the path of empire-第34章

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merican　missionaries　had　labored　long　and　disinterestedly　for　the　moral　regeneration　of　both　China　and　Japan　with　results　which　are　now　universally　recognized　as　beneficial；　though　in　1900　there　was　still　among　the　Chinese　much　of　that　friction　which　is　the　inevitable　reaction　from　an　attempt　to　change　the　fundamentals　of　an　ancient　faith　and　long…standing　habits。　American　merchants；　it　is　true；　had　been　of　all　classes；　but　at　any　rate　there　had　always　been　a　sufficient　leaven　of　those　of　the　highest　type　to　insure　a　reasonable　reputation。

The　conduct　of　the　American　Government　in　the　Far　East　had　been　most　honorable　and　friendly。　The　treaty　with　Japan　in　1858　contained　the　clause：　〃The　President　of　the　United　States；　at　the　request　of　the　Japanese　Government；　will　act　as　a　friendly　mediator　in　such　matters　of　difference　as　may　arise　between　the　Government　of　Japan　and　any　European　power。〃　Under　Seward　the　United　States　did；　indeed；　work　in　concert　with　European　powers　to　force　the　opening　of　the　Shimonoseki　Straits　in　1864；　and　a　revision　of　the　tariff　in　1866。　Subsequently；　however；　the　United　States　cooperated　with　Japan　in　her　effort　to　free　herself　from　certain　disadvantageous　features　of　early　treaties。　In　1883　the　United　States　returned　the　indemnity　received　at　the　time　of　the　Shimonoseki　affairan　example　of　international　equity　almost　unique　at　the　time　but　subsequently　paralleled　in　American　relations　with　China。　The　one　serious　difficulty　existing　in　the　relationships　of　the　United　States　with　both　China　and　Japan　resulted　from　an　unwillingness　to　receive　their　natives　as　immigrants　when　people　of　nearly　every　other　country　were　admitted。　The　American　attitude　had　already　been　expressed　in　the　Chinese　Exclusion　Act。　As　yet　the　chief　difficulty　was　with　that　nation；　but　it　was　inevitable　that　such　distinctions　would　prove　particularly　galling　to　the　rising　spirit　of　the　Japanese。

John　Hay　was　keenly　aware　of　the　possibilities　involved　in　these　Far　Eastern　events。　Of　profound　moment　under　any　circumstances；　they　were　doubly　so　now　that　the　United　States　was　territorially　involved。　To　take　a　slice　of　this　Eastern　area　was　a　course　quite　open　to　the　United　States　and　one　which　some　of　the　powers　at　least　would　have　welcomed。　Hay；　however；　wrote　to　Paul　Dana　on　March　16；　1899；　as　follows：　〃We　are；　of　course；　opposed　to　the　dismemberment　of　that　empire　＇China＇；　and　we　do　not　think　that　t2he　public　opinion　of　the　United　States　would　justify　this　Government　in　taking　part　in　the　great　game　of　spoliation　now　going　on。〃　He　felt　also　that　the　United　States　should　not　tie　its　hands　by　〃formal　alliances　with　other　Powers　interested；〃　nor　was　he　prepared　〃to　assure　China　that　we　would　join　her　in　repelling　that　demand　by　armed　force。〃

It　remained；　then；　for　the　Secretary　of　State　to　find　a　lever　for　peaceful　interference　on　the　part　of　his　country　and　a　plan　for　future　operations。　The　first　he　found　in　the　commercial　interest　of　the　United　States。　Since　the　Government　refrained　from　pressing　for　special　favors　in　any　single　part　of　the　Chinese　Empire；　it　could　demand　that　American　interests　be　not　infringed　anywhere。　The　Secretary　of　State　realized　that　in　a　democracy　statesmen　cannot　overlook　the　necessity　of　condensing　their　policies　into　popular　catchwords　or　slogans。　Today　such　phrases　represent　in　large　measure　the　power　referred　to　in　the　old　saying：　〃Let　me　make　the　songs　of　a　nation；　and　I　care　not　who　makes　its　laws。〃　The　single　phrase；　〃scrap　of　paper；〃　probably　cost　Germany　more　than　any　one　of　her　atrocious　deeds　in　the　Great　War。　Hay's　policy　with　regard　to　China　had　the　advantage　of　two　such　phrases。　The　〃golden　rule；〃　however；　proved　less　lasting　than　the　〃open　door；〃　which　was　coined　apparently　in　the　instructions　to　the　Paris　Peace　Commission。　This　phrase　expressed　just　what　the　United　States　meant。　The　precise　plan　of　the　American　Government　was　outlined　and　its　execution　undertaken　in　a　circular　note　of　September　6；　1899；　which　the　Secretary　of　State　addressed　to　London；　Berlin；　and　St。　Petersburg。　In　this　he　asked　the　powers　to　agree　to　respect　all　existing　open　ports　and　established　interests　within　their　respective　spheres；　to　enforce　the　Chinese　tariff　and　no　other；　and　to　refrain　from　all　discrimination　in　port　and　railroad　charges。　To　make　such　a　proposal　to　the　European　powers　required　courage。　In　its　essential　elements　the　situation　in　the　Far　East　was　not　unlike　the　internal　economic　condition　prevailing　at　the　same　time　in　the　United　States。　In　this　country　great　transportation　monopolies　had　been　built　up；　having　an　enormous　capitalization；　and　many　of　them　were　dependent　for　their　profits　on　the　advantage　of　price　fixing　that　monopoly　may　be　expected　to　bring。　Then　state　and　nation　stepped　in　and　asserted　their　right　to　fix　prices　in　the　interest　of　the　consumer。　The　consequent　political　struggles　illustrate　the　difficulties　besetting　the　Secretary　of　State　in　his　somewhat　similar　attempt　to　take　the　chief　fruits　from　the　powers　which　had　just　acquired　Chinese　territoryan　undertaking　in　which　he　had　none　of　the　support　of　legal　powers　effective　in　the　United　States。

