the　object　on　reaching　its

highest　point　may　be　regarded　for　a　moment　as　at　the　same　time　both

rising　and　falling；　and　as　thus　passing　in　fact　from　the　ascending

to　the　falling　motion。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　21。　Acceptance　and　Delivery。



　　A　thing　is　not　acquired　in　a　case　of　contract　by　the　acceptance

（acceptatio）　of　the　promise；　but　only　by　the　delivery　（traditio）　of

the　object　promised。　For　all　promise　is　relative　to　performance；　and

if　what　was　promised　is　a　thing；　the　performance　cannot　be　executed

otherwise　than　by　an　act　whereby　the　acceptor　is　put　by　the　promiser

into　possession　of　the　thing；　and　this　is　delivery。　Before　the

delivery　and　the　reception　of　the　thing；　the　performance　of　the　act

required　has　not　yet　taken　place；　the　thing　has　not　yet　passed　from

the　one　person　to　the　other　and；　consequently；　has　not　been　acquired

by　that　other。　Hence　the　right　arising　from　a　contract　is　only　a

personal　right；　and　it　only　becomes　a　real　right　by　delivery。



　　A　contract　upon　which　delivery　immediately　follows　（pactum　re

initum）　excludes　any　interval　of　time　between　its　conclusion　and　its

execution；　and　as　such　it　requires　no　further　particular　act　in　the

future　by　which　one　person　may　transfer　to　another　what　is　his。　But　if

there　is　a　time…　definite　or　indefinite…　agreed　upon　between　them

for　the　delivery；　the　question　then　arises　whether　the　thing　has

already　before　that　time　become　the　acceptor's　by　the　contract；　so

that　his　right　is　a　right　in　the　thing；　or　whether　a　further　special

contract　regarding　the　delivery　alone　must　be　entered　upon；　so　that

the　right　that　is　acquired　by　mere　acceptance　is　only　a　personal

right；　and　thus　it　does　not　become　a　right　in　the　thing　until

delivery？　That　the　relation　must　be　determined　according　to　the　latter

alternative　will　be　clear　from　what　follows。

　　Suppose　I　conclude　a　contract　about　a　thing　that　I　wish　to

acquire…　such　as　a　horse