the spirit of laws-第15章

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　leaves　fields　untouched；　where　the　eye　is　refreshed　by　the　prospect　of　fine　meadows。

10。　Difference　of　Obedience　in　Moderate　and　Despotic　Governments。　In　despotic　states；　the　nature　of　government　requires　the　most　passive　obedience；　and　when　once　the　prince's　will　is　made　known；　it　ought　infallibly　to　produce　its　effect。

Here　they　have　no　limitations　or　restrictions；　no　mediums；　terms；　equivalents；　or　remonstrances；　no　change　to　propose：　man　is　a　creature　that　blindly　submits　to　the　absolute　will　of　the　sovereign。

In　a　country　like　this　they　are　no　more　allowed　to　represent　their　apprehensions　of　a　future　danger　than　to　impute　their　miscarriage　to　the　capriciousness　of　fortune。　Man's　portion　here；　like　that　of　beasts；　is　instinct；　compliance；　and　punishment。

Little　does　it　then　avail　to　plead　the　sentiments　of　nature；　filial　respect；　conjugal　or　parental　tenderness；　the　laws　of　honour；　or　want　of　health；　the　order　is　given；　and；　that　is　sufficient。

In　Persia；　when　the　king　has　condemned　a　person；　it　is　no　longer　lawful　to　mention　his　name；　or　to　intercede　in　his　favour。　Even　if　the　prince　were　intoxicated；　or　non　compos；　the　decree　must　be　executed；＇19＇　otherwise　he　would　contradict　himself；　and　the　law　admits　of　no　contradiction。　This　has　been　the　way　of　thinking　in　that　country　in　all　ages；　as　the　order　which　Ahasuerus　gave；　to　exterminate　the　Jews；　could　not　be　revoked；　they　were　allowed　the　liberty　of　defending　themselves。

One　thing；　however；　may　be　sometimes　opposed　to　the　prince's　will；＇20＇　namely；　religion。　They　will　abandon；　nay　they　will　slay　a　parent；　if　the　prince　so　commands；　but　he　cannot　oblige　them　to　drink　wine。　The　laws　of　religion　are　of　a　superior　nature；　because　they　bind　the　sovereign　as　well　as　the　subject。　But　with　respect　to　the　law　of　nature；　it　is　otherwise；　the　prince　is　no　longer　supposed　to　be　a　man。

In　monarchical　and　moderate　states；　the　power　is　limited　by　its　very　spring；　I　mean　by　honour；　which；　like　a　monarch；　reigns　over　the　prince　and　his　people。　They　will　not　allege　to　their　sovereign　the　laws　of　religion；　a　courtier　would　be　apprehensive　of　rendering　himself　ridiculous。　But　the　laws　of　honour　will　be　appealed　to　on　all　occasions。　Hence　arise　the　restrictions　necessary　to　obedience；　honour　is　naturally　subject　to　whims；　by　which　the　subject's　submission　will　be　ever　directed。

Though　the　manner　of　obeying　be　different　in　these　two　kinds　of　government；　the　power　is　the　same。　On　which　side　soever　the　monarch　turns；　he　inclines　the　scale；　and　is　obeyed。　The　whole　difference　is　that　in　a　monarchy　the　prince　receives　instruction；　at　the　same　time　that　his　ministers　have　greater　abilities；　and　are　more　versed　in　public　affairs；　than　the　ministers　of　a　despotic　government。

11。　Reflections　on　the　preceding　Chapters。　Such　are　the　principles　of　the　three　sorts　of　government：　which　does　not　imply　that　in　a　particular　republic　they　actually　are；　but　that　they　ought　to　be；　virtuous；　nor　does　it　prove　that　in　a　particular　monarchy　they　are　actuated　by　honour；　or　in　a　particular　despotic　government　by　fear；　but　that　they　ought　to　be　directed　by　these　principles；　otherwise　the　government　is　imperfect。

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1。　This　is　a　very　important　distinction；　whence　I　shall　draw　many　consequences；　for　it　is　the　key　of　an　infinite　number　of　laws。

2。　Cromwell。

3。　Plutarch；　Pericles；　Plato；　in　Critias。

4。　She　had　at　that　time　twenty…one　thousand　citizens；　ten　thousand　strangers；　and　four　hundred　thousand　slaves。　See　Athen？us；　vi。

5。　She　had　then　twenty　thousand　citizens。　See　Demosthenes　in　Aristog。

6。　They　had　passed　a　law；　which　rendered　it　a　capital　crime　for　any　one　to　propose　applying　the　money　designed　for　the　theatres　to　military

7。　This　lasted　three　years。

8。　Public　crimes　may　be　punished；　because　it　is　here　a　common　concern；　but　private　crimes　will　go　unpunished；　because　it　is　the　common　interest　not　to　punish　them。

9。　I　speak　here　of　political　virtue；　which　is　also　moral　virtue　as　it　is　directed　to　the　public　good；　very　little　of　private　moral　virtue；　and　not　at　all　of　that　virtue　which　relates　to　revealed　truths。　This　will　appear　better　in　v。　2。

