fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第22章

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which　is　necessary　unless　he　is　to　be　denied　the　consciousness　of

himself　as　an　intelligence　and；　consequently；　as　a　rational　cause；

energizing　by　reason；　that　is；　operating　freely。　This　thought

certainly　involves　the　idea　of　an　order　and　a　system　of　laws　different

from　that　of　the　mechanism　of　nature　which　belongs　to　the　sensible

world；　and　it　makes　the　conception　of　an　intelligible　world

necessary　（that　is　to　say；　the　whole　system　of　rational　beings　as

things　in　themselves）。　But　it　does　not　in　the　least　authorize　us　to

think　of　it　further　than　as　to　its　formal　condition　only；　that　is；　the

universality　of　the　maxims　of　the　will　as　laws；　and　consequently　the

autonomy　of　the　latter；　which　alone　is　consistent　with　its　freedom；

whereas；　on　the　contrary；　all　laws　that　refer　to　a　definite　object

give　heteronomy；　which　only　belongs　to　laws　of　nature　and　can　only

apply　to　the　sensible　world。

　　But　reason　would　overstep　all　its　bounds　if　it　undertook　to

explain　how　pure　reason　can　be　practical；　which　would　be　exactly　the

same　problem　as　to　explain　how　freedom　is　possible。

　　For　we　can　explain　nothing　but　that　which　we　can　reduce　to　laws；　the

object　of　which　can　be　given　in　some　possible　experience。　But

freedom　is　a　mere　idea；　the　objective　reality　of　which　can　in　no

wise　be　shown　according　to　laws　of　nature；　and　consequently　not　in　any

possible　experience；　and　for　this　reason　it　can　never　be

comprehended　or　understood；　because　we　cannot　support　it　by　any　sort

of　example　or　analogy。　It　holds　good　only　as　a　necessary　hypothesis　of

reason　in　a　being　that　believes　itself　conscious　of　a　will；　that　is；

of　a　faculty　distinct　from　mere　desire　（namely；　a　faculty　of

determining　itself　to　action　as　an　intelligence；　in　other　words；　by

laws　of　reason　independently　on　natural　instincts）。　Now　where

determination　according　to　laws　of　nature　ceases；　there　all

explanation　ceases　also；　and　nothing　remains　but　defence；　i。e。；　the

removal　of　the　objections　of　those　who　pretend　to　have　seen　deeper

into　the　nature　of　things；　and　thereupon　boldly　declare　freedom

impossible。　We　can　only　point　out　to　them　that　the　supposed

contradiction　that　they　have　discovered　in　it　arises　only　from　this；

that　in　order　to　be　able　to　apply　the　law　of　nature　to　human

actions；　they　must　necessarily　consider　man　as　an　appearance：　then

when　we　demand　of　them　that　they　should　also　think　of　him　qua

intelligence　as　a　thing　in　itself；　they　still　persist　in　considering

him　in　this　respect　also　as　an　appearance。　In　this　view　it　would　no

doubt　be　a　contradiction　to　suppose　the　causality　of　the　same

subject　（that　is；　his　will）　to　be　withdrawn　from　all　the　natural

laws　of　the　sensible　world。　But　this　contradiction　disappears；　if　they

would　only　bethink　themselves　and　admit；　as　is　reasonable；　that　behind

the　appearances　there　must　also　lie　at　their　root　（although　hidden）

the　things　in　themselves；　and　that　we　cannot　expect　the　laws　of

these　to　be　the　same　as　those　that　govern　their　appearances。

　　The　subjective　impossibility　of　explaining　the　freedom　of　the　will

is　identical　with　the　impossibility　of　discovering　and　explaining　an

interest*　which　man　can　take　in　the　moral　law。　Nevertheless　he　does

actually　take　an　interest　in　it；　the　basis　of　which　in　us　we　call

the　moral　feeling；　which　some　have　falsely　assigned　as　the　standard　of

our　moral　judgement；　whereas　it　must　rather　be　viewed　as　the

subjective　effect　that　the　law　exercises　on　the　will；　the　objective

principle　of　which　is　furnished　by　reason　alone。



　　*Interest　is　that　by　which　reason　becomes　practical；　i。e。；　a　cause

determining　the　will。　Hence　we　say　of　rational　beings　only　that　they

take　an　interest　in　a　thing；　irrational　beings　only　feel　sensual

appetites。　Reason　takes　a　direct　interest　in　action　then　only　when　the

universal　validity　of　its　maxims　is　alone　sufficient　to　determine

the　will。　Such　an　interest　alone　is　pure。　But　if　it　can　determine

