fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第7章

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altogether　from　our　ideas　of　duty；　or　maintain　in　the　soul　a

well…grounded　respect　for　its　law；　but　the　clear　conviction　that

although　there　should　never　have　been　actions　which　really　sprang　from

such　pure　sources；　yet　whether　this　or　that　takes　place　is　not　at

all　the　question；　but　that　reason　of　itself；　independent　on　all

experience；　ordains　what　ought　to　take　place；　that　accordingly　actions

of　which　perhaps　the　world　has　hitherto　never　given　an　example；　the

feasibility　even　of　which　might　be　very　much　doubted　by　one　who　founds

everything　on　experience；　are　nevertheless　inflexibly　commanded　by

reason；　that；　e。g。；　even　though　there　might　never　yet　have　been　a

sincere　friend；　yet　not　a　whit　the　less　is　pure　sincerity　in

friendship　required　of　every　man；　because；　prior　to　all　experience；

this　duty　is　involved　as　duty　in　the　idea　of　a　reason　determining

the　will　by　a　priori　principles。

　　When　we　add　further　that；　unless　we　deny　that　the　notion　of　morality

has　any　truth　or　reference　to　any　possible　object；　we　must　admit

that　its　law　must　be　valid；　not　merely　for　men　but　for　all　rational

creatures　generally；　not　merely　under　certain　contingent　conditions　or

with　exceptions　but　with　absolute　necessity；　then　it　is　clear　that

no　experience　could　enable　us　to　infer　even　the　possibility　of　such

apodeictic　laws。　For　with　what　right　could　we　bring　into　unbounded

respect　as　a　universal　precept　for　every　rational　nature　that　which

perhaps　holds　only　under　the　contingent　conditions　of　humanity？　Or　how

could　laws　of　the　determination　of　our　will　be　regarded　as　laws　of　the

determination　of　the　will　of　rational　beings　generally；　and　for　us

only　as　such；　if　they　were　merely　empirical　and　did　not　take　their

origin　wholly　a　priori　from　pure　but　practical　reason？

　　Nor　could　anything　be　more　fatal　to　morality　than　that　we　should

wish　to　derive　it　from　examples。　For　every　example　of　it　that　is　set

before　me　must　be　first　itself　tested　by　principles　of　morality；

whether　it　is　worthy　to　serve　as　an　original　example；　i。e。；　as　a

pattern；　but　by　no　means　can　it　authoritatively　furnish　the　conception

of　morality。　Even　the　Holy　One　of　the　Gospels　must　first　be　compared

with　our　ideal　of　moral　perfection　before　we　can　recognise　Him　as

such；　and　so　He　says　of　Himself；　〃Why　call　ye　Me　（whom　you　see）

good；　none　is　good　（the　model　of　good）　but　God　only　（whom　ye　do　not

see）？〃　But　whence　have　we　the　conception　of　God　as　the　supreme　good？

Simply　from　the　idea　of　moral　perfection；　which　reason　frames　a　priori

and　connects　inseparably　with　the　notion　of　a　free　will。　Imitation

finds　no　place　at　all　in　morality；　and　examples　serve　only　for

encouragement；　i。e。；　they　put　beyond　doubt　the　feasibility　of　what　the

law　commands；　they　make　visible　that　which　the　practical　rule

expresses　more　generally；　but　they　can　never　authorize　us　to　set　aside

the　true　original　which　lies　in　reason　and　to　guide　ourselves　by

examples。

　　If　then　there　is　no　genuine　supreme　principle　of　morality　but　what

must　rest　simply　on　pure　reason；　independent　of　all　experience；　I

think　it　is　not　necessary　even　to　put　the　question　whether　it　is

good　to　exhibit　these　concepts　in　their　generality　（in　abstracto）　as

they　are　established　a　priori　along　with　the　principles　belonging　to

them；　if　our　knowledge　is　to　be　distinguished　from　the　vulgar　and　to

be　called　philosophical。

　　In　our　times　indeed　this　might　perhaps　be　necessary；　for　if　we

collected　votes　whether　pure　rational　knowledge　separated　from

everything　empirical；　that　is　to　say；　metaphysic　of　morals；　or　whether

popular　practical　philosophy　is　to　be　preferred；　it　is　easy　to　guess

which　side　would　preponderate。

　　This　descending　to　popular　notions　is　certainly　very　commendable；　if

the　ascent　to　the　principles　of　pure　reason　has　first　taken　place

and　been　satisfactorily　accomplished。　This　implies　that　we　first　found

ethics　on　metaphysics；　and　then；　when　it　is　firmly　established；

