meditations on first philosophy-第16章
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er held the truths of mathematics （which concern only numbers and figures） to be。 This indeed is not at first manifest； since it would seem to present some appearance of being a sophism。 For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence； I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God； and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing。 But； nevertheless； when I think of it with more attention； I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a ＇rectilinear＇ triangle； or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley； and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God （that is； a Being supremely perfect） to whom existence is lacking （that is to say； to whom a certain perfection is lacking）； than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley。 But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley； still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley； it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world； similarly although I conceive of God as possessing existence； it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God which exists； for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things； and just as I may imagine a winged horse； although no horse with wings exists； so I could perhaps attribute existence to God； although no God existed。 But a sophism is concealed in this objection； for from the fact that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley； it does not follow that there is any mountain or any valley in existence； but only that the mountain and the valley； whether they exist or do not exist； cannot in any way be separated one from the other。 While from the fact that I cannot conceive God without existence； it follows that existence is inseparable from Him； and hence that He really exists； not that my thought can bring this to pass； or impose any necessity on things； but； on the contrary； because the necessity which lies in the thing itself； i。e。 the necessity of the existence of God determines me to think in this way。 For it is not within my power to think of God without existence （that is of a supremely perfect Being devoid of a supreme perfection） though it is in my power to imagine a horse either with wings or without wings。 And we must not here object that it is in truth necessary for me to assert that God exists after having presupposed that He possesses every sort of perfection； since existence is one of these； but that as a matter of fact my original supposition was not necessary； just as it is not necessary to consider that all quadrilateral figures can be inscribed in the circle； for supposing I thought this； I should be constrained to admit that the rhombus might be inscribed in the circle since it is a quadrilateral figure； which； however； is manifestly false。 ＇We must not； I say； make any such allegations because＇ although it is not necessary that I should at any time entertain the notion of God； nevertheless whenever it happens that I think of a first and a sovereign Being； and； so to speak； derive the idea of Him from the storehouse of my mind； it is necessary that I should attribute to Him every sort of perfection； although I do not get so far as to enumerate them all； or to apply my mind to each one in particular。 And this necessity suffices to make me conclude （after having recognised that existence is a perfection） that this first and sovereign Being really exists； just as though it is not necessary for me ever to imagine any triangle； yet； whenever I wish to consider a rectilinear figure composed only of three angles； it is absolutely essential that I should attribute to it all those properties which serve to bring about the conclusion that its three angles are not greater than two right angles； even although I may not then be considering this point in particular。 But when I consider which figures are capable of being inscribed in the circle； it is in no wise necessary that I should think that all quadrilateral figures are of this number； on the contrary； I cannot even pretend that this is the case； so long as I do not desire to accept anything which I cannot conceive clearly and distinctly。 And in consequence there is a great difference between the false suppositions such as this； and the true ideas born within me； the first and principal of which is that of God。 For really I discern in many ways that this idea is not something factitious； and depending solely on my thought； but that it is the image of a true and immutable nature； first of all； because I cannot conceive anything but God himself to whose essence existence ＇necessarily＇ pertains； in the second place because it is not possible for me to conceive two or more Gods in this same position； and； granted that there is one such God who now exists； I see clearly that it is necessary that He should have existed from all eternity； and that He must exist eternally； and finally； because I know an infinitude of other properties in God； none of which I can either diminish or change。 For the rest； whatever proof or argument I avail myself of； we must always return to the point that it is only those things which we conceive clearly and distinctly that have the power of persuading me entirely。 And although amongst the matters which I conceive of in this way； some indeed are manifestly obvious to all； while others only manifest themselves to those who consider them closely and examine them attentively； still； after they have once been discovered； the latter are not esteemed as any less certain than the former。 For example； in the case of every right…angled triangle； although it does not so manifestly appear that the square of the base is equal to the squares of the two other sides as that this base is opposite to the greatest angle； still； when this has once been apprehended； we are just as certain of its truth as of the truth of the other。 And as regards God； if my mind were not pre…occupied with prejudices； and if my thought did not find itself on all hands diverted by the continual pressure of sensible things； there would be nothing which I could know more immediately and more easily than Him。 For is there anything more manifest than that there is a God； that is to say； a Supreme Being； to whose essence alone existence pertains？21 And although for a firm grasp of this truth I have need of a strenuous application of mind； at present I not only feel myself to be as assured of it as of all that I hold as most certain； but I also remark that the certainty of all other things depends on it so absolutely； that without this knowledge it is impossible ever to know anything perfectly。 For although I am of such a nature that as long as22 I understand anything very clearly and distinctly； I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true； yet because I am also of such a nature that I cannot have my mind constantly fixed on the same object in order to perceive it clearly； and as I often recollect having formed a past judgment without at the same time properly recollecting the reasons that led me to make it； it may happen meanwhile that other reasons present themselves to me； which would easily cause me to change my opinion； if I were ignorant of the facts of the existence of God； and thus I should have no true and certain knowledge； but only vague and vacillating opinions。 Thus； for example； when I consider the nature of a ＇rectilinear＇ triangle； I who have some little knowledge of the principles of geometry recognise quite clearly that the three angles are equal to two right angles； and it is not possible for me not to believe this so long as I apply my mind to its demonstration； but so soon as I abstain from attending to the proof； although I still recollect having clearly comprehended it； it may easily occur that I come to doubt its truth； if I am ignorant of there being a God。 For I can persuade myself of having been so constituted by nature that I can easily deceive myself even in those matters which I believe myself to app
