eminent victorians-第61章

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last　appointment。　The　precise　motives　of　those　responsible　for　

these　transactions　are　less　easy　to　discern。　It　is　difficult　to　

understand　what　the　reasons　could　have　been　which　induced　the　

Government；　not　only　to　override　the　hesitations　of　Sir　Evelyn　

Baring；　but　to　overlook　the　grave　and　obvious　dangers　involved　in



sending　such　a　man　as　Gordon　to　the　Sudan。　The　whole　history　of　

his　life；　the　whole　bent　of　his　character；　seemed　to　disqualify　

him　for　the　task　for　which　he　had　been　chosen。　He　was　before　all　

things　a　fighter；　an　enthusiast；　a　bold　adventurer；　and　he　was　

now　to　be　entrusted　with　the　conduct　of　an　inglorious　retreat。　He



was　alien　to　the　subtleties　of　civilised　statesmanship；　he　was　

unamenable　to　official　control；　he　was　incapable　of　the　skilful　

management　of　delicate　situations；　and　he　was　now　to　be　placed　in



a　position　of　great　complexity；　requiring　at　once　a　cool　

judgment；　a　clear　perception　of　fact；　and　a　fixed　determination　

to　carry　out　a　line　of　policy　laid　down　from　above。　He　had；　it　is



true；　been　Governor…General　of　the　Sudan；　but　he　was　now　to　

return　to　the　scene　of　his　greatness　as　the　emissary　of　a　

defeated　and　humbled　power；　he　was　to　be　a　fugitive　where　he　had　

once　been　a　ruler；　the　very　success　of　his　mission　was　to　consist



in　establishing　the　triumph　of　those　forces　which　he　had　spent　

years　in　trampling　underfoot。　All　this　should　have　been　clear　to　

those　in　authority；　after　a　very　little　reflection。　It　was　clear　

enough　to　Sir　Evelyn　Baring；　though；　with　characteristic

reticence；　

he　had　abstained　from　giving　expression　to　his　thoughts。　But；

even　

if　a　general　acquaintance　with　Gordon's　life　and　character　were

not　

sufficient　to　lead　to　these　conclusions；　he　himself　had　taken

care　to　

put　their　validity　beyond　reasonable　doubt。　



Both　in　his　interview　with　Mr。　Stead　and　in　his　letter　to　Sir

Samuel　Baker；　

he　had　indicated　unmistakably　his　own　attitude　towards　the　Sudan

situation。　

The　policy　which　he　advocated；　the　state　of　feeling　in　which　he

showed　

himself　to　be；　was　diametrically　opposed　to　the　declared

intentions　of　the　

Government。　He　was　by　no　means　in　favour　of　withdrawing　from　the　

Sudan；　he　was　in　favour；　as　might　have　been　supposed；　of　vigorous



military　action。　It　might　be　necessary　to　abandon；　for　the　time　

being；　the　more　remote　garrisons　in　Darfur　and　Equatoria；　but　

Khartoum　must　be　held　at　all　costs。　To　allow　the　Mahdi　to　enter　

Khartoum　would　not　merely　mean　the　return　of　the　whole　of　the　

Sudan　to　barbarism；　it　would　be　a　menace　to　the　safety　of　Egypt　

herself。　To　attempt　to　protect　Egypt　against　the　Mahdi　by　

fortifying　her　southern　frontier　was　preposterous。　'You　might　as　

well　fortify　against　a　fever。'　Arabia；　Syria；　the　whole　

Mohammedan　world；　would　be　shaken　by　the　Mahdi's　advance。　'In　

self…defence；'　Gordon　declared　to　Mr。　Stead；　the　policy　of　

evacuation　cannot　possibly　be　justified。'　



