fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第14章

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because　it　is　universal；　applying　as　it　does　to　all　rational　beings

whatever；　and　experience　is　not　capable　of　determining　anything

about　them；　secondly；　because　it　does　not　present　humanity　as　an　end

to　men　（subjectively）；　that　is　as　an　object　which　men　do　of　themselves

actually　adopt　as　an　end；　but　as　an　objective　end；　which　must　as　a　law

constitute　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　all　our　subjective

ends；　let　them　be　what　we　will；　it　must　therefore　spring　from　pure

reason。　In　fact　the　objective　principle　of　all　practical　legislation

lies　（according　to　the　first　principle）　in　the　rule　and　its　form　of

universality　which　makes　it　capable　of　being　a　law　（say；　e。　g。；　a

law　of　nature）；　but　the　subjective　principle　is　in　the　end；　now　by　the

second　principle　the　subject　of　all　ends　is　each　rational　being；

inasmuch　as　it　is　an　end　in　itself。　Hence　follows　the　third

practical　principle　of　the　will；　which　is　the　ultimate　condition　of

its　harmony　with　universal　practical　reason；　viz。：　the　idea　of　the

will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally　legislative　will。

　　On　this　principle　all　maxims　are　rejected　which　are　inconsistent

with　the　will　being　itself　universal　legislator。　Thus　the　will　is

not　subject　simply　to　the　law；　but　so　subject　that　it　must　be　regarded

as　itself　giving　the　law　and；　on　this　ground　only；　subject　to　the

law　（of　which　it　can　regard　itself　as　the　author）。

　　In　the　previous　imperatives；　namely；　that　based　on　the　conception　of

the　conformity　of　actions　to　general　laws；　as　in　a　physical　system

of　nature；　and　that　based　on　the　universal　prerogative　of　rational

beings　as　ends　in　themselves…　these　imperatives；　just　because　they

were　conceived　as　categorical；　excluded　from　any　share　in　their

authority　all　admixture　of　any　interest　as　a　spring　of　action；　they

were；　however；　only　assumed　to　be　categorical；　because　such　an

assumption　was　necessary　to　explain　the　conception　of　duty。　But　we

could　not　prove　independently　that　there　are　practical　propositions

which　command　categorically；　nor　can　it　be　proved　in　this　section；　one

thing；　however；　could　be　done；　namely；　to　indicate　in　the　imperative

itself；　by　some　determinate　expression；　that　in　the　case　of　volition

from　duty　all　interest　is　renounced；　which　is　the　specific　criterion

of　categorical　as　distinguished　from　hypothetical　imperatives。　This　is

done　in　the　present　（third）　formula　of　the　principle；　namely；　in　the

idea　of　the　will　of　every　rational　being　as　a　universally

legislating　will。

　　For　although　a　will　which　is　subject　to　laws　may　be　attached　to　this

law　by　means　of　an　interest；　yet　a　will　which　is　itself　a　supreme

lawgiver　so　far　as　it　is　such　cannot　possibly　depend　on　any

interest；　since　a　will　so　dependent　would　itself　still　need　another

law　restricting　the　interest　of　its　self…love　by　the　condition　that　it

should　be　valid　as　universal　law。

　　Thus　the　principle　that　every　human　will　is　a　will　which　in　all

its　maxims　gives　universal　laws；*　provided　it　be　otherwise

justified；　would　be　very　well　adapted　to　be　the　categorical

imperative；　in　this　respect；　namely；　that　just　because　of　the　idea

of　universal　legislation　it　is　not　based　on　interest；　and　therefore　it

alone　among　all　possible　imperatives　can　be　unconditional。　Or　still

better；　converting　the　proposition；　if　there　is　a　categorical

imperative　（i。e。；　a　law　for　the　will　of　every　rational　being）；　it

can　only　command　that　everything　be　done　from　maxims　of　one's　will

regarded　as　a　will　which　could　at　the　same　time　will　that　it　should

itself　give　universal　laws；　for　in　that　case　only　the　practical

principle　and　the　imperative　which　it　obeys　are　unconditional；　since

they　cannot　be　based　on　any　interest。



　　*I　may　be　excused　from　adducing　examples　to　elucidate　this

principle；　as　those　which　have　already　been　used　to　elucidate　the

categorical　imperative　and　its　formula　would　all　serve　for　the　like

