fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第23章

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to　explain　this　is　beyond　the　power　of　human　reason；　and　all　the

labour　and　pains　of　seeking　an　explanation　of　it　are　lost　an

　　It　is　just　the　same　as　if　I　sought　to　find　out　how　freedom　itself　is

possible　as　the　causality　of　a　will。　For　then　I　quit　the　ground　of

philosophical　explanation；　and　I　have　no　other　to　go　upon。　I　might

indeed　revel　in　the　world　of　intelligences　which　still　remains　to

me；　but　although　I　have　an　idea　of　it　which　is　well　founded；　yet　I

have　not　the　least　knowledge　of　it；　nor　an　I　ever　attain　to　such

knowledge　with　all　the　efforts　of　my　natural　faculty　of　reason。　It

signifies　only　a　something　that　remains　over　when　I　have　eliminated

everything　belonging　to　the　world　of　sense　from　the　actuating

principles　of　my　will；　serving　merely　to　keep　in　bounds　the

principle　of　motives　taken　from　the　field　of　sensibility；　fixing　its

limits　and　showing　that　it　does　not　contain　all　in　all　within

itself；　but　that　there　is　more　beyond　it；　but　this　something　more　I

know　no　further。　Of　pure　reason　which　frames　this　ideal；　there　remains

after　the　abstraction　of　all　matter；　i。e。；　knowledge　of　objects；

nothing　but　the　form；　namely；　the　practical　law　of　the　universality　of

the　maxims；　and　in　conformity　with　this　conception　of　reason　in

reference　to　a　pure　world　of　understanding　as　a　possible　efficient

cause；　that　is　a　cause　determining　the　will。　There　must　here　be　a

total　absence　of　springs；　unless　this　idea　of　an　intelligible　world　is

itself　the　spring；　or　that　in　which　reason　primarily　takes　an

interest；　but　to　make　this　intelligible　is　precisely　the　problem

that　we　cannot　solve。

　　Here　now　is　the　extreme　limit　of　all　moral　inquiry；　and　it　is　of

great　importance　to　determine　it　even　on　this　account；　in　order　that

reason　may　not　on　the　one　band；　to　the　prejudice　of　morals；　seek　about

in　the　world　of　sense　for　the　supreme　motive　and　an　interest

comprehensible　but　empirical；　and　on　the　other　hand；　that　it　may　not

impotently　flap　its　wings　without　being　able　to　move　in　the　（for　it）

empty　space　of　transcendent　concepts　which　we　call　the　intelligible

world；　and　so　lose　itself　amidst　chimeras。　For　the　rest；　the　idea　of　a

pure　world　of　understanding　as　a　system　of　all　intelligences；　and　to

which　we　ourselves　as　rational　beings　belong　（although　we　are　likewise

on　the　other　side　members　of　the　sensible　world）；　this　remains

always　a　useful　and　legitimate　idea　for　the　purposes　of　rational

belief；　although　all　knowledge　stops　at　its　threshold；　useful；　namely；

to　produce　in　us　a　lively　interest　in　the　moral　law　by　means　of　the

noble　ideal　of　a　universal　kingdom　of　ends　in　themselves　（rational

beings）；　to　which　we　can　belong　as　members　then　only　when　we　carefully

conduct　ourselves　according　to　the　maxims　of　freedom　as　if　they　were

laws　of　nature。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Concluding　Remark



　　The　speculative　employment　of　reason　with　respect　to　nature　leads　to

the　absolute　necessity　of　some　supreme　cause　of　the　world：　the

practical　employment　of　reason　with　a　view　to　freedom　leads　also　to

absolute　necessity；　but　only　of　the　laws　of　the　actions　of　a

rational　being　as　such。　Now　it　is　an　essential　principle　of　reason；

however　employed；　to　push　its　knowledge　to　a　consciousness　of　its

necessity　（without　which　it　would　not　be　rational　knowledge）。　It　is；

however；　an　equally　essential　restriction　of　the　same　reason　that　it

can　neither　discern　the　necessity　of　what　is　or　what　happens；　nor　of

what　ought　to　happen；　unless　a　condition　is　supposed　on　which　it　is　or

happens　or　ought　to　happen。　In　this　way；　however；　by　the　constant

inquiry　for　the　condition；　the　satisfaction　of　reason　is　only

further　and　further　postponed。　Hence　it　unceasingly　seeks　the

unconditionally　necessary　and　finds　itself　forced　to　assume　it；

although　without　any　means　of　making　it　comprehensible　to　itself；

happy　enough　if　only　it　can　discover　a　conception　which　agrees　with

this　assumption。　It　is　therefore　no　fault　in　our　deduction　of　the

supreme　principle　of　morality；　but　an　objection　that　should　be　made　to

human　reason　in　general；　that　it　cannot　enable　us　to　conceive　the

absolute　necessity　of　an　unconditional　practical　law　（such　as　the

categorical　imperative　must　be）。　It　cannot　be　blamed　for　refusing　to

explain　this　necessity　by　a　condition；　that　is　to　say；　by　means　of

some　interest　assumed　as　a　basis；　since　the　law　would　then　cease　to　be

a　supreme　law　of　reason。　And　thus　while　we　do　not　comprehend　the

practical　unconditional　necessity　of　the　moral　imperative；　we　yet

comprehend　its　incomprehensibility；　and　this　is　all　that　can　be　fairly

demanded　of　a　philosophy　which　strives　to　carry　its　principles　up　to

the　very　limit　of　human　reason。





　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　…THE　END…