the spirit of laws-第66章

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f　paying　for　fear　of　exactions；　and　the　danger　of　paying　for　fear　of　new　burdens。

A　well…regulated　government　ought　to　set　aside；　for　the　first　article　of　its　expense；　a　determinate　sum　to　answer　contingent　cases。　It　is　with　the　public　as　with　individuals；　who　are　ruined　when　they　live　up　exactly　to　their　income。

With　regard　to　an　obligation　for　the　whole　amongst　the　inhabitants　of　the　same　village；　some　pretend＇16＇　that　it　is　but　reasonable；　because　there　is　a　possibility　of　a　fraudulent　combination　on　their　side：　but　was　it　ever　heard　that；　upon　mere　supposition；　we　are　to　establish　a　thing　in　itself　unjust　and　ruinous　to　the　state？

19。　Which　is　more　suitable　to　the　Prince　and　to　the　People；　the　farming　the　Revenues；　or　managing　them　by　Commission。　The　managing　of　the　revenues　by　commission　is　like　the　conduct　of　a　good　father　of　a　family；　who　collects　his　own　rents　himself　with　economy　and　order。

By　this　management　of　the　revenues　the　prince　is　at　liberty　to　press　or　to　retard　the　levy　of　the　taxes；　either　according　to　his　own　wants　or　to　those　of　his　people。　By　this　he　saves　to　the　state　the　immense　profits　of　the　farmers；　who　impoverish　it　in　a　thousand　ways。　By　this　he　prevents　the　people　from　being　mortified　with　the　sight　of　sudden　fortunes。　By　this　the　public　money　passes　through　few　hands；　goes　directly　to　the　treasury；　and　consequently　makes　a　quicker　return　to　the　people。　By　this　the　prince　avoids　an　infinite　number　of　bad　laws　extorted　from　him　by　the　importunate　avarice　of　the　farmers；　who　pretend　to　offer　a　present　advantage　for　regulations　pernicious　to　posterity。

As　the　moneyed　man　is　always　the　most　powerful；　the　farmer　renders　himself　arbitrary　even　over　the　prince　himself；　he　is　not　the　legislator；　but　he　obliges　the　legislator　to　give　laws。

I　acknowledge　that　it　is　sometimes　of　use　to　farm　out　a　new　duty；　for　there　is　an　art　in　preventing　frauds；　which　motives　of　interest　suggest　to　the　farmers；　but　commissioners　never　think　of。　Now　the　manner　of　levying　it　being　once　established　by　the　farmer；　it　may　afterwards　be　safely　entrusted　to　a　commission。　In　England　the　management　of　the　Excise　and　of　the　Post…office　was　borrowed　from　that　of　the　farmers　of　the　revenue。

In　republics　the　revenues　of　the　state　are　generally　managed　by　commission。　The　contrary　practice　was　a　great　defect　in　the　Roman　government。＇17＇　In　despotic　governments　the　people　are　infinitely　happier　where　this　management　is　established　　witness　Persia　and　China。＇18＇　The　unhappiest　of　all　are　those　where　the　prince　farms　out　his　sea…ports　and　trading　cities。　The　history　of　monarchies　abounds　with　mischiefs　done　by　the　farmers　of　the　revenue。

Incensed　at　the　oppressive　extortions　of　the　publicans；　Nero　formed　a　magnanimous　but　impracticable　scheme　of　abolishing　all　kinds　of　imposts。　He　did　not　think　of　managing　the　revenues　by　commissioners；　but　he　made　four　edicts：＇19＇　that　the　laws　enacted　against　publicans；　which　had　hitherto　been　kept　secret；　should　be　promulgated；　that　they　should　exact　no　claims　for　above　a　year　backward；　that　there　should　be　a　pr？tor　established　to　determine　their　pretensions　without　any　formality；　and　that　the　merchants　should　pay　no　duty　for　their　vessels。　These　were　the　halcyon　days　of　that　emperor。

20。　Of　the　Farmers　of　the　Revenues。　When　the　lucrative　profession　of　a　farmer　of　the　revenue　becomes　likewise　a　post　of　honour；　the　state　is　ruined。　It　may　do　well　enough　in　despotic　governments；　where　this　employment　is　often

times　exercised　by　the　governors　themselves。　But　it　is　by　no　means　proper　in　a　republic；　since　a　custom　of　the　like　nature　destroyed　that　of　Rome。　Nor　is　it　better　in　monarchies；　nothing　being　more　opposite　to　the　spirit　of　this　government。　All　the　other　orders　of　the　state　are　dissatisfied；　honour　loses　its　whole　value；　the　gradual　and　natural　means　of　distinction　are　no　longer　respected；　and　the　very　principle　of　the　government　is　subverted。

It　is　true　indeed　that　scandalous　fortunes　were　raised　in　former　times；　but　this　was　one　of　the　calamities　of　the　Fifty　Years'　War。　These　riches　were　then　considered　as　ridiculous；　now　we　admire　them。

