fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第8章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！



simply　this：　that　the　teachers　themselves　have　not　got　their　own

notions　clear；　and　when　they　endeavour　to　make　up　for　this　by　raking

up　motives　of　moral　goodness　from　every　quarter；　trying　to　make

their　physic　right　strong；　they　spoil　it。　For　the　commonest

understanding　shows　that　if　we　imagine；　on　the　one　hand；　an　act　of

honesty　done　with　steadfast　mind；　apart　from　every　view　to　advantage

of　any　kind　in　this　world　or　another；　and　even　under　the　greatest

temptations　of　necessity　or　allurement；　and；　on　the　other　hand；　a

similar　act　which　was　affected；　in　however　low　a　degree；　by　a

foreign　motive；　the　former　leaves　far　behind　and　eclipses　the

second；　it　elevates　the　soul　and　inspires　the　wish　to　be　able　to　act

in　like　manner　oneself。　Even　moderately　young　children　feel　this

impression；　ana　one　should　never　represent　duties　to　them　in　any　other

light。



　　From　what　has　been　said；　it　is　clear　that　all　moral　conceptions　have

their　seat　and　origin　completely　a　priori　in　the　reason；　and　that；

moreover；　in　the　commonest　reason　just　as　truly　as　in　that　which　is　in

the　highest　degree　speculative；　that　they　cannot　be　obtained　by

abstraction　from　any　empirical；　and　therefore　merely　contingent；

knowledge；　that　it　is　just　this　purity　of　their　origin　that　makes　them

worthy　to　serve　as　our　supreme　practical　principle；　and　that　just　in

proportion　as　we　add　anything　empirical；　we　detract　from　their　genuine

influence　and　from　the　absolute　value　of　actions；　that　it　is　not

only　of　the　greatest　necessity；　in　a　purely　speculative　point　of　view；

but　is　also　of　the　greatest　practical　importance；　to　derive　these

notions　and　laws　from　pure　reason；　to　present　them　pure　and　unmixed；

and　even　to　determine　the　compass　of　this　practical　or　pure　rational

knowledge；　i。e。；　to　determine　the　whole　faculty　of　pure　practical

reason；　and；　in　doing　so；　we　must　not　make　its　principles　dependent　on

the　particular　nature　of　human　reason；　though　in　speculative

philosophy　this　may　be　permitted；　or　may　even　at　times　be　necessary；

but　since　moral　laws　ought　to　hold　good　for　every　rational　creature；

we　must　derive　them　from　the　general　concept　of　a　rational　being。　In

this　way；　although　for　its　application　to　man　morality　has　need　of

anthropology；　yet；　in　the　first　instance；　we　must　treat　it

independently　as　pure　philosophy；　i。e。；　as　metaphysic；　complete　in

itself　（a　thing　which　in　such　distinct　branches　of　science　is　easily

done）；　knowing　well　that　unless　we　are　in　possession　of　this；　it　would

not　only　be　vain　to　determine　the　moral　element　of　duty　in　right

actions　for　purposes　of　speculative　criticism；　but　it　would　be

impossible　to　base　morals　on　their　genuine　principles；　even　for　common

practical　purposes；　especially　of　moral　instruction；　so　as　to

produce　pure　moral　dispositions；　and　to　engraft　them　on　men's　minds　to

the　promotion　of　the　greatest　possible　good　in　the　world。

　　But　in　order　that　in　this　study　we　may　not　merely　advance　by　the

natural　steps　from　the　common　moral　judgement　（in　this　case　very

worthy　of　respect）　to　the　philosophical；　as　has　been　already　done；　but

also　from　a　popular　philosophy；　which　goes　no　further　than　it　can

reach　by　groping　with　the　help　of　examples；　to　metaphysic　（which

does　allow　itself　to　be　checked　by　anything　empirical　and；　as　it

must　measure　the　whole　extent　of　this　kind　of　rational　knowledge；　goes

as　far　as　ideal　conceptions；　where　even　examples　fail　us）；　we　must

follow　and　clearly　describe　the　practical　faculty　of　reason；　from

the　general　rules　of　its　determination　to　the　point　where　the　notion

of　duty　springs　from　it。

　　Everything　in　nature　works　according　to　laws。　Rational　beings

alone　have　the　faculty　of　acting　according　to　the　conception　of

laws；　that　is　according　to　principles；　i。e。；　have　a　will。　Since　the

deduction　of　actions　from　principles　requires　reason；　the　will　is

nothing　but　practical　reason。　If　reason　infallibly　determines　the

