the spirit of laws-第24章
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ent。 This is easily accounted for。 To form a moderate government； it is necessary to combine the several powers； to regulate； temper； and set them in motion； to give； as it were； ballast to one； in order to enable it to counterpoise the other。 This is a masterpiece of legislation； rarely produced by hazard； and seldom attained by prudence。 On the contrary； a despotic government offers itself； as it were； at first sight； it is uniform throughout； and as passions only are requisite to establish it； this is what every capacity may reach。
15。 The same Subject continued。 In warm climates； where despotic power generally prevails； the passions disclose themselves earlier； and are sooner extinguished；＇43＇ the understanding is sooner ripened； they are less in danger of squandering their fortunes； there is less facility of distinguishing themselves in the world； less communication between young people； who are confined at home； they marry much earlier； and consequently may be sooner of age than in our European climates。 In Turkey they are of age at fifteen。＇44＇
They have no such thing as a cession of goods； in a government where there is no fixed property； people depend rather on the person than on his estate。
The cession of goods is naturally admitted in moderate governments；＇45＇ but especially in republics； because of the greater confidence usually placed in the probity of the citizens； and the lenity and moderation arising from a form of government which every subject seems to nave preferred to all others。
Had the legislators of the Roman republic established the cession of goods；＇46＇ they never would have been exposed to so many seditions and civil discords； neither would they have experienced the danger of the evils； nor the inconvenience of the remedies。
Poverty and the precariousness of property in a despotic state render usury natural； each person raising the value of his money in proportion to the danger he sees in lending it。 Misery therefore pours from all parts into those unhappy countries； they are bereft of everything； even of the resource of borrowing。
Hence it is that a merchant under this government is unable to carry on an extensive commerce； he lives from hand to mouth； and were he to encumber himself with a large quantity of merchandise； he would lose more by the exorbitant interest he must give for money than he could possibly get by the goods。 Hence they have no laws here relating to commerce； they are all reduced to what is called the bare police。
A government cannot be unjust without having hands to exercise its injustice。 Now； it is impossible but that these hands will be grasping for themselves。 The embezzling of the public money is therefore natural in despotic states。
As this is a common crime under such a government； confiscations are very useful。 By these the people are eased； the money drawn by this method being a considerable tribute which could hardly be raised on the exhausted subject： neither is there in those countries any one family which the prince would be glad to preserve。
In moderate governments it is quite a different thing。 Confiscations would render property uncertain； would strip innocent children； would destroy a whole family； instead of punishing a single criminal。 In republics they would be attended with the mischief of subverting equality； which is the very soul of this government； by depriving a citizen of his necessary subsistence。＇47＇
There is a Roman law＇48＇ against confiscations； except in the case of crimen majestatis； or high treason of the most heinous nature。 It would be a prudent thing to follow the spirit of this law； and to limit confiscations to particular crimes。 In countries where a local custom has rendered real estates alienable； Bodin very justly observes that confiscations should extend only to such as are purchased or acquired。＇49＇
16。 Of the Communication of Power。 In a despotic government the power is communicated entire to the person entrusted with it。 The vizir himself is the despotic prince； and each particular officer is the vizir。 In monarchies the power is less immediately applied； being tempered by the monarch as he gives it。＇50＇ He makes such a distribution of his authority as never to communicate a part of it without reserving a greater share to himself。
Hence in monarchies the governors of towns are not so dependent on the governor of the province as not to be still more so on the prince； and the private officers or military bodies are not so far subject to their general as not to owe still a greater subjection to their sovereign。
In most monarchies it has been wisely regulated that those who have an extensive command should not belong to any military corps； so that as they have no authority but through the prince's pleasure； and as they may be employed or not； they are in some measure in the service； and in some measure out of it。
This is incompatible with a despotic government。 For if those who are not actually employed were still invested with privileges and titles； the consequence must be that there would be men in the state who might be said to be great of themselves； a thing directly opposite to the nature of this government。
Were the governor of a town independent of the pasha； expedients would be daily necessary to make them agree； which is highly absurd in a despotic state。 Besides； if a particular governor should refuse to obey； how could the other answer for his province with his head？
In this kind of government； authority must ever be wavering； nor is that of the lowest magistrate more steady than that of the despotic prince。 Under moderate governments； the law is prudent in all its parts； and perfectly well known； so that even the pettiest magistrates are capable of following it。 But in a despotic state； where the prince's will is the law； though the prince were wise； yet how could the magistrate follow a will he does not know？ He must certainly follow his own。
Again； as the law is only the prince's will； and as the prince can only will what he knows； the consequence is that there are an infinite number of people who must will for him； and make their wills keep pace with his。 In fine； as the law is the momentary will of the prince； it is necessary that those who will for him should follow his sudden manner of willing。
17。 Of Presents。 It is a received custom in despotic countries never to address any superior whomsoever； not excepting their kings； without making them a present。 The Mogul＇51＇ never receives the petitions of his subjects if they come with empty hands。 These princes spoil even their own favours。
But thus it must ever be in a government where no man is a citizen； where they have all a notion that a superior is under no obligation to an inferior； where men imagine themselves bound by no other tie than the chastisements inflicted by one party upon another； where； in fine； there is very little to do； and where the people have seldom an occasion of presenting themselves before the great； of offering their petitions； and much less their complaints。
In a republic； presents are odious； because virtue stands in no need of them。 In monarchies； honour is a much stronger incentive than presents。 But in a despotic government； where there is neither honour nor virtue； people cannot be determined to act but through hope of the conveniences of life。
It is in conformity with republican ideas that Plato＇52＇ ordered those who received presents for doing their duty to be punished with death。 〃They must not take presents；〃 says he； 〃neither for good nor for evil actions。〃
A very bad law was that among the Romans＇53＇ which gave the magistrates leave to accept small presents＇＇54＇ provided they did not exceed one hundred crowns in the whole year。 They who receive nothing expect nothing； they who receive a little soon covet more； till at length their desires swell to an exorbitant height。
Besides； it is much easier to convict a man who knows himself obliged to accept no present at all； and yet will accept something； than a person who takes more when he ought to take less； and who always finds pretexts； excuses； and plausible reasons in justification of his conduct。
18。 Of Rewards conferred by
