the spirit of laws-第21章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


　the　body　that　governs。　From　these　two　inequalities；　hatreds　and　jealousies　arise；　which　the　laws　ought　ever　to　prevent　or　repress。

The　first　inequality　is　chiefly　when　the　privileges　of　the　nobility　are　honourable　only　as　they　are　ignominious　to　the　people。　Such　was　the　law　at　Rome　by　which　the　patricians　were　forbidden　to　marry　plebeians；＇21＇　a　law　that　had　no　other　effect　than　to　render　the　patricians　on　the　one　side　more　haughty；　and　on　the　other　more　odious。　The　reader　may　see　what　advantages　the　tribunes　derived　thence　in　their　harangues。

This　inequality　occurs　likewise　when　the　condition　of　the　citizens　differs　with　regard　to　taxes；　which　may　happen　in　four　different　ways：　when　the　nobles　assume　the　privilege　of　paying　none；　when　they　commit　frauds　to　exempt　themselves；＇22＇　when　they　engross　the　public　money；　under　pretence　of　rewards　or　appointments　for　their　respective　employments；　in　fine；　when　they　render　the　common　people　tributary；　and　divide　among　their　own　body　the　profits　arising　from　the　several　subsidies。　This　last　case　is　very　rare；　an　aristocracy　so　instituted　would　be　the　most　intolerable　of　all　governments。

While　Rome　inclined　towards　aristocracy；　she　avoided　all　these　inconveniences。　The　magistrates　never　received　any　emoluments　from　their　office。　The　chief　men　of　the　republic　were　taxed　like　the　rest；　nay；　more　heavily；　and　sometimes　the　taxes　fell　upon　them　alone。　In　fine；　far　from　sharing　among　themselves　the　revenues　of　the　state；　all　they　could　draw　from　the　public　treasure；　and　all　the　wealth　that　fortune　flung　into　their　laps；　they　bestowed　freely　on　the　people；　to　be　excused　from　accepting　public　honours。＇23＇

It　is　a　fundamental　maxim　that　largesses　are　pernicious　to　the　people　in　a　democracy；　but　salutary　in　an　aristocratic　government。　The　former　make　them　forget　they　are　citizens；　the　latter　bring　them　to　a　sense　of　it。　If　the　revenues　of　the　state　are　not　distributed　among　the　people；　they　must　be　convinced　at　least　of　their　being　well　administered：　to　feast　their　eyes　with　the　public　treasure　is　with　them　the　same　thing　almost　as　enjoying　it。　The　golden　chain　displayed　at　Venice；　the　riches　exhibited　at　Rome　in　public　triumphs；　the　treasures　preserved　in　the　temple　of　Saturn；　were　in　reality　the　wealth　of　the　people。

It　is　a　very　essential　point　in　an　aristocracy　that　the　nobles　themselves　should　not　levy　the　taxes。　The　first　order　of　the　state　in　Rome　never　concerned　themselves　with　it；　the　levying　of　the　taxes　was　committed　to　the　second；　and　even　this　in　process　of　time　was　attended　with　great　inconveniences。　In　an　aristocracy　of　this　kind；　where　the　nobles　levied　the　taxes；　the　private　people　would　be　all　at　the　discretion　of　persons　in　public　employments；　and　there　would　be　no　such　thing　as　a　superior　tribunal　to　check　their　power。　The　members　appointed　to　remove　the　abuses　would　rather　enjoy　them。　The　nobles　would　be　like　the　princes　of　despotic　governments；　who　confiscate　whatever　estates　they　please。

Soon　would　the　profits　hence　arising　be　considered　as　a　patrimony；　which　avarice　would　enlarge　at　pleasure。　The　farms　would　be　lowered；　and　the　public　revenues　reduced　to　nothing。　This　is　the　reason　that　some　governments；　without　having　ever　received　any　remarkable　shock；　have　dwindled　away　to　such　a　degree　as　not　only　their　neighbours；　but　even　their　own　subjects；　have　been　surprised　at　it。

The　laws　should　likewise　forbid　the　nobles　all　kinds　of　commerce：　merchants　of　such　unbounded　credit　would　monopolise　all　to　themselves。　Commerce　is　a　profession　of　people　who　are　upon　an　equality；　hence　among　despotic　states　the　most　miserable　are　those　in　which　the　prince　applies　himself　to　trade。

The　laws　of　Venice　debar＇24＇　the　nobles　from　commerce；　by　which　they　might　even　innocently　acquire　exorbitant　wealth。

The　laws　ought　to　employ　the　most　effectual　means　for　making　the　nobles　do　justice　to　the　people。　If　they　have　not　established　a　tribune；　they　ought　to　be　a　tribune　themselves。

