fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第3章

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be　brought　about　by　it　in　favour　of　any　inclination；　nay　even　of　the

sum　total　of　all　inclinations。　Even　if　it　should　happen　that；　owing　to

special　disfavour　of　fortune；　or　the　niggardly　provision　of　a

step…motherly　nature；　this　will　should　wholly　lack　power　to　accomplish

its　purpose；　if　with　its　greatest　efforts　it　should　yet　achieve

nothing；　and　there　should　remain　only　the　good　will　（not；　to　be

sure；　a　mere　wish；　but　the　summoning　of　all　means　in　our　power）；　then；

like　a　jewel；　it　would　still　shine　by　its　own　light；　as　a　thing

which　has　its　whole　value　in　itself。　Its　usefulness　or　fruitfulness

can　neither　add　nor　take　away　anything　from　this　value。　It　would　be；

as　it　were；　only　the　setting　to　enable　us　to　handle　it　the　more

conveniently　in　common　commerce；　or　to　attract　to　it　the　attention

of　those　who　are　not　yet　connoisseurs；　but　not　to　recommend　it　to　true

connoisseurs；　or　to　determine　its　value。

　　There　is；　however；　something　so　strange　in　this　idea　of　the　absolute

value　of　the　mere　will；　in　which　no　account　is　taken　of　its　utility；

that　notwithstanding　the　thorough　assent　of　even　common　reason　to

the　idea；　yet　a　suspicion　must　arise　that　it　may　perhaps　really　be　the

product　of　mere　high…flown　fancy；　and　that　we　may　have　misunderstood

the　purpose　of　nature　in　assigning　reason　as　the　governor　of　our　will。

Therefore　we　will　examine　this　idea　from　this　point　of　view。

　　In　the　physical　constitution　of　an　organized　being；　that　is；　a　being

adapted　suitably　to　the　purposes　of　life；　we　assume　it　as　a

fundamental　principle　that　no　organ　for　any　purpose　will　be　found

but　what　is　also　the　fittest　and　best　adapted　for　that　purpose。　Now　in

a　being　which　has　reason　and　a　will；　if　the　proper　object　of　nature

were　its　conservation；　its　welfare；　in　a　word；　its　happiness；　then

nature　would　have　hit　upon　a　very　bad　arrangement　in　selecting　the

reason　of　the　creature　to　carry　out　this　purpose。　For　all　the

actions　which　the　creature　has　to　perform　with　a　view　to　this　purpose；

and　the　whole　rule　of　its　conduct；　would　be　far　more　surely　prescribed

to　it　by　instinct；　and　that　end　would　have　been　attained　thereby

much　more　certainly　than　it　ever　can　be　by　reason。　Should　reason

have　been　communicated　to　this　favoured　creature　over　and　above；　it

must　only　have　served　it　to　contemplate　the　happy　constitution　of

its　nature；　to　admire　it；　to　congratulate　itself　thereon；　and　to

feel　thankful　for　it　to　the　beneficent　cause；　but　not　that　it　should

subject　its　desires　to　that　weak　and　delusive　guidance　and　meddle

bunglingly　with　the　purpose　of　nature。　In　a　word；　nature　would　have

taken　care　that　reason　should　not　break　forth　into　practical　exercise；

nor　have　the　presumption；　with　its　weak　insight；　to　think　out　for

itself　the　plan　of　happiness；　and　of　the　means　of　attaining　it。　Nature

would　not　only　have　taken　on　herself　the　choice　of　the　ends；　but

also　of　the　means；　and　with　wise　foresight　would　have　entrusted　both

to　instinct。

　　And；　in　fact；　we　find　that　the　more　a　cultivated　reason　applies

itself　with　deliberate　purpose　to　the　enjoyment　of　life　and　happiness；

so　much　the　more　does　the　man　fail　of　true　satisfaction。　And　from　this

circumstance　there　arises　in　many；　if　they　are　candid　enough　to

confess　it；　a　certain　degree　of　misology；　that　is；　hatred　of　reason；

especially　in　the　case　of　those　who　are　most　experienced　in　the　use　of

it；　because　after　calculating　all　the　advantages　they　derive；　I　do　not

say　from　the　invention　of　all　the　arts　of　common　luxury；　but　even　from

the　sciences　（which　seem　to　them　to　be　after　all　only　a　luxury　of

the　understanding）；　they　find　that　they　have；　in　fact；　only　brought

more　trouble　on　their　shoulders。　rather　than　gained　in　happiness；

and　they　end　by　envying；　rather　than　despising；　the　more　common

stamp　of　men　who　keep　closer　to　the　guidance　of　mere　instinct　and　do

not　allow　their　reason　much　influence　on　their　conduct。　And　this　we

