the spirit of laws-第49章

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Of　the　three　powers　above　mentioned；　the　judiciary　is　in　some　measure　next　to　nothing：　there　remain；　therefore；　only　two；　and　as　these　have　need　of　a　regulating　power　to　moderate　them；　the　part　of　the　legislative　body　composed　of　the　nobility　is　extremely　proper　for　this　purpose。

The　body　of　the　nobility　ought　to　be　hereditary。　In　the　first　place　it　is　so　in　its　own　nature；　and　in　the　next　there　must　be　a　considerable　interest　to　preserve　its　privileges　　privileges　that　in　themselves　are　obnoxious　to　popular　envy；　and　of　course　in　a　free　state　are　always　in　danger。

But　as　a　hereditary　power　might　be　tempted　to　pursue　its　own　particular　interests；　and　forget　those　of　the　people；　it　is　proper　that　where　a　singular　advantage　may　be　gained　by　corrupting　the　nobility；　as　in　the　laws　relating　to　the　supplies；　they　should　have　no　other　share　in　the　legislation　than　the　power　of　rejecting；　and　not　that　of　resolving。

By　the　power　of　resolving　I　mean　the　right　of　ordaining　by　their　own　authority；　or　of　amending　what　has　been　ordained　by　others。　By　the　power　of　rejecting　I　would　be　understood　to　mean　the　right　of　annulling　a　resolution　taken　by　another；　which　was　the　power　of　the　tribunes　at　Rome。　And　though　the　person　possessed　of　the　privilege　of　rejecting　may　likewise　have　the　right　of　approving；　yet　this　approbation　passes　for　no　more　than　a　declaration　that　he　intends　to　make　no　use　of　his　privilege　of　rejecting；　and　is　derived　from　that　very　privilege。

The　executive　power　ought　to　be　in　the　hands　of　a　monarch；　because　this　branch　of　government；　having　need　of　despatch；　is　better　administered　by　one　than　by　many：　on　the　other　hand；　whatever　depends　on　the　legislative　power　is　oftentimes　better　regulated　by　many　than　by　a　single　person。

But　if　there　were　no　monarch；　and　the　executive　power　should　be　committed　to　a　certain　number　of　persons　selected　from　the　legislative　body；　there　would　be　an　end　then　of　liberty；　by　reason　the　two　powers　would　be　united；　as　the　same　persons　would　sometimes　possess；　and　would　be　always　able　to　possess；　a　share　in　both。

Were　the　legislative　body　to　be　a　considerable　time　without　meeting；　this　would　likewise　put　an　end　to　liberty。　For　of　two　things　one　would　naturally　follow：　either　that　there　would　be　no　longer　any　legislative　resolutions；　and　then　the　state　would　fall　into　anarchy；　or　that　these　resolutions　would　be　taken　by　the　executive　power；　which　would　render　it　absolute。

It　would　be　needless　for　the　legislative　body　to　continue　always　assembled。　This　would　be　troublesome　to　the　representatives；　and；　moreover；　would　cut　out　too　much　work　for　the　executive　power；　so　as　to　take　off　its　attention　to　its　office；　and　oblige　it　to　think　only　of　defending　its　own　prerogatives；　and　the　right　it　has　to　execute。

Again；　were　the　legislative　body　to　be　always　assembled；　it　might　happen　to　be　kept　up　only　by　filling　the　places　of　the　deceased　members　with　new　representatives；　and　in　that　case；　if　the　legislative　body　were　once　corrupted；　the　evil　would　be　past　all　remedy。　When　different　legislative　bodies　succeed　one　another；　the　people　who　have　a　bad　opinion　of　that　which　is　actually　sitting　may　reasonably　entertain　some　hopes　of　the　next：　but　were　it　to　be　always　the　same　body；　the　people　upon　seeing　it　once　corrupted　would　no　longer　expect　any　good　from　its　laws；　and　of　course　they　would　either　become　desperate　or　fall　into　a　state　of　indolence。

The　legislative　body　should　not　meet　of　itself。　For　a　body　is　supposed　to　have　no　will　but　when　it　is　met；　and　besides；　were　it　not　to　meet　unanimously；　it　would　be　impossible　to　determine　which　was　really　the　legislative　body；　the　part　assembled；　or　the　other。　And　if　it　had　a　right　to　prorogue　itself；　it　might　happen　never　to　be　prorogued；　which　would　be　extremely　dangerous；　in　case　it　should　ever　attempt　to　encroach　on　the　executive　power。　Besides；　there　are　seasons；　some　more　proper　than　others；　for　assembling　the　legislative　body：　it　is　fit；　therefore；　that　the　executive　power　should　regulate　the　time　of　meeting；　as　well　as　the　duration　of　those　assemblies；　according　to　the　circumstances　and　exigencies　of　a　state　known　to　itself。

