the spirit of laws-第48章

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Most　kingdoms　in　Europe　enjoy　a　moderate　government　because　the　prince　who　is　invested　with　the　two　first　powers　leaves　the　third　to　his　subjects。　In　Turkey；　where　these　three　powers　are　united　in　the　Sultan's　person；　the　subjects　groan　under　the　most　dreadful　oppression。

In　the　republics　of　Italy；　where　these　three　powers　are　united；　there　is　less　liberty　than　in　our　monarchies。　Hence　their　government　is　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　as　violent　methods　for　its　support　as　even　that　of　the　Turks；　witness　the　state　inquisitors；＇6＇　and　the　lion's　mouth　into　which　every　informer　may　at　all　hours　throw　his　written　accusations。

In　what　a　situation　must　the　poor　subject　be　in　those　republics！　The　same　body　of　magistrates　are　possessed；　as　executors　of　the　laws；　of　the　whole　power　they　have　given　themselves　in　quality　of　legislators。　They　may　plunder　the　state　by　their　general　determinations；　and　as　they　have　likewise　the　judiciary　power　in　their　hands；　every　private　citizen　may　be　ruined　by　their　particular　decisions。

The　whole　power　is　here　united　in　one　body；　and　though　there　is　no　external　pomp　that　indicates　a　despotic　sway；　yet　the　people　feel　the　effects　of　it　every　moment。

Hence　it　is　that　many　of　the　princes　of　Europe；　whose　aim　has　been　levelled　at　arbitrary　power；　have　constantly　set　out　with　uniting　in　their　own　persons　all　the　branches　of　magistracy；　and　all　the　great　offices　of　state。

I　allow　indeed　that　the　mere　hereditary　aristocracy　of　the　Italian　republics　does　not　exactly　answer　to　the　despotic　power　of　the　Eastern　princes。　The　number　of　magistrates　sometimes　moderates　the　power　of　the　magistracy；　the　whole　body　of　the　nobles　do　not　always　concur　in　the　same　design；　and　different　tribunals　are　erected；　that　temper　each　other。　Thus　at　Venice　tlie　legislative　power　is　in　the　council；　the　executive　in　the　pregadi；　and　the　judiciary　in　the　quarantia。　But　the　mischief　is；　that　these　different　tribunals　are　composed　of　magistrates　all　belonging　to　the　same　body；　which　constitutes　almost　one　and　the　same　power。

The　judiciary　power　ought　not　to　be　given　to　a　standing　senate；　it　should　be　exercised　by　persons　taken　from　the　body　of　the　people＇7＇　at　certain　times　of　the　year；　and　consistently　with　a　form　and　manner　prescribed　by　law；　in　order　to　erect　a　tribunal　that　should　last　only　so　long　as　necessity　requires。

By　this　method　the　judicial　power；　so　terrible　to　mankind；　not　being　annexed　to　any　particular　state　or　profession；　becomes；　as　it　were；　invisible。　People　have　not　then　the　judges　continually　present　to　their　view；　they　fear　the　office；　but　not　the　magistrate。

In　accusations　of　a　deep　and　criminal　nature；　it　is　proper　the　person　accused　should　have　the　privilege　of　choosing；　in　some　measure；　his　judges；　in　concurrence　with　the　law；　or　at　least　he　should　have　a　right　to　except　against　so　great　a　number　that　the　remaining　part　may　be　deemed　his　own　choice。

The　other　two　powers　may　be　given　rather　to　magistrates　or　permanent　bodies；　because　they　are　not　exercised　on　any　private　subject；　one　being　no　more　than　the　general　will　of　the　state；　and　the　other　the　execution　of　that　general　will。

But　though　the　tribunals　ought　not　to　be　fixed；　the　judgments　ought；　and　to　such　a　degree　as　to　be　ever　conformable　to　the　letter　of　the　law。　Were　they　to　be　the　private　opinion　of　the　judge；　people　would　then　live　in　society；　without　exactly　knowing　the　nature　of　their　obligations。

The　judges　ought　likewise　to　be　of　the　same　rank　as　the　accused；　or；　in　other　words；　his　peers；　to　the　end　that　he　may　not　imagine　he　is　fallen　into　the　hands　of　persons　inclined　to　treat　him　with　rigour。

If　the　legislature　leaves　the　executive　power　in　possession　of　a　right　to　imprison　those　subjects　who　can　give　security　for　their　good　behaviour；　there　is　an　end　of　liberty；　unless　they　are　taken　up；　in　order　to　answer　without　delay　to　a　capital　crime；　in　which　case　they　are　really　free；　being　subject　only　to　the　power　of　the　law。

