the spirit of laws-第22章

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veniences；　however；　that　vanish　when　confronted　with　its　general　utility：　but　when　these　privileges　are　communicated　to　the　people；　every　principle　of　government　is　wantonly　violated。

In　monarchies　a　person　may　leave　the　bulk　of　his　estate　to　one　of　his　children　　a　permission　improper　in　any　other　government。

The　laws　ought　to　favour　all　kinds　of　commerce＇30＇　consistent　with　the　constitution；　to　the　end　that　the　subjects　may；　without　ruining　themselves；　be　able　to　satisfy　the　continual　cravings　of　the　prince　and　his　court。

They　should　establish　some　regulation　that　the　manner　of　collecting　the　taxes　may　not　be　more　burdensome　than　the　taxes　themselves。

The　weight　of　duties　produces　labour；　labour　weariness；　and　weariness　the　spirit　of　indolence。

10。　Of　the　Expedition　peculiar　to　the　Executive　Power　in　Monarchies。　Great　is　the　advantage　which　a　monarchical　government　has　over　a　republic：　as　the　state　is　conducted　by　a　single　person；　the　executive　power　is　thereby　enabled　to　act　with　greater　expedition。　But　as　this　expedition　may　degenerate　into　rapidity；　the　laws　should　use　some　contrivance　to　slacken　it。　They　ought　not　only　to　favour　the　nature　of　each　constitution；　but　likewise　to　remedy　the　abuses　that　might　result　from　this　very　nature。

Cardinal　Richelieu＇31＇　advises　monarchs　to　permit　no　such　things　as　societies　or　communities　that　raise　difficulties　upon　every　trifle。　If　this　man's　heart　had　not　been　bewitched　with　the　love　of　despotic　power；　still　these　arbitrary　notions　would　have　filled　his　head。

The　bodies　entrusted　with　the　deposition　of　the　laws　are　never　more　obedient　than　when　they　proceed　slowly；　and　use　that　reflection　in　the　prince's　affairs　which　can　scarcely　be　expected　from　the　ignorance　of　a　court；　or　from　the　precipitation　of　its　councils。＇32＇

What　would　have　become　of　the　finest　monarchy　in　the　world　if　the　magistrates；　by　their　delays；　their　complaints；　and　entreaties；　had　not　checked　the　rapidity　even　of　their　princes'　virtues；　when　these　monarchs；　consulting　only　the　generous　impulse　of　their　minds；　would　fain　have　given　a　boundless　reward　to　services　performed　with　an　unlimited　courage　and　fidelity？

11。　Of　the　Excellence　of　a　Monarchical　Government。　Monarchy　has　a　great　advantage　over　a　despotic　government。　As　it　naturally　requires　there　should　be　several　orders　or　ranks　of　subjects；　the　state　is　more　permanent；　the　constitution　more　steady；　and　the　person　of　him　who　governs　more　secure。

Cicero　is　of　opinion　that　the　establishing　of　the　tribunes　preserved　the　republic。　〃And　indeed；〃　says　he；　〃the　violence　of　a　headless　people　is　more　terrible。　A　chief　or　head　is　sensible　that　the　affair　depends　upon　himself；　and　therefore　he　thinks；　but　the　people　in　their　impetuosity　are　ignorant　of　the　danger　into　which　they　hurry　themselves。〃　This　reflection　may　be　applied　to　a　despotic　government；　which　is　a　people　without　tribunes；　and　to　a　monarchy；　where　the　people　have　some　sort　of　tribunes。

Accordingly　it　is　observable　that　in　the　commotions　of　a　despotic　government；　the　people；　hurried　away　by　their　passions；　are　apt　to　push　things　as　far　as　they　can　go。　The　disorders　they　commit　are　all　extreme；　whereas　in　monarchies　matters　are　seldom　carried　to　excess。　The　chiefs　are　apprehensive　on　their　own　account；　they　are　afraid　of　being　abandoned；　and　the　intermediate　dependent　powers　do　not　choose　that　the　populace　should　have　too　much　the　upper　hand。　It　rarely　happens　that　the　states　of　the　kingdom　are　entirely　corrupted：　the　prince　adheres　to　these；　and　the　seditious；　who　have　neither　will　nor　hopes　to　subvert　the　government；　have　neither　power　nor　will　to　dethrone　the　prince。

In　these　circumstances　men　of　prudence　and　authority　interfere；　moderate　measures　are　first　proposed；　then　complied　with；　and　things　at　length　are　redressed；　the　laws　resume　their　vigour；　and　command　submission。

Thus　all　our　histories　are　full　of　civil　wars　without　revolutions；　while　the　histories　of　despotic　governments　abound　with　revolutions　without　civil　wars。