procure　a　hearing　for　it　by　giving　it　a　popular　character。　But　it　is

quite　absurd　to　try　to　be　popular　in　the　first　inquiry；　on　which　the

soundness　of　the　principles　depends。　It　is　not　only　that　this

proceeding　can　never　lay　claim　to　the　very　rare　merit　of　a　true

philosophical　popularity；　since　there　is　no　art　in　being

intelligible　if　one　renounces　all　thoroughness　of　insight；　but　also　it

produces　a　disgusting　medley　of　compiled　observations　and

half…reasoned　principles。　Shallow　pates　enjoy　this　because　it　can　be

used　for　every…day　chat；　but　the　sagacious　find　in　it　only

confusion；　and　being　unsatisfied　and　unable　to　help　themselves；　they

turn　away　their　eyes；　while　philosophers；　who　see　quite　well　through

this　delusion；　are　little　listened　to　when　they　call　men　off　for　a

time　from　this　pretended　popularity；　in　order　that　they　might　be

rightfully　popular　after　they　have　attained　a　definite　insight。

　　We　need　only　look　at　the　attempts　of　moralists　in　that　favourite

fashion；　and　we　shall　find　at　one　time　the　special　constitution　of

human　nature　（including；　however；　the　idea　of　a　rational　nature

generally）；　at　one　time　perfection；　at　another　happiness；　here　moral

sense；　there　fear　of　God。　a　little　of　this；　and　a　little　of　that；　in

marvellous　mixture；　without　its　occurring　to　them　to　ask　whether　the

principles　of　morality　are　to　be　sought　in　the　knowledge　of　human

nature　at　all　（which　we　can　have　only　from　experience）；　or；　if　this　is

not　so；　if　these　principles　are　to　be　found　altogether　a　priori；

free　from　everything　empirical；　in　pure　rational　concepts　only　and

nowhere　else；　not　even　in　the　smallest　degree；　then　rather　to　adopt

the　method　of　making　this　a　separate　inquiry；　as　pure　practical

philosophy；　or　（if　one　may　use　a　name　so　decried）　as　metaphysic　of

morals；*　to　bring　it　by　itself　to　completeness；　and　to　require　the

public；　which　wishes　for　popular　treatment；　to　await　the　issue　of　this

undertaking。



　　*Just　as　pure　mathematics　are　distinguished　from　applied；　pure　logic

from　applied；　so　if　we　choose　we　may　also　distinguish　pure

philosophy　of　morals　（metaphysic）　from　applied　（viz。；　applied　to　human

nature）。　By　this　designation　we　are　also　at　once　reminded　that　moral

principles　are　not　based　on　properties　of　human　nature；　but　must

subsist　a　priori　of　themselves；　while　from　such　principles　practical

rules　must　be　capable　of　being　deduced　for　every　rational　nature；

and　accordingly　for　that　of　man。



　　Such　a　metaphysic　of　morals；　completely　isolated；　not　mixed　with　any

anthropology；　theology；　physics；　or　hyperphysics；　and　still　less

with　occult　qualities　（which　we　might　call　hypophysical）；　is　not

only　an　indispensable　substratum　of　all　sound　theoretical　knowledge　of

duties；　but　is　at　the　same　time　a　desideratum　of　the　highest

importance　to　the　actual　fulfilment　of　their　precepts。　For　the　pure

conception　of　duty；　unmixed　with　any　foreign　addition　of　empirical

attractions；　and；　in　a　word；　the　conception　of　the　moral　law；

exercises　on　the　human　heart；　by　way　of　reason　alone　（which　first

becomes　aware　with　this　that　it　can　of　itself　be　practical）；　an

influence　so　much　more　powerful　than　all　other　springs*　which　may　be

derived　from　the　field　of　experience；　that；　in　the　consciousness　of

its　worth；　it　despises　the　latter；　and　can　by　degrees　become　their

master；　whereas　a　mixed　ethics；　compounded　partly　of　motives　drawn

from　feelings　and　inclinations；　and　partly　also　of　conceptions　of

reason；　must　make　the　mind　waver　between　motives　which　cannot　be

brought　under　any　principle；　which　lead　to　good　only　by　mere

accident　and　very　often　also　to　evil。



　　*I　have　a　letter　from　the　late　excellent　Sulzer；　in　which　he　asks　me

what　can　be　the　reason　that　moral　instruction；　although　containing

much　that　is　convincing　for　the　reason；　yet　accomplishes　so　little？　My

answer　was　postponed　in　order　that　I　might　make　it　complete。　But　it　is

simply　this：　that　the　teachers　themselves　have　not　got　their　own

notions　clear；　and　when　they　endeavou