the path of empire-第22章

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ld　town　to…night；〃　though　it　may　be　believed　that　the　energy　and　swing　of　the　music　rather　than　the　words　made　it　so。　The　atmosphere　of　the　country　was　one　of　a　great　national　picnic　where　each　one　was　expected　to　carry　his　own　lunch。　There　was　apparent　none　of　the　concentration　of　effort　and　of　the　calm　foresight　so　necessary　for　efficiency　in　modern　warfare。　For　youth　the　Spanish　American　War　was　a　great　adventure；　for　the　nation　it　was　a　diversion　sanctioned　by　a　high　purpose。

This　abandon　was　doubtless　in　part　due　to　a　comfortable　consciousness　of　the　vast　disparity　in　resources　between　Spain　and　the　United　States；　which；　it　was　supposed；　meant　automatically　a　corresponding　difference　in　fighting　strength。　The　United　States　did；　indeed；　have　vast　superiorities　which　rendered　unnecessary　any　worry　over　many　of　the　essentials　which　gripped　the　popular　mind　during　the　Great　War。　People　believed　that　the　country　could　supply　the　munitions　needed；　and　that　of　facilities　for　transport　it　had　enough。　If　the　United　States　did　not　have　at　hand　exactly　the　munitions　needed；　if　the　transportation　system　had　not　been　built　to　launch　an　army　into　Cuba；　it　was　popularly　supposed　that　the　wealth　of　the　country　rendered　such　trifles　negligible；　and　that；　if　insufficient　attention　had　been　given　to　the　study　of　such　matters　in　the　past；　American　ingenuity　would　quickly　offset　the　lack　of　skilled　military　experience。　The　fact　that　American　soldiers　traveled　in　sleeping　cars　while　European　armies　were　transported　in　freight　cars　blinded　Americans　for　a　while　to　the　significant　fact　that　there　was　but　a　single　track　leading　to　Tampa；　the　principal　point　of　embarkation　for　Cuba；　and　no　one　thought　of　building　another。

Nothing　so　strongly　marks　the　amateur　character　of　the　conduct　of　the　Spanish　War　as　the　activity　of　the　American　press。　The　navy　was　dogged　by　press　dispatch　boats　which　revealed　its　every　move。　When　Admiral　Sampson　started　upon　his　cruise　to　San　Juan；　he　requested　the　press　boats　to　observe　secrecy；　and　Admiral　Chadwick　comments　with　satisfaction　upon　the　fact　that　this　request　was　observed　〃fully　and　honorably。。。by　every　person　except　one。〃　When　Lieutenant　Whitney　risked　his　life　as　a　spy　in　order　to　investigate　conditions　in　Porto　Rico；　his　plans　and　purpose　were　blazoned　in　the　press。　Incredible　as　it　may　now　seem；　the　newspaper　men　appear　to　have　felt　themselves　part　of　the　army。　They　offered　their　services　as　equals；　and　William　Randolph　Hearst　even　ordered　one　of　his　staff　to　sink　a　vessel　in　the　Suez　Canal　to　delay　Camara　on　his　expedition　against　Dewey。　This　order；　fortunately　for　the　international　reputation　of　the　United　States；　was　not　executed。　With　all　their　blare　and　childish　enthusiasm；　the　reporters　do　not　seem　to　have　been　so　successful　in　revealing　to　Americans　the　plans　of　Spain　as　they　were　in　furnishing　her　with　itemized　accounts　of　all　the　doings　of　the　American　forces。

While　the　press　not　only　revealed　but　formulated　courses　of　action　in　the　case　of　the　army；　the　navy；　at　least；　was　able　to　follow　its　own　plans。　For　this　difference　there　were　several　causes；　chief　of　which　was　the　fact　that　the　navy　was　a　fully　professional　arm；　ready　for　action　both　in　equipment　and　in　plans；　and　able　to　take　a　prompt　initiative　in　carrying　out　an　aggressive　campaign。　The　War　Department　had　a　more　difficult　task　in　adjusting　itself　to　the　new　conditions　brought　about　by　the　Spanish　American　War。　The　army　was　made　up　on　the　principle　traditionally　held　in　the　United　States　that　the　available　army　force　in　time　of　peace　should　be　just　sufficient　for　the　purposes　of　peace；　and　that　it　should　be　enlarged　in　time　of　war。　To　allow　a　fair　amount　of　expansion　without　too　much　disturbance　to　the　organization　in　increasing　to　war　strength；　the　regular　army　was　over…officered　in　peace　times。　The　chief　reliance　in　war　was　placed　upon　the　militia。　The　organization　and　training　of　this　force　was　left；　however；　under　a　few　very　general　directions；　to　the　various　States。　As　a　result；　its　quality　varied　and　it　was　nowhere　highly　efficient　in　the　military　sense。　Some　regiments；　it　is　true；　were　impressive　on　parade；　but　almost　none　of　the　officers　knew　anything　of　actual　modern　warfare。　There　had　been　no　preliminary　sifting　of　ability　in　the　army；　and　it　was　only　as　experience　gave　the　test　that　the　capable　and　informed　were　called　into　positions　of　importance。　In　fact；　the　training　of　the　regular　officers　was　inferior　to　that　of　the　naval　officers。　West　Point　and　Annapolis　were　both　excellent　in　the　quality　of　their　instruction；　but　what　they　offered　amounted　only　to　a　college　course；　and　in　the　army　there　was　no　provision　for　systematic　graduate　study　corresponding　to　the　Naval　War　College　at　Newport。