But　should　the　legislature　think　itself　in　danger　by　some　secret　conspiracy　against　the　state；　or　by　a　correspondence　with　a　foreign　enemy；　it　might　authorise　the　executive　power；　for　a　short　and　limited　time；　to　imprison　suspected　persons；　who　in　that　case　would　lose　their　liberty　only　for　a　while；　to　preserve　it　for　ever。

And　this　is　the　only　reasonable　method　that　can　be　substituted　to　the　tyrannical　magistracy　of　the　Ephori；　and　to　the　state　inquisitors　of　Venice；　who　are　also　despotic。

As　in　a　country　of　liberty；　every　man　who　is　supposed　a　free　agent　ought　to　be　his　own　governor；　the　legislative　power　should　reside　in　the　whole　body　of　the　people。　But　since　this　is　impossible　in　large　states；　and　in　small　ones　is　subject　to　many　inconveniences；　it　is　fit　the　people　should　transact　by　their　representatives　what　they　cannot　transact　by　themselves。

The　inhabitants　of　a　particular　town　are　much　better　acquainted　with　its　wants　and　interests　than　with　those　of　other　places；　and　are　better　judges　of　the　capacity　of　their　neighbours　than　of　that　of　the　rest　of　their　countrymen。　The　members；　therefore；　of　the　legislature　should　not　be　chosen　from　the　general　body　of　the　nation；　but　it　is　proper　that　in　every　considerable　place　a　representative　should　be　elected　by　the　inhabitants。＇8＇

The　great　advantage　of　representatives　is；　their　capacity　of　discussing　public　affairs。　For　this　the　people　collectively　are　extremely　unfit；　which　is　one　of　the　chief　inconveniences　of　a　democracy。

It　is　not　at　all　necessary　that　the　representatives　who　have　received　a　general　instruction　from　their　constituents　should　wait　to　be　directed　on　each　particular　affair；　as　is　practised　in　the　diets　of　Germany。　True　it　is　that　by　this　way　of　proceeding　the　speeches　of　the　deputies　might　with　greater　propriety　be　called　the　voice　of　the　nation；　but；　on　the　other　hand；　this　would　occasion　infinite　delays；　would　give　each　deputy　a　power　of　controlling　the　assembly；　and；　on　the　most　urgent　and　pressing　occasions；　the　wheels　of　government　might　be　stopped　by　the　caprice　of　a　single　person。

When　the　deputies；　as　Mr。　Sidney　well　observes；　represent　a　body　of　people；　as　in　Holland；　they　ought　to　be　accountable　to　their　constituents；　but　it　is　a　different　thing　in　England；　where　they　are　deputed　by　boroughs。

All　the　inhabitants　of　the　several　districts　ought　to　have　a　right　of　voting　at　the　election　of　a　representative；　except　such　as　are　in　so　mean　a　situation　as　to　be　deemed　to　have　no　will　of　their　own。

One　great　fault　there　was　in　most　of　the　ancient　republics；　that　the　people　had　a　right　to　active　resolutions；　such　as　require　some　execution；　a　thing　of　which　they　are　absolutely　incapable。　They　ought　to　have　no　share　in　the　government　but　for　the　choosing　of　representatives；　which　is　within　their　reach。　For　though　few　can　tell　the　exact　degree　of　men's　capacities；　yet　there　are　none　but　are　capable　of　knowing　in　general　whether　the　person　they　choose　is　better　qualified　than　most　of　his　neighbours。

Neither　ought　the　representative　body　to　be　chosen　for　the　executive　part　of　government；　for　which　it　is　not　so　fit；　but　for　the　enacting　of　laws；　or　to　see　whether　the　laws　in　being　are　duly　executed；　a　thing　suited　to　their　abilities；　and　which　none　indeed　but　themselves　can　properly　perform。

In　such　a　state　there　are　always　persons　distinguished　by　their　birth；　riches；　or　honours：　but　were　they　to　be　confounded　with　the　common　people；　and　to　have　only　the　weight　of　a　single　vote　like　the　rest；　the　common　liberty　would　be　their　slavery；　and　they　would　have　no　interest　in　supporting　it；　as　most　of　the　popular　resolutions　would　be　against　them。　The　share　they　have；　therefore；　in　the　legislature　ought　to　be　proportioned　to　their　other　advantages　in　the　state；　which　happens　only　when　they　form　a　body　that　has　a　right　to　check　the　licentiousness　of　the　people；　as　the　people　have　a　right　to　oppose　any　encroachment　of　theirs。　

The　legislative　power　is　therefore　committed　to　the　body　of　the　nobles；　and　to　that　which　represents　the　people；　each　having　their　assemblies　and　deliberations　apart；　each　their　separate　views　and　interests。

Of　the　three　powers　above　mentioned；　the　judiciary　is　in　some　measure　next　t