the path of empire-第23章

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ly　have　welcomed　for　service　in　the　tropics　the　selection　of　men　old　enough　to　be　generals　in　1865　and　then　for　thirty…three　years　without　military　experience　in　an　age　of　great　development　in　the　methods　of　warfare。　The　other　commanding　officers　were　as　old　and　were　mostly　chosen　by　seniority　in　a　service　retiring　at　sixty…four。　The　unwonted　strain　of　active　service　naturally　proved　too　great。　At　the　most　critical　moment　of　the　campaign　in　Cuba；　the　commanding　general；　William　R。　Shafter；　had　eaten　nothing　for　four　days；　and　his　plucky　second　in　command；　the　wiry　Georgian　cavalry　leader　of　1864　and　1865；　General　〃Joe〃　Wheeler；　was　not　physically　fit　to　succeed　him。　There　is　not　the　least　doubt　that　the　fighting　spirit　of　the　men　was　strong　and　did　not　fail；　but　the　defect　in　those　branches　of　knowledge　which　are　required　to　keep　an　army　fit　to　fight　is　equally　certain。　The　primary　cause　for　the　melting　of　the　American　army　by　disease　must　be　acknowledged　to　be　the　insufficient　training　of　the　officers。

This　hit　or　miss　method；　however；　had　its　compensations；　for　it　brought　about　some　appointments　of　unusual　merit。　Conspicuous　were　those　of　Colonel　Leonard　Wood　and　Lieutenant　Colonel　Theodore　Roosevelt。　The　latter　had　resigned　as　Assistant　Secretary　of　the　Navy；　a　position　in　which　he　had　contributed　a　great　deal　to　the　efficiency　of　that　Department；　in　order　to　take　a　more　tangible　part　in　the　war。　After　raising　among　his　friends　and　the　cowboys　of　the　West　a　regiment　of　〃Rough　Riders；〃　he　declined　its　command　on　plea　of　military　inexperience。　Roosevelt　made　one　of　those　happy　choices　which　are　a　mark　of　his　administrative　ability　in　selecting　as　colonel　Leonard　Wood；　an　army　surgeon　whose　quality　he　knew　through　common　experiences　in　the　West。

To　send　into　a　midsummer　tropical　jungle　an　American　army；　untrained　to　take　care　of　its　health；　for　the　most　part　clothed　in　the　regulation　army　woolens；　and　tumbled　together　in　two　months；　was　an　undertaking　which…could　be　justified　only　on　the　ground　that　the　national　safety　demanded　immediate　action。　In　1898；　however；　it　seemed　to　be　universally　taken　for　granted　by　people　and　administration；　by　professional　soldier　as　well　as　by　public　sentiment；　that　the　army　must　invade　Cuba　without　regard　to　its　fitness　for　such　active　service。　The　responsibility　for　this　decision　must　rest　upon　the　nation。　The　experience　of　centuries　had　proved　conspicuously　that　climate　was　the　strongest　defense　of　the　Caribbean　islands　against　invasion；　and　it　was　in　large　measure　the　very　sacrifice　of　so　many　American　soldiers　that　induced　the　study　of　tropical　diseases。　In　1898　it　could　hardly　be　expected　that　the　American　command；　inexperienced　and　eager　for　action；　should　have　recognized　the　mosquito　as　the　carrier　of　yellow　fever　and　the　real　enemy；　or　should　have　realized　the　necessity　of　protecting　the　soldiers　by　inoculation　against　typhoid　fever。

Fixed　as　was　the　determination　to　send　an　army　into　Cuba　at　the　earliest　possible　moment；　there　had　been　a　wide　diversity　of　opinion　as　to　what　should　be　the　particular　objective。　General　Miles　wavered　between　the　choice　of　the　island　of　Porto　Rico　and　Puerto　Principe；　a　city　in　the　interior　and　somewhat　east　of　the　middle　of　Cuba；　the　Department　hesitated　between　Tunas　on　the　south　coast　of　Cuba；　within　touch　of　the　insurgents；　and　Mariel　on　the　north；　the　seizure　of　which　would　be　the　first　step　in　a　siege　of　Havana。　The　situation　at　Santiago；　however；　made　that　city　the　logical　objective　of　the　troops；　and　on　the　31st　of　May；　General　Shafter　was　ordered　to　be　prepared　to　move。　On　the　7th　of　June　he　was　ordered　to　sail　with　〃not　less　than　10；000　men；〃　but　an　alarming；　though　unfounded；　rumor　of　a　Spanish　squadron　off　the　north　coast　of　Cuba　delayed　the　expedition　until　the　14th。　With　an　army　of　seventeen　thousand　on　thirty…two　transports；　and　accompanied　by　eighty…nine　newspaper　correspondents；　Shafter　arrived　on　the　20th　of　June　off　Santiago。

