meditations on first philosophy-第14章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
t is of very small extent and extremely limited； and at the same time I find the idea of another faculty much more ample and even infinite； and seeing that I can form the idea of it； I recognise from this very fact that it pertains to the nature of God。 If in the same way I examine the memory； the imagination； or some other faculty； I do not find any which is not small and circumscribed； while in God it is immense ＇or infinite＇。 It is free…will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great； it is indeed the case that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God。 For although the power of will is incomparably greater in God than in me； both by reason of the knowledge and the power which； conjoined with it； render it stronger and more efficacious； and by reason of its object； inasmuch as in God it extends to a great many things； it nevertheless does not seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in itself： for the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it （that is； to affirm or deny； to pursue or to shun it）； or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny； pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding； we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so。 For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries； but contrariwise the more I lean to the one￥whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good and true are to be found in it； or whether God so disposes my inward thought￥the more freely do I choose and embrace it。 And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge； far from diminishing my liberty； rather increase it and strengthen it。 Hence this indifference which I feel； when I am not swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason； is the lowest grade of liberty； and rather evinces a lack or negation in knowledge than a perfection of will： for if I always recognised clearly what was true and good； I should never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or choice I should make； and then I should be entirely free without ever being indifferent。 From all this I recognise that the power of will which I have received from God is not of itself the source of my errors￥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind￥any more than is the power of understanding； for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding； there is no doubt that all that I understand； I understand as I ought； and it is not possible that I err in this。 Whence then come my errors？ They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding； I do not restrain it within the same bounds； but extend it also to things which I do not understand： and as the will is of itself indifferent to these； it easily falls into error and sin； and chooses the evil for the good； or the false for the true。 For example； when I lately examined whether anything existed in the world； and found that from the very fact that I considered this question it followed very clearly that I myself existed； I could not prevent myself from believing that a thing I so clearly conceived was true： not that I found myself compelled to do so by some external cause； but simply because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great inclination of my will； and I believed this with so much the greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less indifference towards it。 Now； on the contrary； I not only know that I exist； inasmuch as I am a thinking thing； but a certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented to my mind； and it comes to pass that I doubt whether this thinking nature which is in me； or rather by which I am what I am； differs from this corporeal nature； or whether both are not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief rather than the other。 From this it follows that I am entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny； or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the matter。 And this indifference does not only extend to matters as to which the understanding has no knowledge； but also in general to all those which are not apprehended with perfect clearness at the moment when the will is deliberating upon them： for； however probable are the conjectures which render me disposed to form a judgment respecting anything； the simple knowledge that I have that those are conjectures alone and not certain and indubitable reasons； suffices to occasion me to judge the contrary。 Of this I have had great experience of late when I set aside as false all that I had formerly held to be absolutely true； for the sole reason that I remarked that it might in some measure be doubted。 But if I abstain from giving my judgment on any thing when I do not perceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness； it is plain that I act rightly and am not deceived。 But if I determine to deny or affirm； I no longer make use as I should of my free will； and if I affirm what is not true； it is evident that I deceive myself； even though I judge according to truth； this comes about only by chance； and I do not escape the blame of misusing my freedom； for the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will。 And it is in the misuse of the free will that the privation which constitutes the characteristic nature of error is met with。 Privation； I say； is found in the act； in so far as it proceeds from me； but it is not found in the faculty which I have received from God； nor even in the act in so far as it depends on Him。 For I have certainly no cause to complain that God has not given me an intelligence which is more powerful； or a natural light which is stronger than that which I have received from Him； since it is proper to the finite understanding not to comprehend a multitude of things； and it is proper to a created understanding to be finite； on the contrary； I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing and who has given me all the perfections I possess； and I should be far from charging Him with injustice； and with having deprived me of； or wrongfully withheld from me； these perfections which He has not bestowed upon me。 I have further no reason to complain that He has given me a will more ample than my understanding； for since the will consists only of one single element； and is so to speak indivisible； it appears that its nature is such that nothing can be abstracted from it ＇without destroying it＇； and certainly the more comprehensive it is found to be； the more reason I have to render gratitude to the giver。 And； finally； I must also not complain that God concurs with me in forming the acts of the will； that is the judgment in which I go astray； because these acts are entirely true and good； inasmuch as they depend on God； and in a certain sense more perfection accrues to my nature from the fact that I can form them； than if I could not do so。 As to the privation in which alone the formal reason of error or sin consists； it has no need of any concurrence from God； since it is not a thing ＇or an existence＇； and since it is not related to God as to a cause； but should be termed merely a negation ＇according to the significance given to these words in the Schools＇。 For in fact it is not an imperfection in God that He has given me the liberty to give or withhold my assent from certain things as to which He has not placed a clear and distinct knowledge in my understanding； but it is without doubt an imperfection in me not to make a good use of my freedom； and to give my judgment readily on matters which I only understand obscurely。 I nevertheless perceive that God could easily have created me so that I never should err； although I still remained free； and endowed with a limited kn