Were　the　executive　power　not　to　have　a　right　of　restraining　the　encroachments　of　the　legislative　body；　the　latter　would　become　despotic；　for　as　it　might　arrogate　to　itself　what　authority　it　pleased；　it　would　soon　destroy　all　the　other　powers。

But　it　is　not　proper；　on　the　other　hand；　that　the　legislative　power　should　have　a　right　to　stay　the　executive。　For　as　the　execution　has　its　natural　limits；　it　is　useless　to　confine　it；　besides；　the　executive　power　is　generally　employed　in　momentary　operations。　The　power；　therefore；　of　the　Roman　tribunes　was　faulty；　as　it　put　a　stop　not　only　to　the　legislation；　but　likewise　to　the　executive　part　of　government；　which　was　attended　with　infinite　mischief。

But　if　the　legislative　power　in　a　free　state　has　no　right　to　stay　the　executive；　it　has　a　right　and　ought　to　have　the　means　of　examining　in　what　manner　its　laws　have　been　executed；　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　that　of　Crete　and　Sparta；　where　the　Cosmi＇9＇　and　the　Ephori＇10＇　gave　no　account　of　their　administration。

But　whatever　may　be　the　issue　of　that　examination；　the　legislative　body　ought　not　to　have　a　power　of　arraigning　the　person；　nor；　of　course；　the　conduct；　of　him　who　is　entrusted　with　the　executive　power。　His　person　should　be　sacred；　because　as　it　is　necessary　for　the　good　of　the　state　to　prevent　the　legislative　body　from　rendering　themselves　arbitrary；　the　moment　he　is　accused　or　tried　there　is　an　end　of　liberty。

In　this　case　the　state　would　be　no　longer　a　monarchy；　but　a　kind　of　republic；　though　not　a　free　government。　But　as　the　person　entrusted　with　the　executive　power　cannot　abuse　it　without　bad　counsellors；　and　such　as　have　the　laws　as　ministers；　though　the　laws　protect　them　as　subjects；　these　men　may　be　examined　and　punished　　an　advantage　which　this　government　has　over　that　of　Gnidus；　where　the　law　allowed　of　no　such　thing　as　calling　the　Amymones＇11＇　to　an　account；　even　after　their　administration；＇12＇　and　therefore　the　people　could　never　obtain　any　satisfaction　for　the　injuries　done　them。

Though；　in　general；　the　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　united　with　any　part　of　the　legislative；　yet　this　is　liable　to　three　exceptions；　founded　on　the　particular　interest　of　the　party　accused。

The　great　are　always　obnoxious　to　popular　envy；　and　were　they　to　be　judged　by　the　people；　they　might　be　in　danger　from　their　judges；　and　would；　moreover；　be　deprived　of　the　privilege　which　the　meanest　subject　is　possessed　of　in　a　free　state；　of　being　tried　by　his　peers。　The　nobility；　for　this　reason；　ought　not　to　be　cited　before　the　ordinary　courts　of　judicature；　but　before　that　part　of　the　legislature　which　is　composed　of　their　own　body。

It　is　possible　that　the　law；　which　is　clearsighted　in　one　sense；　and　blind　in　another；　might；　in　some　cases；　be　too　severe。　But　as　we　have　already　observed；　the　national　judges　are　no　more　than　the　mouth　that　pronounces　the　words　of　the　law；　mere　passive　beings；　incapable　of　moderating　either　its　force　or　rigour。　That　part；　therefore；　of　the　legislative　body；　which　we　have　just　now　observed　to　be　a　necessary　tribunal　on　another　occasion；　is　also　a　necessary　tribunal　in　this；　it　belongs　to　its　supreme　authority　to　moderate　the　law　in　favour　of　the　law　itself；　by　mitigating　the　sentence。

It　might　also　happen　that　a　subject　entrusted　with　the　administration　of　public　affairs　may　infringe　the　rights　of　the　people；　and　be　guilty　of　crimes　which　the　ordinary　magistrates　either　could　not　or　would　not　punish。　But；　in　general；　the　legislative　power　cannot　try　causes：　and　much　less　can　it　try　this　particular　case；　where　it　represents　the　party　aggrieved；　which　is　the　people。　It　can　only；　therefore；　impeach。　But　before　what　court　shall　it　bring　its　impeachment？　Must　it　go　and　demean　itself　before　the　ordinary　tribunals；　which　are　its　inferiors；　and；　being　composed；　moreover；　of　men　who　are　chosen　from　the　people　as　well　as　itself；　will　naturally　be　swayed　by　the　authority　of　so　powerful　an　accuser？　No：　in　order　to　preserve　the　dignity　of　the　people；　and　the　security　of　the　subj