The　Spanish　troops　in　Cubathe　American　control　of　the　sea　made　it　unnecessary　to　consider　those　available　in　Spainamounted；　according　to　returns　in　April；　1898；　to　196；820。　This　formidable　number；　however；　was　not　available　at　any　one　strategic　spot　owing　to　the　difficulty　of　transporting　either　troops　or　supplies；　particularly　at　the　eastern　end　of　the　island；　in　the　neighborhood　of　Santiago。　It　was　estimated　that　the　number　of　men　of　use　about　Santiago　was　about　12；000；　with　5000　approaching　to　assist。　Perhaps　3000　insurgents　were　at　hand　under　General　Garcia。　The　number　sent；　then；　was　not　inadequate　to　the　task。　Equal　numbers　are　not；　indeed；　ordinarily　considered　sufficient　for　an　offensive　campaign　against　fortifications；　but　the　American　commanders　counted　upon　a　difference　in　morale　between　the　two　armies；　which　was　justified　by　results。　Besides　the　American　Army　could　be　reinforced　as　necessity　arose。



CHAPTER　XI。　The　Campaign　Of　Santiago　De　Cuba

In　planning　the　campaign　against　Santiago；　Admiral　Sampson　wished　the　army　immediately　to　assault　the　defenses　at　the　harbor　mouth　in　order　to　open　the　way　for　the　navy。　General　Shafter；　however；　after　conferring　with　General　Garcia；　the　commander　of　the　insurgents；　decided　to　march　overland　against　the　city。　The　army　did　not　have　sufficient　small　vessels　to　effect　a　landing；　but　the　navy　came　to　its　assistance；　and　on　the　22d　of　June　the　first　American　troops　began　to　disembark　at　Daiquiri；　though　it　was　not　until　the　26th　that　the　entire　expedition　was　on　shore。　On　the　second　day　Siboney；　which　had　a　better　anchorage　and　was　some　six　miles　closer　to　Santiago；　was　made　the　base。　From　Siboney　there　stretched　for　eight　or　ten　miles　a　rolling　country　covered　with　heavy　jungle　brush　and　crossed　by　mere　threads　of　roads。　There　was　indeed　a　railroad；　but　this　followed　a　roundabout　route　by　the　coast。　Through　this　novel　and　extremely　uncomfortable　country；　infected　with　mosquitoes；　the　troops　pressed；　eager　to　meet　the　enemy。

The　first　engagement　took　place　at　Las　Guasimas；　on　the　24th　of　June。　Here　a　force　of　about　a　thousand　dismounted　cavalry；　partly　regulars　and　partly　Rough　Riders；　defeated　nearly　twice　their　number　of　Spaniards。　This　was　the　only　serious　resistance　which　the　Americans　encountered　until　they　reached　the　advanced　defenses　of　Santiago。　The　next　week　they　spent　in　getting　supplies　ashore；　improving　the　roads；　and　reconnoitering。　The　newspapers　considered　this　interval　entirely　too　long！　The　30th　of　June　found　the　Americans　confronting　the　main　body　of　Spaniards　in　position；　and　on　the　1st　of　July；　the　two　armies　joined　battle。

Between　the　opposing　forces　was　the　little　river　San　Juan　and　its　tributaries。　The　Spanish　left　wing　was　at　El　Caney；　supported　by　a　stone　blockhouse；　rifle　pits；　and　barbed　wire；　but　with　no　artillery。　About　four　miles　away　was　San　Juan　Hill；　with　more　formidable　works　straddling　the　main　road　which　led　to　Santiago。　Opposite　El　Caney；　General　Lawton　was　in　command　of　about　seven　thousand　Americans。　The　fight　here　began　at　half…past　six　in　the　morning；　but　the　American　artillery　was　placed　at　too　great　a　distance　to　be　very　effective。　The　result　was　a　long　and　galling　exchange　of　rifle　firing；　which　is　apt　to　prove　trying　to　raw　troops。　The　infantry；　however；　advanced　with　persistency　and　showed　marked　personal　initiative　as　they　pushed　forward　under　such　protection　as　the　brush　and　grass　afforded　until　they　finally　rushed　a　position　which　gave　opportunity　to　the　artillery。　After　this　they　speedily　captured　the　blockhouse。

The　fight　lasted　over　eight　hours　instead　of　two；　as　had　been　expected；　and　thus　delayed　General　Lawton；　who　was　looked　for　at　San　Juan　by　the　American　left。　The　losses；　too；　were　heavy；　the　total　casualties　amounting　to　seven　per　cent　of　the　force　engaged。　The　Americans；　however；　had　gained　the　position；　and　after　a　battle　which　had　been　long　and　serious　enough　to　test　thoroughly　the　quality　of　the　personnel　of　the　army。　Whatever　deficiencies　the　Americans　may　have　had　in　organization；　training；　and　military　education；　they　undoubtedly　possessed　fighting　spirit；　courage；　and　personal　ingenuity；　and　these　are；　after　all；　the　qualities　for　which　builders　of　armies　look。

The　battle　of　El