The　writers　of　the　history　of　the　civil　wars　of　some　countries；　even　those　who　fomented　them；　sufficiently　demonstrate　the　little　foundation　princes　have　to　suspect　the　authority　with　which　they　invest　particular　bodies　of　men；　since；　even　under　the　unhappy　circumstance　of　their　errors；　they　sighed　only　after　the　laws　and　their　duty；　and　restrained；　more　than　they　were　capable　of　inflaming；　the　impetuosity　of　the　revolted。＇33＇　Cardinal　Richelieu；　reflecting　perhaps　that　he　had　too　much　reduced　the　states　of　the　kingdom；　has　recourse　to　the　virtues　of　the　prince　and　of　his　ministers　for　the　support＇34＇　of　government：　but　he　requires　so　many　things；　that　indeed　there　is　none　but　an　angel　capable　of　such　attention；　such　resolution　and　knowledge；　and　scarcely　can　we　flatter　ourselves　that　we　shall　ever　see　such　a　prince　and　ministers　while　monarchy　subsists。

As　people　who　live　under　a　good　government　are　happier　than　those　who　without　rule　or　leaders　wander　about　the　forests；　so　monarchs　who　live　under　the　fundamental　laws　of　their　country　are　far　happier　than　despotic　princes　who　have　nothing　to　regulate；　neither　their　own　passions　nor　those　of　their　subjects。

12。　The　same　Subject　continued。　Let　us　not　look　for　magnanimity　in　despotic　governments；　the　prince　cannot　impart　a　greatness　which　he　has　not　himself；　with　him　there　is　no　such　thing　as　glory。

It　is　in　monarchies　that　we　behold　the　subjects　encircling　the　throne；　and　cheered　by　the　irradiancy　of　the　sovereign；　there　it　is　that　each　person　filling；　as　it　were；　a　larger　space；　is　capable　of　exercising　those　virtues　which　adorn　the　soul；　not　with　independence；　but　with　true　dignity　and　greatness。

13。　An　Idea　of　Despotic　Power。　When　the　savages　of　Louisiana　are　desirous　of　fruit；　they　cut　the　tree　to　the　root；　and　gather　the　fruit。＇35＇　This　is　an　emblem　of　despotic　government。

14。　In　what　Manner　the　Laws　are　in　relation　to　the　Principles　of　Despotic　Government。　The　principle　of　despotic　government　is　fear；　but　a　timid；　ignorant；　and　faint…spirited　people　have　no　occasion　for　a　great　number　of　laws。

Everything　ought　to　depend　here　on　two　or　three　ideas；　hence　there　is　no　necessity　that　any　new　notions　should　be　added。　When　we　want　to　break　a　horse；　we　take　care　not　to　let　him　change　his　master；　his　lesson；　or　his　pace。　Thus　an　impression　is　made　on　his　brain　by　two　or　three　motions；　and　no　more。

If　a　prince　is　shut　up　in　a　seraglio；　he　cannot　leave　his　voluptuous　abode　without　alarming　those　who　keep　him　confined。　Thev　will　not　bear　that　his　person　and　power　should　pass　into　other　hands。　He　seldom　therefore　wages　war　in　person；　and　hardly　ventures　to　entrust　the　command　to　his　generals。

A　prince　of　this　stamp；　unaccustomed　to　resistance　in　his　palace；　is　enraged　to　see　his　will　opposed　by　armed　force；　hence　he　is　generally　governed　by　wrath　or　vengeance。　Besides；　he　can　have　no　notion　of　true　glory。　War　therefore　is　carried　on　under　such　a　government　in　its　full　natural　fury；　and　less　extent　is　given　to　the　law　of　nations　than　in　other　states。

Such　a　prince　has　so　many　imperfections　that　they　are　afraid　to　expose　his　natural　stupidity　to　public　view。　He　is　concealed　in　his　palace；　and　the　people　are　ignorant　of　his　situation。　It　is　lucky　for　him　that　the　inhabitants　of　those　countries　need　only　the　name　of　a　prince　to　govern　them。

When　Charles　XII　was　at　Bender；　he　met　with　some　opposition　from　the　senate　of　Sweden；　upon　which　he　wrote　word　home　that　he　would　send　one　of　his　boots　to　command　them。　This　boot　would　have　governed　like　a　despotic　prince。

If　the　prince　is　a　prisoner；　he　is　supposed　to　be　dead；　and　another　mounts　the　throne。　The　treaties　made　by　the　prisoner　are　void；　his　successor　will　not　ratify　them；　and　indeed；　as　he　is　the　law；　the　state；　and　the　prince：　when　he　is　no　longer　a　prince；　he　is　nothing：　were　he　not　therefore　deemed　to　be　deceased；　the　state　would　be　subverted。

One　thing　which　chiefly　determined　the　Turks　to　conclude　a　separate　peace　with　Peter　I　was　the　Muscovites　telling　the　Vizir　that　in　Sweden　another　prince　had　been　placed　upon　the　throne。＇36＇

The　preservation　of　the　state　is　only　the　preservation　of　the　prince；　or　rather　of　th