fundamental principles of the metaphysic of morals-第13章

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this　is　called　the　means。　The　subjective　ground　of　the　desire　is　the

spring；　the　objective　ground　of　the　volition　is　the　motive；　hence

the　distinction　between　subjective　ends　which　rest　on　springs；　and

objective　ends　which　depend　on　motives　valid　for　every　rational　being。

Practical　principles　are　formal　when　they　abstract　from　all　subjective

ends；　they　are　material　when　they　assume　these；　and　therefore

particular　springs　of　action。　The　ends　which　a　rational　being　proposes

to　himself　at　pleasure　as　effects　of　his　actions　（material　ends）　are

all　only　relative；　for　it　is　only　their　relation　to　the　particular

desires　of　the　subject　that　gives　them　their　worth；　which　therefore

cannot　furnish　principles　universal　and　necessary　for　all　rational

beings　and　for　every　volition；　that　is　to　say　practical　laws。　Hence

all　these　relative　ends　can　give　rise　only　to　hypothetical

imperatives。

　　Supposing；　however；　that　there　were　something　whose　existence　has　in

itself　an　absolute　worth；　something　which；　being　an　end　in　itself；

could　be　a　source　of　definite　laws；　then　in　this　and　this　alone

would　lie　the　source　of　a　possible　categorical　imperative；　i。e。；　a

practical　law。

　　Now　I　say：　man　and　generally　any　rational　being　exists　as　an　end

in　himself；　not　merely　as　a　means　to　be　arbitrarily　used　by　this　or

that　will；　but　in　all　his　actions；　whether　they　concern　himself　or

other　rational　beings；　must　be　always　regarded　at　the　same　time　as

an　end。　All　objects　of　the　inclinations　have　only　a　conditional　worth；

for　if　the　inclinations　and　the　wants　founded　on　them　did　not　exist；

then　their　object　would　be　without　value。　But　the　inclinations；

themselves　being　sources　of　want；　are　so　far　from　having　an　absolute

worth　for　which　they　should　be　desired　that　on　the　contrary　it　must　be

the　universal　wish　of　every　rational　being　to　be　wholly　free　from

them。　Thus　the　worth　of　any　object　which　is　to　be　acquired　by　our

action　is　always　conditional。　Beings　whose　existence　depends　not　on

our　will　but　on　nature's；　have　nevertheless；　if　they　are　irrational

beings；　only　a　relative　value　as　means；　and　are　therefore　called

things；　rational　beings；　on　the　contrary；　are　called　persons；

because　their　very　nature　points　them　out　as　ends　in　themselves；

that　is　as　something　which　must　not　be　used　merely　as　means；　and　so

far　therefore　restricts　freedom　of　action　（and　is　an　object　of

respect）。　These；　therefore；　are　not　merely　subjective　ends　whose

existence　has　a　worth　for　us　as　an　effect　of　our　action；　but　objective

ends；　that　is；　things　whose　existence　is　an　end　in　itself；　an　end

moreover　for　which　no　other　can　be　substituted；　which　they　should

subserve　merely　as　means；　for　otherwise　nothing　whatever　would　possess

absolute　worth；　but　if　all　worth　were　conditioned　and　therefore

contingent；　then　there　would　be　no　supreme　practical　principle　of

reason　whatever。

　　If　then　there　is　a　supreme　practical　principle　or；　in　respect　of　the

human　will；　a　categorical　imperative；　it　must　be　one　which；　being

drawn　from　the　conception　of　that　which　is　necessarily　an　end　for

everyone　because　it　is　an　end　in　itself；　constitutes　an　objective

principle　of　will；　and　can　therefore　serve　as　a　universal　practical

law。　The　foundation　of　this　principle　is：　rational　nature　exists　as　an

end　in　itself。　Man　necessarily　conceives　his　own　existence　as　being

so；　so　far　then　this　is　a　subjective　principle　of　human　actions。　But

every　other　rational　being　regards　its　existence　similarly；　just　on

the　same　rational　principle　that　holds　for　me：*　so　that　it　is　at　the

same　time　an　objective　principle；　from　which　as　a　supreme　practical

law　all　laws　of　the　will　must　be　capable　of　being　deduced。　Accordingly

the　practical　imperative　will　be　as　follows：　So　act　as　to　treat

humanity；　whether　in　thine　own　person　or　in　that　of　any　other；　in

every　case　as　an　end　withal；　never　as　means　only。　We　will　now

inquire　whether　this　can　be　practically　carried　out。



　　*This　proposition　is　here　stated　as　a　postulate。　The　ground　of　it

will　be　found　in　the　concluding　section。



　　To　abide　by　the　previous　examples：

　　Firstly；　under　the　head　of　necessary　duty　to　oneself：　He　who

contemplates　suicide　should　ask　himself　whether　his　action　can　be

consistent　with　the　idea　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself。　If　he