Every　sort　of　asylum　in　opposition　to　the　execution　of　the　laws　destroys　aristocracy；　and　is　soon　succeeded　by　tyranny。　They　ought　always　to　mortify　the　lust　of　dominion。　There　should　be　either　a　temporary　or　perpetual　magistrate　to　keep　the　nobles　in　awe；　as　the　Ephori　at　Sparta　and　the　State　Inquisitors　at　Venice　　magistrates　subject　to　no　formalities。　This　sort　of　government　stands　in　need　of　the　strongest　springs：　thus　a　mouth　of　stone＇25＇　is　open　to　every　informer　at　Venice　　a　mouth　to　which　one　would　be　apt　to　give　the　appellation　of　tyranny。

These　arbitrary　magistrates　in　an　aristocracy　bear　some　analogy　to　the　censorship　in　democracies；　which　of　its　own　nature　is　equally　independent。　And；　indeed；　the　censors　ought　to　be　subject　to　no　inquiry　in　relation　to　their　conduct　during　their　office；　they　should　meet　with　a　thorough　confidence；　and　never　be　discouraged。　In　this　respect　the　practice　of　the　Romans　deserved　admiration；　magistrates　of　all　denominations　were　accountable　for　their　administration；＇26＇　except　the　censors。＇27＇

There　are　two　very　pernicious　things　in　an　aristocracy　　excess　either　of　poverty；　or　of　wealth　in　the　nobility。　To　prevent　their　poverty；　it　is　necessary；　above　all　things；　to　oblige　them　to　pay　their　debts　in　time。　To　moderate　the　excess　of　wealth；　prudent　and　gradual　regulations　should　be　made；　but　no　confiscations；　no　agrarian　laws；　no　expunging　of　debts；　these　are　productive　of　infinite　mischief。

The　laws　ought　to　abolish　the　right　of　primogeniture　among　the　nobles＇28＇　to　the　end　that　by　a　continual　division　of　the　inheritances　their　fortunes　may　be　always　upon　a　level。

There　should　be　no　substitutions；　no　powers　of　redemption；　no　rights　of　Majorasgo；　or　adoption。　The　contrivances　for　perpetuating　the　grandeur　of　families　in　monarchical　governments　ought　never　to　be　employed　in　aristocracies。＇29＇

When　the　laws　have　compassed　the　equality　of　families；　the　next　thing　is　to　preserve　a　proper　harmony　and　union　among　them。　The　quarrels　of　the　nobility　ought　to　be　quickly　decided；　otherwise　the　contests　of　individuals　become　those　of　families。　Arbiters　may　terminate；　or　even　prevent；　the　rise　ot　disputes。

In　fine；　the　laws　must　not　favour　the　distinctions　raised　by　vanity　among　families；　under　pretence　that　they　are　more　noble　or　ancient　than　others。　Pretences　of　this　nature　ought　to　be　ranked　among　the　weaknesses　of　private　persons。

We　have　only　to　cast　an　eye　upon　Sparta；　there　we　may　see　how　the　Ephori　contrived　to　check　the　foibles　of　the　kings；　as　well　as　those　of　the　nobility　and　common　people。

9。　In　what　Manner　the　Laws　are　in　relation　to　their　Principle　in　Monarchies。　As　honour　is　the　principle　of　a　monarchical　government；　the　laws　ought　to　be　in　relation　to　this　principle。

They　should　endeavour　to　support　the　nobility；　in　respect　to　whom　honour　may　be；　in　some　measure；　deemed　both　child　and　parent。

They　should　render　the　nobility　hereditary；　not　as　a　boundary　between　the　power　of　the　prince　and　the　weakness　of　the　people；　but　as　the　link　which　connects　them　both。

In　this　government；　substitutions　which　preserve　the　estates　of　families　undivided　are　extremely　useful；　though　in　others　not　so　proper。

Here　the　power　of　redemption　is　of　service；　as　it　restores　to　noble　families　the　lands　that　had　been　alienated　by　the　prodigality　of　a　parent。

The　land　of　the　nobility　ought　to　have　privileges　as　well　as　their　persons。　The　monarch's　dignity　is　inseparable　from　that　of　his　kingdom；　and…the　dignity　of　the　nobleman　from　that　of　his　fief。

All　these　privileges　must　be　peculiar　to　the　nobility；　and　incommunicable　to　the　people；　unless　we　intend　to　act　contrary　to　the　principle　of　government；　and　to　diminish　the　power　of　the　nobles　together　with　that　of　the　people。

Substitutions　are　a　restraint　to　commerce；　the　power　of　redemption　produces　an　infinite　number　of　processes；　every　estate　in　land　that　is　sold　throughout　the　kingdom　is　in　some　measure　without　an　owner　for　the　space　of　a　year。　Privileges　annexed　to　fiefs　give　a　power　very　burdensome　to　those　governments　which　tolerate　them。　These　are　the　inconveniences　of　nobility　　inconveniences；　however；　that　vanish　when　confronted　with　its　general　utility：　but　when　these　privileges