meditations on first philosophy-第12章
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he other things which I possess） since I should discover in them that my powers were limited。 But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present； neither can I escape the force of this reasoning； and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is； that I need not seek for any author of my existence。 For all the course of my life may be divided into an infinite number of parts； none of which is in any way dependent on the other； and thus from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now； unless some cause at this instant； so to speak； produces me anew； that is to say； conserves me。 It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time； that； in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures； a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew； supposing it did not yet exist； so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason。 All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate myself； if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still be in the future； for since I am nothing but a thinking thing； or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself which is precisely in question at present； if such a power did reside in me； I should certainly be conscious of it。 But I am conscious of nothing of the kind； and by this I know clearly that I depend on some being different from myself。 Possibly； however； this being on which I depend is not that which I call God； and I am created either by my parents or by some other cause less perfect than God。 This cannot be； because； as I have just said； it is perfectly evident that there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect； and thus since I am a thinking thing； and possess an idea of God within me； whatever in the end be the cause assigned to my existence； it must be allowed that it is likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God。 We may again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from itself or from some other thing。 For if from itself； it follows by the reasons before brought forward； that this cause must itself be God； for since it possesses the virtue of self… existence； it must also without doubt have the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the idea； that is； all those which I conceive as existing in God。 But if it derives its existence from some other cause than itself； we shall again ask； for the same reason； whether this second cause exists by itself or through another； until from one step to another； we finally arrive at an ultimate cause； which will be God。 And it is perfectly manifest that in this there can be no regression into infinity； since what is in question is not so much the cause which formerly created me； as that which conserves me at the present time。 Nor can we suppose that several causes may have concurred in my production； and that from one I have received the idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God； and from another the idea of some other； so that all these perfections indeed exist somewhere in the universe； but not as complete in one unity which is God。 On the contrary； the unity； the simplicity or the inseparability of all things which are in god is one of the principal perfections which I conceive to be in Him。 And certainly the idea of this unity of all Divine perfections cannot have been placed in me by any cause from which I have not likewise received the ideas of all the other perfections； for this cause could not make me able to comprehend them as joined together in an inseparable unity without having at the same time caused me in some measure to know what they are ＇and in some way to recognise each one of them＇。 Finally； so far as my parents ＇from whom it appears I have sprung＇ are concerned； although all that I have ever been able to believe of them were true； that does not make it follow that it is they who conserve me； nor are they even the authors of my being in any sense； in so far as I am a thinking being； since what they did was merely to implant certain dispositions in that matter in which the self￥i。e。 the mind； which alone I at present identify with myself￥is by me deemed to exist。 And thus there can be no difficulty in their regard； but we must of necessity conclude from the fact alone that I exist； or that the idea of a Being supremely perfect￥that is of God￥is in me； that the proof of God's existence is grounded on the highest evidence。 It only remains to me to examine into the manner in which I have acquired this idea from God； for I have not received it through the senses； and it is never presented to me unexpectedly； as is usual with the ideas of sensible things when these things present themselves； or seem to present themselves； to the external organs of my senses； nor is it likewise a fiction of my mind； for it is not in my power to take from or to add anything to it； and consequently the only alternative is that it is innate in me； just as the idea of myself is innate in me。 And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God； in creating me； placed this idea within me to be like the mark of the workman imprinted on his work； and it is likewise not essential that the mark shall be something different from the work itself。 For from the sole fact that God created me it is most probable that in some way he has placed his image and similitude upon me； and that I perceive this similitude （in which the idea of God is contained） by means of the same faculty by which I perceive myself￥that is to say； when I reflect on myself I not only know that I am something ＇imperfect＇； incomplete and dependent on another； which incessantly aspires after something which is better and greater than myself； but I also know that He on whom I depend possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I aspire ＇and the ideas of which I find within myself＇； and that not indefinitely or potentially alone； but really； actually and infinitely； and that thus He is God。 And the whole strength of the argument which I have here made use of to prove the existence of God consists in this； that I recognise that it is not possible that my nature should be what it is； and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God； if God did not veritably exist￥a God； I say； whose idea is in me； i。e。 who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them all； who is liable to no errors or defect ＇and who has none of all those marks which denote imperfection＇。 From this it is manifest that He cannot be a deceiver； since the light of nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed from some defect。 But before I examine this matter with more care； and pass on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived from it； it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to contemplate God Himself； to ponder at leisure His marvellous attributes； to consider； and admire； and adore； the beauty of this light so resplendent； at least as far as the strength of my mind； which is in some measure dazzled by the sight； will allow me to do so。 For just as faith teaches us that the supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this contemplation of the Divine Majesty； so we continue to learn by experience that a similar meditation； though incomparably less perfect； causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of which we are capable in this life。 Meditation IV。 Of the True and the False。 I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my mind from my senses； and I have accurately observed that there are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting corporeal objects； that there are many more which are known to us respecting the hu