must　admit；　that　the　judgement　of　those　who　would　very　much　lower

the　lofty　eulogies　of　the　advantages　which　reason　gives　us　in　regard

to　the　happiness　and　satisfaction　of　life；　or　who　would　even　reduce

them　below　zero；　is　by　no　means　morose　or　ungrateful　to　the　goodness

with　which　the　world　is　governed；　but　that　there　lies　at　the　root　of

these　judgements　the　idea　that　our　existence　has　a　different　and　far

nobler　end；　for　which；　and　not　for　happiness；　reason　is　properly

intended；　and　which　must；　therefore；　be　regarded　as　the　supreme

condition　to　which　the　private　ends　of　man　must；　for　the　most　part；　be

postponed。

　　For　as　reason　is　not　competent　to　guide　the　will　with　certainty　in

regard　to　its　objects　and　the　satisfaction　of　all　our　wants　（which

it　to　some　extent　even　multiplies）；　this　being　an　end　to　which　an

implanted　instinct　would　have　led　with　much　greater　certainty；　and

since；　nevertheless；　reason　is　imparted　to　us　as　a　practical

faculty；　i。e。；　as　one　which　is　to　have　influence　on　the　will；

therefore；　admitting　that　nature　generally　in　the　distribution　of

her　capacities　has　adapted　the　means　to　the　end；　its　true

destination　must　be　to　produce　a　will；　not　merely　good　as　a　means　to

something　else；　but　good　in　itself；　for　which　reason　was　absolutely

necessary。　This　will　then；　though　not　indeed　the　sole　and　complete

good；　must　be　the　supreme　good　and　the　condition　of　every　other；

even　of　the　desire　of　happiness。　Under　these　circumstances；　there　is

nothing　inconsistent　with　the　wisdom　of　nature　in　the　fact　that　the

cultivation　of　the　reason；　which　is　requisite　for　the　first　and

unconditional　purpose；　does　in　many　ways　interfere；　at　least　in　this

life；　with　the　attainment　of　the　second；　which　is　always

conditional；　namely；　happiness。　Nay；　it　may　even　reduce　it　to　nothing；

without　nature　thereby　failing　of　her　purpose。　For　reason　recognizes

the　establishment　of　a　good　will　as　its　highest　practical　destination；

and　in　attaining　this　purpose　is　capable　only　of　a　satisfaction　of　its

own　proper　kind；　namely　that　from　the　attainment　of　an　end；　which

end　again　is　determined　by　reason　only；　notwithstanding　that　this

may　involve　many　a　disappointment　to　the　ends　of　inclination。

　　We　have　then　to　develop　the　notion　of　a　will　which　deserves　to　be

highly　esteemed　for　itself　and　is　good　without　a　view　to　anything

further；　a　notion　which　exists　already　in　the　sound　natural

understanding；　requiring　rather　to　be　cleared　up　than　to　be　taught；

and　which　in　estimating　the　value　of　our　actions　always　takes　the

first　place　and　constitutes　the　condition　of　all　the　rest。　In　order　to

do　this；　we　will　take　the　notion　of　duty；　which　includes　that　of　a

good　will；　although　implying　certain　subjective　restrictions　and

hindrances。　These；　however；　far　from　concealing　it；　or　rendering　it

unrecognizable；　rather　bring　it　out　by　contrast　and　make　it　shine

forth　so　much　the　brighter。

　　I　omit　here　all　actions　which　are　already　recognized　as　inconsistent

with　duty；　although　they　may　be　useful　for　this　or　that　purpose；　for

with　these　the　question　whether　they　are　done　from　duty　cannot　arise

at　all；　since　they　even　conflict　with　it。　I　also　set　aside　those

actions　which　really　conform　to　duty；　but　to　which　men　have　no

direct　inclination；　performing　them　because　they　are　impelled

thereto　by　some　other　inclination。　For　in　this　case　we　can　readily

distinguish　whether　the　action　which　agrees　with　duty　is　done　from

duty；　or　from　a　selfish　view。　It　is　much　harder　to　make　this

distinction　when　the　action　accords　with　duty　and　the　subject　has

besides　a　direct　inclination　to　it。　For　example；　it　is　always　a　matter

of　duty　that　a　dealer　should　not　over　charge　an　inexperienced

purchaser；　and　wherever　there　is　much　commerce　the　prudent　tradesman

does　not　overcharge；　but　keeps　a　fixed　price　for　everyone；　so　that　a

child　buys　of　him　as　well　as　any　other。　Men　are　thus　honestly

served；　but　this　is　not　enough　to　make　us　believe　that　the　tradesman

has　so　acted　from　duty　and　from　principles　of　honesty：　h