the spirit of laws-第13章
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21。 This is what ruined the republic of Rome。 See Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decline of the Romans； 14； 16。
22。 Tournefort； Voyages。
23。 At Lucca the magistrates are chosen only for two months。
24。 Diodorus； xviii； p。 601； ed。 Rhodoman。
25。 Ferdinand； king of Aragon； made himself grand master of the orders； and that alone changed the constitution。
26。 The Eastern kings are never without vizirs； says Sir John Chardin。
Book III。 Of the Principles of the Three Kinds of Government
1。 Difference between the Nature and Principle of Government。 Having examined the laws in relation to the nature of each government； we must investigate those which relate to its principle。
There is this difference between the nature and principle＇1＇ of government； that the former is that by which it is constituted； the latter that by which it is made to act。 One is its particular structure； and the other the human passions which set it in motion。
Now； laws ought no less to relate to the principle than to the nature of each government。 We must； therefore； inquire into this principle； which shall be the subject of this third book。
2。 Of the Principle of different Governments。 I have already observed that it is the nature of a republican government that either the collective body of the people； or particular families； should be possessed of the supreme power； of a monarchy； that the prince should have this power； but in the execution of it should be directed by established laws； of a despotic government； that a single person should rule according to his own will and caprice。 This enables me to discover their three principles； which are thence naturally derived。 I shall begin with a republican government； and in particular with that of democracy。
3。 Of the Principle of Democracy。 There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government。 The force of laws in one； and the prince's arm in the other； are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole。 But in a popular state； one spring more is necessary； namely； virtue。
What I have here advanced is confirmed by the unanimous testimony of historians； and is extremely agreeable to the nature of things。 For it is clear that in a monarchy； where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them； there is less need of virtue than in a popular government； where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction。
Clear is it also that a monarch who； through bad advice or indolence； ceases to enforce the execution of the laws； may easily repair the evil； he has only to follow other advice； or to shake off this indolence。 But when； in a popular government； there is a suspension of the laws； as this can proceed only from the corruption of the republic； the state is certainly undone。
A very droll spectacle it was in the last century to behold the impotent efforts of the English towards the establishment of democracy。 As they who had a share in the direction of public affairs were void of virtue； as their ambition was inffamed by the success of the most daring of their members；＇2＇ as the prevailing parties were successively animated by the spirit of faction； the government was continually changing： the people； amazed at so many revolutions； in vain attempted to erect a commonwealth。 At length； when the country had undergone the most violent shocks； they were obliged to have recourse to the very government which they had so wantonly proscribed。
When Sylla thought of restoring Rome to her liberty； this unhappy city was incapable of receiving that blessing。 She had only the feeble remains of virtue； which were continually diminishing。 Instead of being roused from her lethargy by C？sar； Tiberius； Caius Claudius； Nero； and Domitian； she riveted every day her chains； if she struck some blows； her aim was at the tyrant； not at the tyranny。
The politic Greeks； who lived under a popular government； knew no other support than virtue。 The modern inhabitants of that country are entirely taken up with manufacture； commerce； finances； opulence； and luxury。
When virtue is banished； ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it； and avarice possesses the whole community。 The objects of their desires are changed； what they were fond of before has become indifferent； they were free while under the restraint of laws； but they would fain now be free to act against law； and as each citizen is like a slave who has run away from his master； that which was a maxim of equity he calls rigour； that which was a rule of action he styles constraint； and to precaution he gives the name of fear。 Frugality； and not the thirst of gain； now passes for avarice。 Formerly the wealth of individuals constituted the public treasure； but now this has become the patrimony of private persons。 The members of the commonwealth riot on the public spoils； and its strength is only the power of a few； and the licence of many。
Athens was possessed of the same number of forces when she triumphed so gloriously as when with such infamy she was enslaved。 She had twenty thousand citizens＇3＇ when she defended the Greeks against the Persians； when she contended for empire with Sparta； and invaded Sicily。 She had twenty thousand when Demetrius Phalereus numbered them＇4＇ as slaves are told by the head in a market…place。 When Philip attempted to lord it over Greece； and appeared at the gates of Athens＇5＇ she had even then lost nothing but time。 We may see in Demosthenes how difficult it was to awaken her； she dreaded Philip； not as the enemy of her liberty； but of her pleasures。＇6＇ This famous city； which had withstood so many defeats； and having been so often destroyed had as often risen out of her ashes； was overthrown at Ch？ronea； and at one blow deprived of all hopes of resource。 What does it avail her that Philip sends back her prisoners； if he does not return her men？ It was ever after as easy to triumph over the forces of Athens as it had been difficult to subdue her virtue。
How was it possible for Carthage to maintain her ground？ When Hannibal； upon his being made pr？tor； endeavoured to hinder the magistrates from plundering the republic； did not they complain of him to the Romans？ Wretches； who would fain be citizens without a city； and be beholden for their riches to their very destroyers！ Rome soon insisted upon having three hundred of their principal citizens as hostages； she obliged them next to surrender their arms and ships； and then she declared war。＇7＇ From the desperate efforts of this defenceless city； one may judge of what she might have performed in her full vigour； and assisted by virtue。
4。 Of the Principle of Aristocracy。 As virtue is necessary in a popular government； it is requisite also in an aristocracy。 True it is that in the latter it is not so absolutely requisite。
The people； who in respect to the nobility are the same as the subjects with regard to a monarch； are restrained by their laws。 They have； therefore； less occasion for virtue than the people in a democracy。 But how are the nobility to be restrained？ They who are to execute the laws against their colleagues will immediately perceive that they are acting against themselves。 Virtue is therefore necessary in this body； from the very nature of the constitution。
An aristocratic government has an inherent vigour； unknown to democracy。 The nobles form a body； who by their prerogative； and for their own particular interest； restrain the people； it is sufficient that there are laws in being to see them executed。
But easy as it may be for the body of the nobles to restrain the people； it is difficult to restrain themselves。＇8＇ Such is the nature of this constitution； that it seems to subject the very same persons to the power of the laws； and at the same time to exempt them。
Now such a body as this can restrain itself only in two ways； either by a very eminent virtue； which puts the nobility in some measure on a level with the people； and may be the means of forming a great republic； or by an inferior virtue； which puts them at least upon a level with one another； and upon this t