destroys　himself　in　order　to　escape　from　painful　circumstances；　he

uses　a　person　merely　as　a　mean　to　maintain　a　tolerable　condition　up　to

the　end　of　life。　But　a　man　is　not　a　thing；　that　is　to　say；　something

which　can　be　used　merely　as　means；　but　must　in　all　his　actions　be

always　considered　as　an　end　in　himself。　I　cannot；　therefore；　dispose

in　any　way　of　a　man　in　my　own　person　so　as　to　mutilate　him；　to

damage　or　kill　him。　（It　belongs　to　ethics　proper　to　define　this

principle　more　precisely；　so　as　to　avoid　all　misunderstanding；　e。

g。；　as　to　the　amputation　of　the　limbs　in　order　to　preserve　myself；

as　to　exposing　my　life　to　danger　with　a　view　to　preserve　it；　etc。　This

question　is　therefore　omitted　here。）

　　Secondly；　as　regards　necessary　duties；　or　those　of　strict

obligation；　towards　others：　He　who　is　thinking　of　making　a　lying

promise　to　others　will　see　at　once　that　he　would　be　using　another

man　merely　as　a　mean；　without　the　latter　containing　at　the　same　time

the　end　in　himself。　For　he　whom　I　propose　by　such　a　promise　to　use　for

my　own　purposes　cannot　possibly　assent　to　my　mode　of　acting　towards

him　and；　therefore；　cannot　himself　contain　the　end　of　this　action。

This　violation　of　the　principle　of　humanity　in　other　men　is　more

obvious　if　we　take　in　examples　of　attacks　on　the　freedom　and

property　of　others。　For　then　it　is　clear　that　he　who　transgresses

the　rights　of　men　intends　to　use　the　person　of　others　merely　as　a

means；　without　considering　that　as　rational　beings　they　ought　always

to　be　esteemed　also　as　ends；　that　is；　as　beings　who　must　be　capable　of

containing　in　themselves　the　end　of　the　very　same　action。*



　　*Let　it　not　be　thought　that　the　common　〃quod　tibi　non　vis　fieri；

etc。〃　could　serve　here　as　the　rule　or　principle。　For　it　is　only　a

deduction　from　the　former；　though　with　several　limitations；　it

cannot　be　a　universal　law；　for　it　does　not　contain　the　principle　of

duties　to　oneself；　nor　of　the　duties　of　benevolence　to　others　（for

many　a　one　would　gladly　consent　that　others　should　not　benefit　him；

provided　only　that　he　might　be　excused　from　showing　benevolence　to

them）；　nor　finally　that　of　duties　of　strict　obligation　to　one　another；

for　on　this　principle　the　criminal　might　argue　against　the　judge　who

punishes　him；　and　so　on。



　　Thirdly；　as　regards　contingent　（meritorious）　duties　to　oneself：　It

is　not　enough　that　the　action　does　not　violate　humanity　in　our　own

person　as　an　end　in　itself；　it　must　also　harmonize　with　it。　Now

there　are　in　humanity　capacities　of　greater　perfection；　which　belong

to　the　end　that　nature　has　in　view　in　regard　to　humanity　in

ourselves　as　the　subject：　to　neglect　these　might　perhaps　be　consistent

with　the　maintenance　of　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　but　not　with　the

advancement　of　this　end。

　　Fourthly；　as　regards　meritorious　duties　towards　others：　The

natural　end　which　all　men　have　is　their　own　happiness。　Now　humanity

might　indeed　subsist；　although　no　one　should　contribute　anything　to

the　happiness　of　others；　provided　he　did　not　intentionally　withdraw

anything　from　it；　but　after　all　this　would　only　harmonize　negatively

not　positively　with　humanity　as　an　end　in　itself；　if　every　one　does

not　also　endeavour；　as　far　as　in　him　lies；　to　forward　the　ends　of

others。　For　the　ends　of　any　subject　which　is　an　end　in　himself　ought

as　far　as　possible　to　be　my　ends　also；　if　that　conception　is　to　have

its　full　effect　with　me。

　　This　principle；　that　humanity　and　generally　every　rational　nature　is

an　end　in　itself　（which　is　the　supreme　limiting　condition　of　every

man's　freedom　of　action）；　is　not　borrowed　from　experience；　firstly；

because　it　is　universal；　applying　as　it　do