meditations on first philosophy-第3章
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ption to desire to determine and understand that which God can and ought to do。 In this way all that they allege will cause us no difficulty； provided only we remember that we must consider our minds as things which are finite and limited； and God as a Being who is incomprehensible and infinite。 Now that I have once for all recognised and acknowledged the opinions of men； I at once begin to treat of God and the Human soul； and at the same time to treat of the whole of the First Philosophy； without however expecting any praise from the vulgar and without the hope that my book will have many readers。 On the contrary； I should never advise anyone to read it excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with me； and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense； and deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice。 I know too well that such men exist in a very small number。 But for those who； without caring to comprehend the order and connections of my reasonings； form their criticisms on detached portions arbitrarily selected； as is the custom with many； these； I say； will not obtain much profit from reading this Treatise。 And although they perhaps in several parts find occasion of cavilling； they can for all their pains make no objection which is urgent or deserving of reply。 And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy them at once； and as I do not presume so much on my own powers as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause difficulty to anyone； I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the truth； in order to see if； by the same reasons which persuaded me； I can also persuade others。 And； after that； I shall reply to the objections which have been made to me by persons of genius and learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for examination； before submitting them to the press。 For they have made so many objections and these so different； that I venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not been already touched upon。 This is why I beg those who read these Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they have given themselves the trouble to read all the objections as well as the replies which I have made to them。6
Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations。 In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which we may； generally speaking； doubt about all things and especially about material things； at least so long as we have no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have hitherto possessed。 But although the utility of a Doubt which is so general does not at first appear； it is at the same time very great； inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of prejudice； and sets out for us a very simple way by which the mind may detach itself from the senses； and finally it makes it impossible for us ever to doubt those things which we have once discovered to be true。 In the second Meditation； mind； which making use of the liberty which pertains to it； takes for granted that all those things of whose existence it has the least doubt； are non… existent； recognises that it is however absolutely impossible that it does not itself exist。 This point is likewise of the greatest moment； inasmuch as by this means a distinction is easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind that is to say to the intellectual nature and those which pertain to body。 But because it may be that some expect from me in this place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality of the soul； I feel that I should here make known to them that having aimed at writing nothing in all this Treatise of which I do not possess very exact demonstrations； I am obliged to follow a similar order to that made use of by the geometers； which is to begin by putting forward as premises all those things upon which the proposition that we seek depends； before coming to any conclusion regarding it。 Now the first and principal matter which is requisite for thoroughly understanding the immortality of the soul is to form the clearest possible conception of it； and one which will be entirely distinct from all the conceptions which we may have of body； and in this Meditation this has been done。 In addition to this it is requisite that we may be assured that all the things which we conceive clearly and distinctly are true in the very way in which we think them； and this could not be proved previously to the Fourth Mediation。 Further we must have a distinct conception of corporeal nature； which is given partly in this Second； and partly in the Fifth and Sixth Meditations。 And finally we should conclude from all this； that those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances； as we regard mind and body to be； are really substances essentially distinct one from the other； and this is the conclusion of the Sixth Meditation。 This is further confirmed in this same Meditation by the fact that we cannot conceive of body excepting in so far as it is divisible； while the mind cannot be conceived of excepting as indivisible。 For we are not able to conceive of the half of a mind as we can do of the smallest of all bodies； so that we see that not only are their natures different but even in some respects contrary to one another。 I have not however dealt further with this matter in this treatise； both because what I have said is sufficient to show clearly enough that the extinction of the mind does not follow from the corruption of the body； and also to give men the hope of another life after death； as also because the premises from which the immortality of the soul may be deduced depend on an elucidation of a complete system of Physics。 This would mean to establish in the first place that all substances generally that is to say all things which cannot exist without being created by God￥are in their nature incorruptible； and that they can never cease to exist unless God； in denying to them his concurrence； reduce them to nought； and secondly that body； regarded generally； is a substance； which is the reason why it also cannot perish； but that the human body； inasmuch as it differs from other bodies； is composed only of a certain configuration of members and of other similar accidents； while the human mind is not similarly composed of any accidents； but is a pure substance。 For although all the accidents of mind be changed； although； for instance； it think certain things； will others； perceive others； etc。； despite all this it does not emerge from these changes another mind： the human body on the other hand becomes a different thing from the sole fact that the figure or form of any of its portions is found to be changed。 From this it follows that the human body may indeed easily enough perish； but the mind ＇or soul of man （I make no distinction between them）＇ is owing to its nature immortal。 In the third Meditation it seems to me that I have explained at sufficient length the principal argument of which I make use in order to prove the existence of God。 But none the less； because I did not wish in that place to make use of any comparisons derived from corporeal things； so as to withdraw as much as I could the minds of readers from the senses； there may perhaps have remained many obscurities which； however； will； I hope； be entirely removed by the Replies which I have made to the Objections which have been set before me。 Amongst others there is； for example； this one； 〃How the idea in us of a being supremely perfect possesses so much objective reality ＇that is to say participates by representation in so many degrees of being and perfection＇ that it necessarily proceeds from a cause which is absolutely perfect。〃 This is illustrated in these Replies by the comparison of a very perfect machine； the idea of which is found in the mind of some workman。 For as the objective contrivance of this idea must have some cause； i。e。 either the science of the workman or that of some other from whom he has received the idea； it is similarly impossible that the idea of
