meditations on first philosophy-第15章
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created me so that I never should err； although I still remained free； and endowed with a limited knowledge； viz。 by giving to my understanding a clear and distinct intelligence of all things as to which I should ever have to deliberate； or simply by His engraving deeply in my memory the resolution never to form a judgment on anything without having a clear and distinct understanding of it； so that I could never forget it。 And it is easy for me to understand that； in so far as I consider myself alone； and as if there were only myself in the world； I should have been much more perfect than I am； if God had created me so that I could never err。 Nevertheless I cannot deny that in some sense it is a greater perfection in the whole universe that certain parts should not be exempt from error as others are than that all parts should be exactly similar。 And I have no right to complain if God； having placed me in the world； has not called upon me to play a part that excels all others in distinction and perfection。 And further I have reason to be glad on the ground that if He has not given me the power of never going astray by the first means pointed out above； which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the things regarding which I can deliberate； He has at least left within my power the other means； which is firmly to adhere to the resolution never to give judgment on matters whose truth is not clearly known to me； for although I notice a certain weakness in my nature in that I cannot continually concentrate my mind on one single thought； I can yet； by attentive and frequently repeated meditation； impress it so forcibly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it whenever I have need of it； and thus acquire the habit of never going astray。 And inasmuch as it is in this that the greatest and principal perfection of man consists； it seems to me that I have not gained little by this day's Meditation； since I have discovered the source of falsity and error。 And certainly there can be no other source than that which I have explained； for as often as I so restrain my will within the limits of my knowledge that it forms no judgment except on matters which are clearly and distinctly represented to it by the understanding； I can never be deceived； for every clear and distinct conception20 is without doubt something； and hence cannot derive its origin from what is nought； but must of necessity have God as its author￥God； I say； who being supremely perfect； cannot be the cause of any error； and consequently we must conclude that such a conception ＇or such a judgment＇ is true。 Nor have I only learned to…day what I should avoid in order that I may not err； but also how I should act in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth； for without doubt I shall arrive at this end if I devote my attention sufficiently to those things which I perfectly understand； and if I separate from these that which I only understand confusedly and with obscurity。 To these I shall henceforth diligently give heed。 Meditation V。 Of the essence of material things； and； again； of God； that He exists。
Many other matters respecting the attributes of God and my own nature or mind remain for consideration； but I shall possibly on another occasion resume the investigation of these。 Now （after first noting what must be done or avoided； in order to arrive at a knowledge of the truth） my principal task is to endeavour to emerge from the state of doubt into which I have these last days fallen； and to see whether nothing certain can be known regarding material things。 But before examining whether any such objects as I conceive exist outside of me； I must consider the ideas of them in so far as they are in my thought； and see which of them are distinct and which confused。 In the first place； I am able distinctly to imagine that quantity which philosophers commonly call continuous； or the extension in length； breadth； or depth； that is in this quantity； or rather in the object to which it is attributed。 Further； I can number in it many different parts； and attribute to each of its parts many sorts of size； figure； situation and local movement； and； finally； I can assign to each of these movements all degrees of duration。 And not only do I know these things with distinctness when I consider them in general； but； likewise ＇however little I apply my attention to the matter＇； I discover an infinitude of particulars respecting numbers； figures； movements； and other such things； whose truth is so manifest； and so well accords with my nature； that when I begin to discover them； it seems to me that I learn nothing new； or recollect what I formerly knew￥that is to say； that I for the first time perceive things which were already present to my mind； although I had not as yet applied my mind to them。 And what I here find to be most important is that I discover in myself an infinitude of ideas of certain things which cannot be esteemed as pure negations； although they may possibly have no existence outside of my thought； and which are not framed by me； although it is within my power either to think or not to think them； but which possess natures which are true and immutable。 For example； when I imagine a triangle； although there may nowhere in the world be such a figure outside my thought； or ever have been； there is nevertheless in this figure a certain determinate nature； form； or essence； which is immutable and eternal； which I have not invented； and which in no wise depends on my mind； as appears from the fact that diverse properties of that triangle can be demonstrated； viz。 that its three angles are equal to two right angles； that the greatest side is subtended by the greatest angle； and the like； which now； whether I wish it or do not wish it； I recognise very clearly as pertaining to it； although I never thought of the matter at all when I imagined a triangle for the first time； and which therefore cannot be said to have been invented by me。 Nor does the objection hold good that possibly this idea of a triangle has reached my mind through the medium of my senses； since I have sometimes seen bodies triangular in shape； because I can form in my mind an infinitude of other figures regarding which we cannot have the least conception of their ever having been objects of sense； and I can nevertheless demonstrate various properties pertaining to their nature as well as to that of the triangle； and these must certainly all be true since I conceive them clearly。 Hence they are something； and not pure negation； for it is perfectly clear that all that is true is something； and I have already fully demonstrated that all that I know clearly is true。 And even although I had not demonstrated this； the nature of my mind is such that I could not prevent myself from holding them to be true so long as I conceive them clearly； and I recollect that even when I was still strongly attached to the objects of sense； I counted as the most certain those truths which I conceived clearly as regards figures； numbers； and the other matters which pertain to arithmetic and geometry； and； in general； to pure and abstract mathematics。 But now； if just because I can draw the idea of something from my thought； it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it； may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God？ It is certain that I no less find the idea of God； that is to say； the idea of a supremely perfect Being； in me； than that of any figure or number whatever it is； and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an ＇actual and＇ eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number； and therefore； although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false； the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics （which concern only numbers and figures） to be。 This indeed i