purpose　here。



　　Looking　back　now　on　all　previous　attempts　to　discover　the

principle　of　morality；　we　need　not　wonder　why　they　all　failed。　It

was　seen　that　man　was　bound　to　laws　by　duty；　but　it　was　not　observed

that　the　laws　to　which　he　is　subject　are　only　those　of　his　own　giving；

though　at　the　same　time　they　are　universal；　and　that　he　is　only

bound　to　act　in　conformity　with　his　own　will；　a　will；　however；　which

is　designed　by　nature　to　give　universal　laws。　For　when　one　has

conceived　man　only　as　subject　to　a　law　（no　matter　what）；　then　this　law

required　some　interest；　either　by　way　of　attraction　or　constraint；

since　it　did　not　originate　as　a　law　from　his　own　will；　but　this　will

was　according　to　a　law　obliged　by　something　else　to　act　in　a　certain

manner。　Now　by　this　necessary　consequence　all　the　labour　spent　in

finding　a　supreme　principle　of　duty　was　irrevocably　lost。　For　men

never　elicited　duty；　but　only　a　necessity　of　acting　from　a　certain

interest。　Whether　this　interest　was　private　or　otherwise；　in　any

case　the　imperative　must　be　conditional　and　could　not　by　any　means

be　capable　of　being　a　moral　command。　I　will　therefore　call　this　the

principle　of　autonomy　of　the　will；　in　contrast　with　every　other

which　I　accordingly　reckon　as　heteronomy。

　　The　conception　of　the　will　of　every　rational　being　as　one　which　must

consider　itself　as　giving　in　all　the　maxims　of　its　will　universal

laws；　so　as　to　judge　itself　and　its　actions　from　this　point　of　view…

this　conception　leads　to　another　which　depends　on　it　and　is　very

fruitful；　namely　that　of　a　kingdom　of　ends。

　　By　a　kingdom　I　understand　the　union　of　different　rational　beings

in　a　system　by　common　laws。　Now　since　it　is　by　laws　that　ends　are

determined　as　regards　their　universal　validity；　hence；　if　we

abstract　from　the　personal　differences　of　rational　beings　and　likewise

from　all　the　content　of　their　private　ends；　we　shall　be　able　to

conceive　all　ends　combined　in　a　systematic　whole　（including　both

rational　beings　as　ends　in　themselves；　and　also　the　special　ends　which

each　may　propose　to　himself）；　that　is　to　say；　we　can　conceive　a

kingdom　of　ends；　which　on　the　preceding　principles　is　possible。

　　For　all　rational　beings　come　under　the　law　that　each　of　them　must

treat　itself　and　all　others　never　merely　as　means；　but　in　every　case

at　the　same　time　as　ends　in　themselves。　Hence　results　a　systematic

union　of　rational　being　by　common　objective　laws；　i。e。；　a　kingdom

which　may　be　called　a　kingdom　of　ends；　since　what　these　laws　have　in

view　is　just　the　relation　of　these　beings　to　one　another　as　ends　and

means。　It　is　certainly　only　an　ideal。

　　A　rational　being　belongs　as　a　member　to　the　kingdom　of　ends　when；

although　giving　universal　laws　in　it；　he　is　also　himself　subject　to

these　laws。　He　belongs　to　it　as　sovereign　when；　while　giving　laws；

he　is　not　subject　to　the　will　of　any　other。

　　A　rational　being　must　always　regard　himself　as　giving　laws　either　as

member　or　as　sovereign　in　a　kingdom　of　ends　which　is　rendered　possible

by　the　freedom　of　will。　He　cannot；　however；　maintain　the　latter

position　merely　by　the　maxims　of　his　will；　but　only　in　case　he　is　a

completely　independent　being　without　wants　and　with　unrestricted　power

adequate　to　his　will。

　　Morality　consists　then　in　the　reference　of　all　action　to　the

legislation　which　alone　can　render　a　kingdom　of　ends　possible。　This

legislation　must　be　capable　of　existing　in　every　rational　being　and　of

emanating　from　his　will；　so　that　the　principle　of　this　will　is　never

to　act　on　any　maxim　which　could　not　without　contradiction　be　also　a

universal　law　and；　accordingly；　always　so　to　act　that　the　will　could

at　the　same　time　regard　itself　as　giving　in　its　maxims　universal　laws。

If　now　the　maxims　of　rational　beings　are　not　by　their　own　nature

coincident　with　this　objective　principle；　then　the　necessity　of　acting

on　it　is　called　practical　necessitation；　i。e。；　duty。　Duty　does　not

apply　to　the　sovereign　in　the　kingdom　of　ends；　but　it　does　to　every

member　of　it　and　to　all　in　the　same　degree。

　　The　practical