the　will　only　by　means　of　another　object　of　desire　or　on　the

suggestion　of　a　particular　feeling　of　the　subject；　then　reason　takes

only　an　indirect　interest　in　the　action；　and；　as　reason　by　itself

without　experience　cannot　discover　either　objects　of　the　will　or　a

special　feeling　actuating　it；　this　latter　interest　would　only　be

empirical　and　not　a　pure　rational　interest。　The　logical　interest　of

reason　（namely；　to　extend　its　insight）　is　never　direct；　but

presupposes　purposes　for　which　reason　is　employed。



　　In　order　indeed　that　a　rational　being　who　is　also　affected　through

the　senses　should　will　what　reason　alone　directs　such　beings　that　they

ought　to　will；　it　is　no　doubt　requisite　that　reason　should　have　a

power　to　infuse　a　feeling　of　pleasure　or　satisfaction　in　the

fulfilment　of　duty；　that　is　to　say；　that　it　should　have　a　causality　by

which　it　determines　the　sensibility　according　to　its　own　principles。

But　it　is　quite　impossible　to　discern；　i。e。；　to　make　it　intelligible　a

priori；　how　a　mere　thought；　which　itself　contains　nothing　sensible；

can　itself　produce　a　sensation　of　pleasure　or　pain；　for　this　is　a

particular　kind　of　causality　of　which　as　of　every　other　causality　we

can　determine　nothing　whatever　a　priori；　we　must　only　consult

experience　about　it。　But　as　this　cannot　supply　us　with　any　relation　of

cause　and　effect　except　between　two　objects　of　experience；　whereas

in　this　case；　although　indeed　the　effect　produced　lies　within

experience；　yet　the　cause　is　supposed　to　be　pure　reason　acting　through

mere　ideas　which　offer　no　object　to　experience；　it　follows　that　for　us

men　it　is　quite　impossible　to　explain　how　and　why　the　universality

of　the　maxim　as　a　law；　that　is；　morality；　interests。　This　only　is

certain；　that　it　is　not　because　it　interests　us　that　it　has　validity

for　us　（for　that　would　be　heteronomy　and　dependence　of　practical

reason　on　sensibility；　namely；　on　a　feeling　as　its　principle；　in　which

case　it　could　never　give　moral　laws）；　but　that　it　interests　us　because

it　is　valid　for　us　as　men；　inasmuch　as　it　had　its　source　in　our　will

as　intelligences；　in　other　words；　in　our　proper　self；　and　what　belongs

to　mere　appearance　is　necessarily　subordinated　by　reason　to　the　nature

of　the　thing　in　itself。

　　The　question　then；　〃How　a　categorical　imperative　is　possible；〃　can

be　answered　to　this　extent；　that　we　can　assign　the　only　hypothesis

on　which　it　is　possible；　namely；　the　idea　of　freedom；　and　we　can

also　discern　the　necessity　of　this　hypothesis；　and　this　is

sufficient　for　the　practical　exercise　of　reason；　that　is；　for　the

conviction　of　the　validity　of　this　imperative；　and　hence　of　the

moral　law；　but　how　this　hypothesis　itself　is　possible　can　never　be

discerned　by　any　human　reason。　On　the　hypothesis；　however；　that　the

will　of　an　intelligence　is　free；　its　autonomy；　as　the　essential　formal

condition　of　its　determination；　is　a　necessary　consequence。

Moreover；　this　freedom　of　will　is　not　merely　quite　possible　as　a

hypothesis　（not　involving　any　contradiction　to　the　principle　of

physical　necessity　in　the　connexion　of　the　phenomena　of　the　sensible

world）　as　speculative　philosophy　can　show：　but　further；　a　rational

being　who　is　conscious　of　causality　through　reason；　that　is　to　say；　of

a　will　（distinct　from　desires）；　must　of　necessity　make　it　practically；

that　is；　in　idea；　the　condition　of　all　his　voluntary　actions。　But　to

explain　how　pure　reason　can　be　of　itself　practical　without　the　aid

of　any　spring　of　action　that　could　be　derived　from　any　other　source；

i。e。；　how　the　mere　principle　of　the　universal　validity　of　all　its

maxims　as　laws　（which　would　certainly　be　the　form　of　a　pure

practical　reason）　can　of　itself　supply　a　spring；　without　any　matter

（object）　of　the　will　in　which　one　could　antecedently　take　any

interest；　and　how　it　can　produce　an　interest　which　would　be　called

purely　moral；　or　in　other　words；　how　pure　reason　can　be　practical…

to　explain　this　is　beyond　the　power　of　human　reason；　and　all　the

labour　and　pains　of　seeking　an　explanation　of　it　are