the spirit of laws-第11章

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　the　same　time　of　the　suffrage　by　lot；　and　of　that　by　choice。　When　the　time　of　their　magistracy　had　expired；　they　were　obliged　to　submit　to　another　judgment　in　regard　to　their　conduct。　Persons　utterly　unqualified　must　have　been　extremely　backward　in　giving　in　their　names　to　be　drawn　by　lot。

The　law　which　determines　the　manner　of　giving　suffrage　is　likewise　fundamental　in　a　democracy。　It　is　a　question　of　some　importance　whether　the　suffrages　ought　to　be　public　or　secret。　Cicero　observes＇13＇　that　the　laws＇14＇　which　rendered　them　secret　towards　the　close　of　the　republic　were　the　cause　of　its　decline。　But　as　this　is　differently　practised　in　different　republics；　I　shall　offer　here　my　thoughts　concerning　this　subject。

The　people's　suffrages　ought　doubtless　to　be　public＇15＇　and　this　should　be　considered　as　a　fundamental　law　of　democracy。　The　lower　class　ought　to　be　directed　by　those　of　higher　rank；　and　restrained　within　bounds　by　the　gravity　of　eminent　personages。　Hence；　by　rendering　the　suffrages　secret　in　the　Roman　republic；　all　was　lost；　it　was　no　longer　possible　to　direct　a　populace　that　sought　its　own　destruction。　But　when　the　body　of　the　nobles　are　to　vote　in　an　aristocracy＇16＇　or　in　a　democracy　the　senate＇17＇　as　the　business　is　then　only　to　prevent　intrigues；　the　suffrages　cannot　be　too　secret。

Intriguing　in　a　senate　is　dangerous；　it　is　dangerous　also　in　a　body　of　nobles；　but　not　so　among　the　people；　whose　nature　is　to　act　through　passion。　In　countries　where　they　have　no　share　in　the　government；　we　often　see　them　as　much　inflamed　on　account　of　an　actor　as　ever　they　could　be　for　the　welfare　of　the　state。　The　misfortune　of　a　republic　is　when　intrigues　are　at　an　end；　which　happens　when　the　people　are　gained　by　bribery　and　corruption：　in　this　case　they　grow　indifferent　to　public　affairs；　and　avarice　becomes　their　predominant　passion。　Unconcerned　about　the　government　and　everything　belonging　to　it；　they　quietly　wait　for　their　hire。

It　is　likewise　a　fundamental　law　in　democracies；　that　the　people　should　have　the　sole　power　to　enact　laws。　And　yet　there　are　a　thousand　occasions　on　which　it　is　necessary　the　senate　should　have　the　power　of　decreeing；　nay；　it　is　frequently　proper　to　make　some　trial　of　a　law　before　it　is　established。　The　constitutions　of　Rome　and　Athens　were　excellent。　The　decrees　of　the　senate＇18＇　had　the　force　of　laws　for　the　space　of　a　year；　but　did　not　become　perpetual　till　they　were　ratified　by　the　consent　of　the　people。

3。　Of　the　Laws　in　relation　to　the　Nature　of　Aristocracy。　In　an　aristocracy　the　supreme　power　is　lodged　in　the　hands　of　a　certain　number　of　persons。　These　are　invested　both　with　the　legislative　and　executive　authority；　and　the　rest　of　the　people　are；　in　respect　to　them；　the　same　as　the　subjects　of　a　monarchy　in　regard　to　the　sovereign。

They　do　not　vote　here　by　lot；　for　this　would　be　productive　of　inconveniences　only。　And　indeed；　in　a　government　where　the　most　mortifying　distinctions　are　already　established；　though　they　were　to　be　chosen　by　lot；　still　they　would　not　cease　to　be　odious；　it　is　the　nobleman　they　envy；　and　not　the　magistrate。

When　the　nobility　are　numerous；　there　must　be　a　senate　to　regulate　the　affairs　which　the　body　of　the　nobles　are　incapable　of　deciding；　and　to　prepare　others　for　their　decision。　In　this　case　it　may　be　said　that　the　aristocracy　is　in　some　measure　in　the　senate；　the　democracy　in　the　body　of　the　nobles；　and　the　people　are　a　cipher。

It　would　be　a　very　happy　thing　in　an　aristocracy　if　the　people；　in　some　measure；　could　be　raised　from　their　state　of　annihilation。　Thus　at　Genoa；　the　bank　of　St。　George　being　administered　by　the　people＇19＇　gives　them　a　certain　influence　in　the　government；　whence　their　whole　prosperity　is　derived。

The　senators　ought　by　no　means　to　have　the　right　of　naming　their　own　members；　for　this　would　be　the　only　way　to　perpetuate　abuses。　At　Rome；　which　in　its　early　years　was　a　kind　of　aristocracy；　the　senate　did　not　fill　up　the　vacant　places　in　their　own　body；　the　new　members　were　nominated　by　the　censors。＇20＇

