the spirit of laws-第42章

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publican　Kind。　The　Canaanites　were　destroyed　by　reason　that　they　were　petty　monarchies；　that　had　no　union　or　confederacy　for　their　common　defence；　and；　indeed；　a　confederacy　is　not　agreeable　to　the　nature　of　petty　monarchies。

As　the　confederate　republic　of　Germany　consists　of　free　cities；　and　of　petty　states　subject　to　different　princes；　experience　shows　us　that　it　is　much　more　imperfect　than　that　of　Holland　and　Switzerland。

The　spirit　of　monarchy　is　war　and　enlargement　of　dominion：　peace　and　moderation　are　the　spirit　of　a　republic。　These　two　kinds　of　government　cannot　naturally　subsist　in　a　confederate　republic。

Thus　we　observe；　in　the　Roman　history；　that　when　the　Veientes　had　chosen　a　king；　they　were　immediately　abandoned　by　all　the　other　petty　republics　of　Tuscany。　Greece　was　undone　as　soon　as　the　kings　of　Macedon　obtained　a　seat　among　the　Amphyktyons。

The　confederate　republic　of　Germany；　composed　of　princes　and　free　towns；　subsists　by　means　of　a　chief；　who　is；　in　some　respects；　the　magistrate　of　the　union；　in　others；　the　monarch。

3。　Other　Requisites　in　a　confederate　Republic。　In　the　republic　of　Holland　one　province　cannot　conclude　an　alliance　without　the　consent　of　the　others。　This　law；　which　is　an　excellent　one；　and　even　necessary　in　a　confederate　republic；　is　wanting　in　the　Germanic　constitution；　where　it　would　prevent　the　misfortunes　that　may　happen　to　the　whole　confederacy；　through　the　imprudence；　ambition；　or　avarice　of　a　single　member。　A　republic　united　by　a　political　confederacy　has　given　itself　entirely　up；　and　has　nothing　more　to　resign。

It　is　difficult　for　the　united　states　to　be　all　of　equal　power　and　extent。　The　Lycian＇3＇　republic　was　an　association　of　twenty…three　towns；　the　large　ones　had　three　votes　in　the　common　council；　the　middling　ones　two；　and　the　small　towns　one。　The　Dutch　republic　consists　of　seven　provinces　of　different　extent　of　territory；　which　have　each　one　voice。

The　cities　of　Lycia＇4＇　contributed　to　the　expenses　of　the　state；　according　to　the　proportion　of　suffrages。　The　provinces　of　the　United　Netherlands　cannot　follow　this　proportion；　they　must　be　directed　by　that　of　their　power。

In　Lycia＇5＇　the　judges　and　town　magistrates　were　elected　by　the　common　council；　and　according　to　the　proportion　already　mentioned。　In　the　republic　of　Holland　they　are　not　chosen　by　the　common　council；　but　each　town　names　its　magistrates。　Were　I　to　give　a　model　of　an　excellent　confederate　republic；　I　should　pitch　upon　that　of　Lycia。

4。　In　what　Manner　despotic　Governments　provide　for　their　Security。　As　republics　provide　for　their　security　by　uniting；　despotic　governments　do　it　by　separating；　and　by　keeping　themselves；　as　it　were；　single。　They　sacrifice　a　part　of　the　country；　and　by　ravaging　and　desolating　the　frontiers　they　render　the　heart　of　the　empire　inaccessible。

It　is　a　received　axiom　in　geometry　that　the　greater　the　extent　of　bodies；　the　more　their　circumference　is　relatively　small。　This　practice；　therefore；　of　laying　the　frontiers　waste　is　more　tolerable　in　large　than　in　middling　states。

A　despotic　government　does　all　the　mischief　to　itself　that　could　be　committed　by　a　cruel　enemy；　whose　arms　it　were　unable　to　resist。

It　preserves　itself　likewise　by　another　kind　of　separation；　which　is　by　putting　the　most　distant　provinces　into　the　hands　of　a　great　vassal。　The　Mogul；　the　king　of　Persia；　and　the　emperors　of　China　have　their　feudatories；　and　the　Turks　have　found　their　account　in　putting　the　Tartars；　the　Moldavians；　the　Wallachians；　and　formerly　the　Transylvanians；　between　themselves　and　their　enemies。

5。　In　what　Manner　a　Monarchical　Government　provides　for　its　Security。　A　monarchy　never　destroys　itself　like　a　despotic　government。　But　a　kingdom　of　a　moderate　extent　is　liable　to　sudden　invasions：　it　must　therefore　have　fortresses　to　defend　its　frontiers；　and　troops　to　garrison　those　fortresses。　The　least　spot　of　ground　is　disputed　with　military　skill　and　resolution。　Despotic　states　make　incursions　against　one　another；　it　is　monarchies　only　that　wage　war。