The　true　policy　was　obvious。　A　strong　manSir　Samuel　Baker；

perhaps

must　be　sent　to　Khartoum；　with　a　large　contingent　of　Indian　and

Turkish　

troops　and　with　two　millions　of　money。　He　would　very　soon

overpower　the　

Mahdi；　whose　forces　would　'fall　to　pieces　of　themselves'。　For　in　

Gordon's　opinion　it　was　'an　entire　mistake　to　regard　the　Mahdi　as



in　any　sense　a　religious　leader'；　he　would　collapse　as　soon　as　he



was　face　to　face　with　an　English　general。　Then　the　distant　

regions　of　Darfur　and　Equatoria　could　once　more　be　occupied；　

their　original　Sultans　could　be　reinstated；　the　whole　country　

would　be　placed　under　civilised　rule；　and　the　slave…trade　would　

be　finally　abolished。　These　were　the　views　which　Gordon　publicly　

expressed　on　January　9th　and　on　January　14th；　and　it　certainly　

seems　strange　that　on　January　10th　and　on　January　14th；　Lord　

Granville　should　have　proposed；　without　a　word　of　consultation　

with　Gordon　himself；　to　send　him　on　a　mission　which　involved；　not



the　reconquest；　but　the　abandonment　of　the　Sudan；　Gordon；　indeed；



when　he　was　actually　approached　by　Lord　Wolseley；　had　apparently　

agreed　to　become　the　agent　of　a　policy　which　was　exactly　the　

reverse　of　his　own。　No　doubt；　too；　it　is　possible　for　a　

subordinate　to　suppress　his　private　convictions　and　to　carry　out　

loyally；　in　spite　of　them；　the　orders　of　his　superiors。　But　how　

rare　are　the　qualities　of　self…control　and　wisdom　which　such　a　

subordinate　must　possess！　And　how　little　reason　there　was　to　

think　that　General　Gordon　possessed　them！



In　fact；　the　conduct　of　the　Government　wears　so　singular　an　

appearance　that　it　has　seemed　necessary　to　account　for　it　by　some



ulterior　explanation。　It　has　often　been　asserted　that　the　true　

cause　of　Gordon's　appointment　was　the　clamour　in　the　Press。　It　is



said　among　others；　by　Sir　Evelyn　Baring　himself；　who　has　given　

something　like　an　official　sanction　to　this　view　of　the　case

that　

the　Government　could　not　resist　the　pressure　of　the　newspapers　

and　the　feeling　in　the　country　which　it　indicated；　that　

Ministers；　carried　off　their　feet　by　a　wave　of　'Gordon　cultus'；　

were　obliged　to　give　way　to　the　inevitable。　But　this　suggestion　

is　hardly　supported　by　an　examination　of　the　facts。　Already；　

early　in　December；　and　many　weeks　before　Gordon's　name　had　begun　

to　figure　in　the　newspapers；　Lord　Granville　had　made　his　first　

effort　to　induce　Sir　Evelyn　Baring　to　accept　Gordon's　services。　

The　first　newspaper　demand　for　a　Gordon　mission　appeared　in　the　

〃Pall　Mall　Gazette〃　on　the　afternoon　of　January　9th；　and　the　very



next　morning；　Lord　Granville　was　making　his　second　telegraphic　

attack　upon　Sir　Evelyn　Baring。　The　feeling　in　the　Press　did　not　

become　general　until　the　11th；　and　on　the　14th　Lord　Granville；　in



his　telegram　to　Mr。　Gladstone；　for　the　third　time　proposed　the　

appointment　of　Gordon。　Clearly；　on　the　part　of　Lord　Granville　at　

any　rate；　there　was　no　extreme　desire　to　resist　the　wishes　of　the



Press。　Nor　was　the　Government　as　a　whole　by　any　means　incapable　

of　ignoring　public　opinion；　a　few　months　were　to　show　that；　

plainly　enough。　It　is　difficult　to　avoid　the　conclusion　that　if　

Ministers　had　been　opposed　to　the　appointment　of　Gordon；　he　would



never　have　been　appointed。　As　it　was；　the　newspapers　were　in　fact



forestalled；　rather　than　followed；　by　the　Government。



How；　then；　are　we　to　explain　the　Government's　action？　Are　we　to　

suppose　that　its　members；　like　the　members　of　the　public　at　

large；　were　themselves　carried　away　by　a　sudden　enthusiasm；　a　

sudden　conviction　that　they　had　found　their　saviour；　that　General



Gordon　was　the　manthey　did　not　quite　know　why；　but　that　was　of　

no　consequencethe　one　man　to　get　them　out　of　the　whole　Sudan　

difficultythey　did　not　quite　know　how；　but　that　was　of　no　

consequence　either　if　only　he　were　sent　to　Khartoum？　Doubtless　

even　Cabinet　Ministers　are　liable　to　such　impulses；　doubtless　it　

is　possible　that　the　Cabinet　of　that　day　allowed　itself　to　drift；



out　of　mere　lack　of　consideration；　and　judgment；　and　foresight；　

along　the　rapid　stream　of　popular　feeling　towards　the　inevitable　

cataract。　That　may　be　so；　yet　there　are　indications　that　a　more　

definite　influence　was　at　work。　There　was　a　section　of　the　

Government　which　had　never　become　quite　reconciled　to　the　policy　

of　withdrawing　from　the　Sudan。　To　this　sectionwe　may　call　it　

the　imperialist　sectionwhich　was　led；　inside　the　Cabinet；　by　

Lord　Hartington；　and　outside　by　Lord　Wolseley；　the　policy　which　

really　commended　itself　was　the　very　policy　which　had　been　

outlined　by　General　Gordon　in　his　interview　with　Mr。　Stead　and

his　

letter　to　Sir　Samuel　Baker。　They　saw　that　it　might　be　necessary　

to　abandon　some　of　the　outlying　parts　of　the　Sudan　to　the　Mahdi；　

but　the　prospect　of　leaving　the　whole　province　in　his　hands　was　

highly　distasteful　to　them；　above　all；　they　dreaded　the　loss　of　

Khartoum。　Now；　supposing　th