These　difficulties　and　deficiencies；　however；　cannot　fully　explain　the　woeful　inferiority　of　the　army　to　the　navy　in　preparedness。　Fundamentally　the　defect　was　at　the　top。　Russell　A。　Alger；　the　Secretary　of　War；　was　a　veteran　of　the　Civil　War　and　a　silver…voiced　orator；　but　his　book　on　the　〃Spanish…American　War；〃　which　was　intended　as　a　vindication　of　his　record；　proves　that　even　eighteen　months　of　as　grueling　denunciation　as　any　American　official　has　ever　received　could　not　enlighten　him　as　to　what　were　the　functions　of　his　office。　Nor　did　he　correct　or　supplement　his　own　incompetence　by　seeking　professional　advice。　There　existed　no　general　staff；　and　it　did　not　occur　to　him；　as　it　did　to　Secretary　Long；　to　create　one　to　advise　him　unofficially。　He　was　on　bad　terms　with　Major　General　Nelson　A。　Miles；　who　was　the　general　in　command。　He　discussed　even　the　details　of　questions　of　army　strategy；　not　only　with　Miles　but　with　the　President　and　members　of　the　Cabinet。　One　of　the　most　extraordinary　decisions　made　during　his　tenure　of　office　was　that　the　act　of　the　9th　of　March；　appropriating　50；000；000　〃for　national　defense；〃　forbade　money　to　be　spent　or　even　contracts　to　be　made　by　the　quartermaster；　the　commissary；　or　the　surgeon　general。　In　his　book　Secretary　Alger　records　with　pride　the　fact　that　all　this　money　was　spent　for　coast　defense。　In　view　of　the　fact　that　the　navy　did　its　task；　this　expenditure　was　absolutely　unnecessary　and　served　merely　to　solace　coast　cities　and　munition　makers。

The　regular　army　on　April　1；　1898；　consisted　of　28；183　officers　and　men。　An　act　of　the　26th　of　April　authorized　its　increase　to　about　double　that　size。　As　enlistment　was　fairly　prompt；　by　August　the　army　consisted　of　56；365　officers　and　men；　the　number　of　officers　being　but　slightly　increased。　It　was　decided　not　to　use　the　militia　as　it　was　then　organized；　but　to　rely　for　numbers　as　usual　chiefly　upon　a　volunteer　army；　authorized　by　the　Act　of　the　22d　of　April；　and　by　subsequent　acts　raised　to　a　total　of　200；000；　with　an　additional　3000　cavalry；　3500　engineers；　and　10；000　〃immunes；〃　or　men　supposed　not　to　be　liable　to　tropical　diseases。　The　war　seemed　equally　popular　all　over　the　country；　and　the　million　who　offered　themselves　for　service　were　sufficient　to　allow　due　consideration　for　equitable　state　quotas　and　for　physical　fitness。　There　were　also　sufficient　Krag…Jorgensen　rifles　to　arm　the　increased　regular　army　and　Springfields　for　the　volunteers。

To　provide　an　adequate　number　of　officers　for　the　volunteer　army　was　more　difficult。　Even　though　a　considerable　number　were　transferred　from　the　regular　to　the　volunteer　army；　they　constituted　only　a　small　proportion　of　the　whole　number　necessary。　Some　few　of　those　appointed　were　graduates　of　West　Point；　and　more　had　been　in　the　militia。　The　great　majority；　however；　had　purely　amateur　experience；　and　many　not　even　so　much。　Those　who　did　know　something；　moreover；　did　not　have　the　same　knowledge　or　experience。　This　raw　material　was　given　no　officer　training　whatsoever　but　was　turned　directly　to　the　task　of　training　the　rank　and　file。　Nor　were　the　appointments　of　new　officers　confined　to　the　lower　ranks。　The　country；　still　mindful　of　its　earlier　wars；　was　charmed　with　the　sentimental　elevation　of　confederate　generals　to　the　rank　of　major　general　in　the　new　army；　though　a　public　better　informed　would　hardly　have　welcomed　for　service　in　the　tropics　the　selection　of　men　old　enough　to　be　generals　in　1865　a