That　Hay　so　promptly　succeeded　in　putting　at　least　a　toe　in　the　door　which　he　wished　to　open　was　due　to　a　number　of　circumstances。　Great　Britain；　devoted　to　the　principle　of　free　trade；　heartily　approved　of　his　proposal　and　at　once　accepted　its　terms。　The　other　powers　expressed　their　sympathy　with　the　ideas　of　the　note；　but；　in　the　case　of　Russia　at　least；　without　the　faintest　intention　of　paying　any　heed　to　it。　Hay　promptly　notified　each　power　of　the　others'　approval　and　stated　that；　with　this　unanimous　consent；　he　would　regard　its　acceptance　of　the　proposals　as　〃final　and　definitive。〃

The　force　which　Hay　had　used　was　the　moral　influence　of　world　opinion。　None　of　the　powers　dared；　with　its　hands　fresh　filled　with　Chinese　plunder；　openly　to　assert　that　it　had　taken　the　spoils　for　selfish　reasons　aloneat　least；　after　another　power　had　denied　such　purpose。　Hay　saw　and　capitalized　the　force　of　conventional　morality　which；　however　superficial　in　many　cases；　had　influenced　the　European　powers；　particularly　since　the　time　of　the　Holy　Alliance。　Accustomed　to　clothe　their　actions　in　the　garb　of　humanitarianism；　they　were　not；　when　caught　thus　red…handed；　prepared　to　be　a　mark　of　scorn　for　the　rest　of　the　world。　The　cult　of　unabashed　might　was　still　a　closet　philosophy　which　even　Germany；　its　chief　devotee；　was　not　yet　ready　to　avow　to　the　world。　Of　course　Hay　knew　that　the　battle　was　not　won；　for　the　bandits　still　held　the　booty。　He　was　too　wise　to　attempt　to　wrench　it　from　them；　for　that　indeed　would　have　meant　battle　for　which　the　United　States　was　not　prepared　in　military　strength　or　popular　intention。　He　had　merely　pledged　these　countries　to　use　their　acquisitions　for　the　general　good。　Though　the　promises　meant　little　in　themselves；　to　have　exacted　them　was　an　initial　step　toward　victory。

In　the　meantime　the　penetration　of　foreign　influences　into　China　was　producing　a　reaction。　A　wave　of　protest　against　the　〃foreign　devils〃　swept　through　the　population　and　acquired　intensity　from　the　acts　of　fanatic　religious　leaders。　That　strange　character；　the　Dowager　Empress；　yielded　to　the　〃Boxers；〃　who　obtained　possession　of　Pekin；　cut　off　the　foreigners　from　the　outside　world；　and　besieged　them　in　the　legations。　That　some　such　movement　was　inevitable　must　have　been　apparent　to　many　European　statesmen；　and　that　it　would　give　them　occasion；　by　interference　and　punishment；　to　solidify　their　〃spheres　of　influence〃　must　have　occurred　to　them。　The　〃open　door〃　was　in　as　immediate　peril　as　were　the　diplomats　in　Pekin。

Secretary　Hay　did　not；　however；　yield　to　these　altered　circumstances。　Instead；　he　built　upon　the　leadership　which　he　had　assumed。　He　promptly　accepted　the　international　responsibility　which　the　emergency　called　for。　The　United　States　at　once　agreed　to　take　its　share；　in　cooperation　with　the　Great　Powers；　in　whatever　measures　should　be　judged　necessary。　The　first　obvious　measure　was　to　relieve　the　foreign　ministers　who　were　besieged　in　Pekin。　American　assistance　was　active　and　immediate。　By　the　efforts　of　the　American　Government；　comm