Every　profession　has　its　particular　lot。　That　of　the　tax…gatherers　is　wealth；　and　wealth　is　its　own　reward。　Glory　and　honour　fall　to　the　share　of　that　nobility　who　are　sensible　of　no　other　happiness。　Respect　and　esteem　are　for　those　ministers　and　magistrates　whose　whole　life　is　a　continued　series　of　labour；　and　who　watch　day　and　night　over　the　welfare　of　the　empire。

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1。　Plutarch；　Notable　Sayings　of　the　Laced？monians。

2。　This　is　what　induced　Charlemagne　to　make　his　excellent　institution　upon　this　head。　See　the　fifth　book　of　the　Capitularies；　art。　303。

3。　This　is　the　practice　in　Germany。

4。　Pollux；　viii。　10；　art。　130。

5。　Or　60　min？。

6。　Tacitus；　Annals；　xiii。　31。

7。　Father　Du　Halde；　ii；　p。　37。

8。　History　of　the　Tartars；　part　III；　p。　290。


9。　Being　willing　to　trade　with　foreigners　without　having　any　communication　with　them；　they　have　pitched　upon　two　nations　for　that　purpose　　the　Dutch　for　the　commerce　of　Europe；　and　the　Chinese　for　that　of　Asia；　they　confine　the　factors　and　sailors　in　a　kind　of　prison；　and　lay　such　a　restraint　upon　them　as　tires　their　patience。

10。　In　Russia　the　taxes　are　but　small；　they　have　been　increased　since　the　despotic　power　of　the　prince　is　exercised　with　more　moderation。　See　the　History　of　the　Tartars；　part　II。

11。　The　Pays　d'etats；　where　the　states　of　the　province　assemble　to　deliberate　on　public　affairs。

12。　This　is　the　practice　of　the　emperors　of　China。

13。　See　in　history　the　greatness；　the　oddity；　and　even　the　folly　of　those　taxes。　Anastasius　invented　a　tax　for　breathing；　ut　quisque　pro　haustu　？ris　penderet。

14。　True　it　is　that　this　state　of　effort　is　the　chief　support　of　the　balance；　because　it　checks　the　great　powers。

15。　All　that　is　wanting　for　this　is　to　improve　the　new　invention　of　the　militia　established　in　most　parts　of　Europe；　and　carry　it　to　the　same　excess　as　they　do　the　regular　troops。

16。　See　A　Treatise　on　the　Roman　Finances；　2；　Paris；　1740。

17。　C？sar　was　obliged　to　remove　the　publicans　from　the　province　of　Asia；　and　to　establish　there　another　kind　of　regulation；　as　we　learn　from　Dio；　xlii。　6；　and　Tacitus；　Annals；　i。　76；　informs　us　that　Macedonia　and　Achaia；　provinces　left　by　Augustus　to　the　people　of　Rome；　and　consequently　governed　pursuant　to　the　ancient　plan；　obtained　to　be　of　the　number　of　those　which　the　emperor　governed　by　his　officers。

18。　See　Sir　John　Chardin's　Travels　through　Persia；　vi。

19。　Tacitus；　Annals；　xiii。　51。




Book　XIV。　Of　Laws　in　Relation　to　the　Nature　of　the　Climate

1。　General　Idea。　If　it　be　true　that　the　temper　of　the　mind　and　the　passions　of　the　heart　are　extremely　different　in　different　climates；　the　laws　ought　to　be　in　relation　both　to　the　variety　of　those　passions　and　to　the　variety　of　those　tempers。

2。　Of　the　Difference　of　Men　in　different　Climates。　Cold　air　constringes　the　extremities　of　the　external　fibres　of　the　body；＇1＇　this　increases　their　elasticity；　and　favours　the　return　of　the　blood　from　the　extreme　parts　to　the　heart。　It　contracts＇2＇　those　very　fibres；　consequently　it　increases　also　their　force。　On　the　contrary；　warm　air　relaxes　and　lengthens　the　extremes　of　the　fibres；　of　course　it　diminishes　their　force　and　elasticity。

People　are　therefore　more　vigorous　in　cold　climates。　Here　the　action　of　the　heart　and　the　reaction　of　the　extremities　of　the　fibres　are　better　performed；　the　temperature　of　the　humours　is　greater；　the　blood　moves　more　freely　towards　the　heart；　and　reciprocally　the　heart　has　more　power。　This　superiority　of　strength　must　produce　various　effects；　for　instance；　a　greater　boldness；　that　is；　more　courage；　a　greater　sense　of　superiority；　that　is；　less　desire　of　revenge；　a　greater　opinion　of　security；　that　is；　more　frankness；　less　suspicion；　policy；　and　cunning。　In　short；　this　must　be　productive　of　very　different　tempers。　Put　a　man　into　a　close；　warm　place；　and　for　the　reasons　above　given　he　will　feel　a　great　faintness。　If　under　this　circumstance　you　propose　a　bold　enterprise　to　him；　I　believe　you　will　find　him　very　little　disposed　towards　it；　his　present　weakness　will　th