10。　This　is　to　be　understood　in　the　sense　of　the　preceding　note。

11。　We　must　not；　says　he；　employ　people　of　mean　extraction；　they　are　too　rigid　and　morose。　　Testament　Polit。；　4。

12。　This　word　good　man　is　understood　here　in　a　political　sense　only。

13。　See　Footnote　1。

14。　See　Perry；　p。　447。

15。　As　it　often　happens　in　a　military　aristocracy。

16。　Ricaut　on　the　Ottoman　Empire。　I；　ii。

17。　See　the　history　of　this　revolution　by　Father　du　Cerceau。

18。　Suetonius；　Life　of　Domitian；　viii。　His　was　a　military　constitution；　which　is　one　of　the　species　of　despotic　government。

19。　See　Sir　John　Chardin。

20。　Ibid。




Book　IV。　That　the　Laws　of　Education　Ought　to　Be　in　Relation　to　the　Principles　of　Government

1。　Of　the　Laws　of　Education。　The　laws　of　education　are　the　first　impressions　we　receive；　and　as　they　prepare　us　for　civil　life；　every　private　family　ought　to　be　governed　by　the　plan　of　that　great　household　which　comprehends　them　all。

If　the　people　in　general　have　a　principle；　their　constituent　parts；　that　is；　the　several　families；　will　have　one　also。　The　laws　of　education　will　be　therefore　different　in　each　species　of　government：　in　monarchies　they　will　have　honour　for　their　object；　in　republics；　virtue；　in　despotic　governments；　fear。

2。　Of　Education　in　Monarchies。　In　monarchies　the　principal　branch　of　education　is　not　taught　in　colleges　or　academies。　It　commences；　in　some　measure；　at　our　setting　out　in　the　world；　for　this　is　the　school　of　what　we　call　honour；　that　universal　preceptor　which　ought　everywhere　to　be　our　guide。

Here　it　is　that　we　constantly　hear　three　rules　or　maxims；　viz。；　that　we　should　have　a　certain　nobleness　in　our　virtues；　a　kind　of　frankness　in　our　morals；　and　a　particular　politeness　in　our　behaviour。

The　virtues　we　are　here　taught　are　less　what　we　owe　to　others　than　to　ourselves；　they　are　not　so　much　what　draws　us　towards　society；　as　what　distinguishes　us　from　our　fellow…citizens。　Here　the　actions　of　men　are　judged；　not　as　virtuous；　but　as　shining；　not　as　just；　but　as　great；　not　as　reasonable；　but　as　extraordinary。　When　honour　here　meets　with　anything　noble　in　our　actions；　it　is　either　a　judge　that　approves　them；　or　sophist　by　whom　they　are　excused。

It　allows　of　gallantry　when　united　with　the　idea　of　sensible　affection；　or　with　that　of　conquest；　this　is　the　reason　why　we　never　meet　with　so　strict　a　purity　of　morals　in　monarchies　as　in　republican　governments。

It　allows　of　cunning　and　craft；　when　joined　with　the　notion　of　greatness　of　soul　or　importance　of　affairs；　as；　for　instance；　in　politics；　with　finesses　of　which　it　is　far　from　being　offended。

It　does　not　forbid　adulation；　save　when　separated　from　the　idea　of　a　large　fortune；　and　connected　only　with　the　sense　of　our　mean　condition。

With　regard　to　morals；　I　have　observed　that　the　education　of　monarchies　ought　to　admit　of　a　certain　frankness　and　open　carriage。　Truth；　therefore；　in　conversation　is　here　a　necessary　point。　But　is　it　for　the　sake　of　truth？　By　no　means。　Truth　is　requisite　only　because　a　person　habituated　to　veracity　has　an　air　of　boldness　and　freedom。　And　indeed　a　man　of　this　stamp　seems　to　lay　a　stress　only　on　the　things　themselves；　not　on　the　manner　in　which　they　are　received。

Hence　it　is　that　in　proportion　as　this　kind　of　frankness　is　commended；　that　of　the　common　people　is　despised；　which　has　nothing　but　truth　and　simplicity　for　its　object。

In　fine；　the　education　of　monarchies　requires　a　certain　politeness　of　behaviour。　Man；　a　sociable　animal；　is　formed　to　please　in　society；　and　a　person　that　would　break　through　the　rules　of　decency；　so　as　to　shock　those　he　conversed　with；　would　lose　the　public　esteem；　and　become　incapable　of　doing　any　good。

But　politeness；　generally　speaking；　does　not　derive　its　origin　from　so　pure　a　source。　It　arises　from　a　desire　of　distinguishing　ourselves。　It　is　pride　that　renders　us　polite；　we　are　flattered　with　being　taken　notice　of　for　behaviour　that　shows　we　are　not　of　a　mean　condition；　and　that　we　have　not　been　bred　with　those　who　in　all　ages　are　c