Fortresses　are　proper　for　monarchies；　despotic　governments　are　afraid　of　them。　They　dare　not　entrust　their　officers　with　such　a　command；　as　none　of　them　have　any　affection　for　the　prince　or　his　government。

6。　Of　the　defensive　Force　of　States　in　general。　To　preserve　a　state　in　its　due　force；　it　must　have　such　an　extent　as　to　admit　of　a　proportion　between　the　celerity　with　which　it　may　be　invaded；　and　that　with　which　it　may　defeat　the　invasion。　As　an　invader　may　appear　on　every　side；　it　is　requisite　that　the　state　should　be　able　to　make　on　every　side　its　defence；　consequently　it　should　be　of　a　moderate　extent；　proportioned　to　the　degree　of　velocity　that　nature　has　given　to　man；　to　enable　him　to　move　from　one　place　to　another。

France　and　Spain　are　exactly　of　a　proper　extent。　They　have　so　easy　a　communication　for　their　forces　as　to　be　able　to　convey　them　immediately　to　what　part　they　have　a　mind；　the　armies　unite　and　pass　with　rapidity　from　one　frontier　to　another；　without　any　apprehension　of　such　difficulties　as　require　time　to　remove。

It　is　extremely　happy　for　France　that　the　capital　stands　near　to　the　different　frontiers　in　proportion　to　their　weakness；　and　the　prince　has　a　better　view　of　each　part　of　his　country　according　as　it　is　more　exposed。

But　when　a　vast　empire；　like　Persia；　is　attacked；　it　is　several　months　before　the　troops　are　assembled　in　a　body；　and　then　they　are　not　able　to　make　such　forced　marches；　for　that　space　of　time；　as　they　could　for　fifteen　days。　Should　the　army　on　the　frontiers　be　defeated；　it　is　soon　dispersed；　because　there　is　no　neighbouring　place　of　retreat。　The　victor；　meeting　with　no　resistance；　advances　with　all　expedition；　sits　down　before　the　capital；　and　lays　siege　to　it；　when　there　is　scarcely　time　sufficient　to　summon　the　governors　of　the　provinces　to　its　relief。　Those　who　foresee　an　approaching　revolution　hasten　it　by　their　disobedience。　For　men　whose　fidelity　is　entirely　owing　to　the　danger　of　punishment　are　easily　corrupted　as　soon　as　it　becomes　distant；　their　aim　is　their　own　private　interest。　The　empire　is　subverted；　the　capital　taken；　and　the　conqueror　disputes　the　several　provinces　with　the　governors。

The　real　power　of　a　prince　does　not　consist　so　much　in　the　facility　he　meets　with　in　making　conquests　as　in　the　difficulty　an　enemy　finds　in　attacking　him；　and；　if　I　may　so　speak；　in　the　immutability　of　his　condition。　But　the　increase　of　territory　obliges　a　government　to　lay　itself　more　open　to　an　enemy。

As　monarchs　therefore　ought　to　be　endued　with　wisdom　in　order　to　increase　their　power；　they　ought　likewise　to　have　an　equal　share　of　prudence　to　confine　it　within　bounds。　Upon　removing　the　inconveniences　of　too　small　a　territory；　they　should　have　their　eye　constantly　on　the　inconveniences　which　attend　its　extent。

7。　A　Reflection。　The　enemies　of　a　great　prince；　whose　reign　was　protracted　to　an　unusual　length；　have　very　often　accused　him；　rather；　I　believe；　from　their　own　fears　than　upon　any　solid　foundation；　of　having　formed　and　carried　on　a　project　of　universal　monarchy。　Had　he　attained　his　aim；　nothing　would　have　been　more　fatal　to　his　subjects；　to　himself；　to　his　family；　and　to　all　Europe。　Heaven；　that　knows　our　true　interests；　favoured　him　more　by　preventing　the　success　of　his　arms　than　it　could　have　done　by　crowning　him　with　victories。　Instead　of　raising　him　to　be　the　only　sovereign　in　Europe；　it　made　him　happier　by　rendering　him　the　most　powerful。

The　subjects　of　this　prince；　who　in　travelling　abroad　are　never　affected　but　with　what　they　have　left　at　home；　who　on　quitting　their　own　habitations　look　upon　glory　as　their　chief　object；　and　in　distant　countries　as　an　obstacle　to　their　return；　who　disgust　you　even　by　their　good　qualities；　because　they　are　tainted　with　so　much　vanity；　who　are　capable　of　supporting　wounds；　perils；　and　fatigues；　but　not　of　foregoing　their　pleasures；　who　are　supremely　fond　of　gaiety；　and　comfort　themselves　for　the　loss　of　a　battle　by　a　song　upon　the　general：　those　subjects；　I　say；　would　never　have　the　solidity　requisite　for　an　enterprise　of　this　kind；　which　if　defeated　in　one　country　would　be　unsuccessful　everywhere　else；　and　if　once　unsuccessf