In　a　republic；　the　sudden　rise　of　a　private　citizen　to　exorbitant　power　produces　monarchy；　or　something　more　than　monarchy。　In　the　latter　the　laws　have　provided　for；　or　in　some　measure　adapted　themselves　to；　the　constitution；　and　the　principle　of　government　checks　the　monarch：　but　in　a　republic；　where　a　private　citizen　has　obtained　an　exorbitant　power；＇21＇　the　abuse　of　this　power　is　much　greater；　because　the　laws　foresaw　it　not；　and　consequently　made　no　provision　against　it。

There　is　an　exception　to　this　rule；　when　the　constitution　is　such　as　to　have　immediate　need　of　a　magistrate　invested　with　extraordinary　power。　Such　was　Rome　with　her　dictators；　such　is　Venice　with　her　state　inquisitors；　these　are　formidable　magistrates；　who　restore；　as　it　were　by　violence；　the　state　to　its　liberty。　But　how　comes　it　that　these　magistracies　are　so　very　different　in　these　two　republics？　It　is　because　Rome　supported　the　remains　of　her　aristocracy　against　the　people；　whereas　Venice　employs　her　state　inquisitors　to　maintain　her　aristocracy　against　the　nobles。　The　consequence　was　that　at　Rome　the　dictatorship　could　be　only　of　short　duration；　as　the　people　acted　through　passion　and　not　with　design。　It　was　necessary　that　a　magistracy　of　this　kind　should　be　exercised　with　lustre　and　pomp；　the　business　being　to　intimidate；　and　not　to　punish；　the　multitude。　It　was　also　proper　that　the　dictator　should　be　created　only　for　some　particular　affair；　and　for　this　only　should　have　an　unlimited　authority；　as　he　was　always　created　upon　some　sudden　emergency。　On　the　contrary；　at　Venice　they　have　occasion　for　a　permanent　magistracy；　for　here　it　is　that　schemes　may　be　set　on　foot；　continued；　suspended；　and　resumed；　that　the　ambition　of　a　single　person　becomes　that　of　a　family；　and　the　ambition　of　one　family　that　of　many。　They　have　occasion　for　a　secret　magistracy；　the　crimes　they　punish　being　hatched　in　secrecy　and　silence。　This　magistracy　must　have　a　general　inquisition；　for　their　business　is　not　to　remedy　known　disorders；　but　to　prevent　the　unknown。　In　a　word；　the　latter　is　designed　to　punish　suspected　crimes；　whereas　the　former　used　rather　menaces　than　punishment　even　for　crimes　that　were　openly　avowed。

In　all　magistracies；　the　greatness　of　the　power　must　be　compensated　by　the　brevity　of　the　duration。　This　most　legislators　have　fixed　to　a　year；　a　longer　space　would　be　dangerous；　and　a　shorter　would　be　contrary　to　the　nature　of　government。　For　who　is　it　that　in　the　management　even　of　his　domestic　affairs　would　be　thus　confined？　At　Ragusa＇22＇　the　chief　magistrate　of　the　republic　is　changed　every　month；　the　other　officers　every　week；　and　the　governor　of　the　castle　every　day。　But　this　can　take　place　only　in　a　small　republic　environed＇23＇　by　formidable　powers；　who　might　easily　corrupt　such　petty　and　insignificant　magistrates。

The　best　aristocracy　is　that　in　which　those　who　have　no　share　in　the　legislature　are　so　few　and　inconsiderable　that　the　governing　party　have　no　interest　in　oppressing　them。　Thus　when＇24＇　Antipater　made　a　law　at　Athens　that　whosoever　was　not　worth　two　thousand　drachms　should　have　no　power　to　vote；　he　formed　by　this　method　the　best　aristocracy　possible；　because　this　was　so　small　a　sum　as　to　exclude　very　few；　and　not　one　of　any　rank　or　consideration　in　the　city。

Aristocratic　families　ought　therefore；　as　much　as　possible；　to　level　themselves　in　appearance　with　the　people。　The　more　an　aristocracy　borders　on　democracy；　the　nearer　it　approaches　perfection：　and；　in　proportion　as　it　draws　towards　monarchy；　the　more　is　it　imperfect。

But　the　most　imperfect　of　all　is　that　in　which　the　part　of　the　people　that　obeys　is　in　a　state　of　civil　servitude　to　those　who　command；　as　the　aristocracy　of　Poland；　where　the　peasants　are　slaves　to　the　nobility。

4。　Of　the　Relation　of　Laws　to　the　Nature　of　Monarchical　Government。　The　intermediate；　subordinate；　and　dependent　powers　constitute　the　nature　of　monarchical　government；　I　mean　of　that　in　which　a　single　person　governs　by　fundamental　laws。　I　said　the　intermediate；　subordinate；　and　dependent　powers。　And　indeed；　in　monarchies　the　prince　is　the　source　of　all　power；　political　and　civil。　These　fundamental　law