will；　then　the　actions　of　such　a　being　which　are　recognised　as

objectively　necessary　are　subjectively　necessary　also；　i。e。；　the

will　is　a　faculty　to　choose　that　only　which　reason　independent　of

inclination　recognises　as　practically　necessary；　i。e。；　as　good。　But　if

reason　of　itself　does　not　sufficiently　determine　the　will；　if　the

latter　is　subject　also　to　subjective　conditions　（particular

impulses）　which　do　not　always　coincide　with　the　objective

conditions；　in　a　word；　if　the　will　does　not　in　itself　completely

accord　with　reason　（which　is　actually　the　case　with　men）；　then　the

actions　which　objectively　are　recognised　as　necessary　are　subjectively

contingent；　and　the　determination　of　such　a　will　according　to

objective　laws　is　obligation；　that　is　to　say；　the　relation　of　the

objective　laws　to　a　will　that　is　not　thoroughly　good　is　conceived　as

the　determination　of　the　will　of　a　rational　being　by　principles　of

reason；　but　which　the　will　from　its　nature　does　not　of　necessity

follow。

　　The　conception　of　an　objective　principle；　in　so　far　as　it　is

obligatory　for　a　will；　is　called　a　command　（of　reason）；　and　the

formula　of　the　command　is　called　an　imperative。

　　All　imperatives　are　expressed　by　the　word　ought　＇or　shall＇；　and

thereby　indicate　the　relation　of　an　objective　law　of　reason　to　a　will；

which　from　its　subjective　constitution　is　not　necessarily　determined

by　it　（an　obligation）。　They　say　that　something　would　be　good　to　do

or　to　forbear；　but　they　say　it　to　a　will　which　does　not　always　do　a

thing　because　it　is　conceived　to　be　good　to　do　it。　That　is　practically

good；　however；　which　determines　the　will　by　means　of　the　conceptions

of　reason；　and　consequently　not　from　subjective　causes；　but

objectively；　that　is　on　principles　which　are　valid　for　every

rational　being　as　such。　It　is　distinguished　from　the　pleasant；　as　that

which　influences　the　will　only　by　means　of　sensation　from　merely

subjective　causes；　valid　only　for　the　sense　of　this　or　that　one；　and

not　as　a　principle　of　reason；　which　holds　for　every　one。*



　　*The　dependence　of　the　desires　on　sensations　is　called

inclination；　and　this　accordingly　always　indicates　a　want。　The

dependence　of　a　contingently　determinable　will　on　principles　of　reason

is　called　an　interest。　This　therefore；　is　found　only　in　the　case　of

a　dependent　will　which　does　not　always　of　itself　conform　to　reason；　in

the　Divine　will　we　cannot　conceive　any　interest。　But　the　human　will

can　also　take　an　interest　in　a　thing　without　therefore　acting　from

interest。　The　former　signifies　the　practical　interest　in　the　action；

the　latter　the　pathological　in　the　object　of　the　action。　The　former

indicates　only　dependence　of　the　will　on　principles　of　reason　in

themselves；　the　second；　dependence　on　principles　of　reason　for　the

sake　of　inclination；　reason　supplying　only　the　practical　rules　how　the

requirement　of　the　inclination　may　be　satisfied。　In　the　first　case　the

action　interests　me；　in　the　second　the　object　of　the　action　（because

it　is　pleasant　to　me）。　We　have　seen　in　the　first　section　that　in　an

action　done　from　duty　we　must　look　not　to　the　interest　in　the

object；　but　only　to　that　in　the　action　itself；　and　in　its　rational

principle　（viz。；　the　law）。



　　A　perfectly　good　will　would　therefore　be　equally　subject　to

objective　laws　（viz。；　laws　of　good）；　but　could　not　be　conceived　as

obliged　thereby　to　act　lawfully；　because　of　itself　from　its　subjective

constitution　it　can　only　be　determined　by　the　conception　of　good。

Therefore　no　imperatives　hold　for　the　Divine　will；　or　in　general　for　a

holy　will；　ought　is　here　out　of　place；　because　the　volition　is　already

of　itself　necessarily　in　unison　with　the　law。　Therefore　imperatives

are　only　formulae　to　express　the　relation　of　objective　laws　of　all

volition　to　the　subjective　imperfection　of　the　will　of　this　or　that

rational　being；　e。g。；　the　human　will。

　　Now　all　imperatives　command　either　hypothetically　or

categorically。　The　former　represent　the　practical　necessity　of　a

possible　action　as　means　to　something　els