charmides-第14章

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which　is　the　science　of　building；　I　should　say　houses；　and　so　of　other



arts；　which　all　have　their　different　results。　　Now　I　want　you；　Critias；　to



answer　a　similar　question　about　temperance；　or　wisdom；　which；　according　to



you；　is　the　science　of　itself。　　Admitting　this　view；　I　ask　of　you；　what



good　work；　worthy　of　the　name　wise；　does　temperance　or　wisdom；　which　is　the



science　of　itself；　effect？　　Answer　me。







That　is　not　the　true　way　of　pursuing　the　enquiry；　Socrates；　he　said；　for



wisdom　is　not　like　the　other　sciences；　any　more　than　they　are　like　one



another：　　but　you　proceed　as　if　they　were　alike。　　For　tell　me；　he　said；



what　result　is　there　of　computation　or　geometry；　in　the　same　sense　as　a



house　is　the　result　of　building；　or　a　garment　of　weaving；　or　any　other　work



of　any　other　art？　　Can　you　show　me　any　such　result　of　them？　　You　cannot。







That　is　true；　I　said；　but　still　each　of　these　sciences　has　a　subject　which



is　different　from　the　science。　　I　can　show　you　that　the　art　of　computation



has　to　do　with　odd　and　even　numbers　in　their　numerical　relations　to



themselves　and　to　each　other。　　Is　not　that　true？







Yes；　he　said。







And　the　odd　and　even　numbers　are　not　the　same　with　the　art　of　computation？







They　are　not。







The　art　of　weighing；　again；　has　to　do　with　lighter　and　heavier；　but　the　art



of　weighing　is　one　thing；　and　the　heavy　and　the　light　another。　　Do　you



admit　that？







Yes。







Now；　I　want　to　know；　what　is　that　which　is　not　wisdom；　and　of　which　wisdom



is　the　science？







You　are　just　falling　into　the　old　error；　Socrates；　he　said。　　You　come



asking　in　what　wisdom　or　temperance　differs　from　the　other　sciences；　and



then　you　try　to　discover　some　respect　in　which　they　are　alike；　but　they　are



not；　for　all　the　other　sciences　are　of　something　else；　and　not　of



themselves；　wisdom　alone　is　a　science　of　other　sciences；　and　of　itself。　



And　of　this；　as　I　believe；　you　are　very　well　aware：　　and　that　you　are　only



doing　what　you　denied　that　you　were　doing　just　now；　trying　to　refute　me；



instead　of　pursuing　the　argument。







And　what　if　I　am？　　How　can　you　think　that　I　have　any　other　motive　in



refuting　you　but　what　I　should　have　in　examining　into　myself？　which　motive



would　be　just　a　fear　of　my　unconsciously　fancying　that　I　knew　something　of



which　I　was　ignorant。　　And　at　this　moment　I　pursue　the　argument　chiefly　for



my　own　sake；　and　perhaps　in　some　degree　also　for　the　sake　of　my　other



friends。　　For　is　not　the　discovery　of　things　as　they　truly　are；　a　good



common　to　all　mankind？







Yes；　certainly；　Socrates；　he　said。







Then；　I　said；　be　cheerful；　sweet　sir；　and　give　your　opinion　in　answer　to



the　question　which　I　asked；　never　minding　whether　Critias　or　Socrates　is



the　person　refuted；　attend　only　to　the　argument；　and　see　what　will　come　of



the　refutation。







I　think　that　you　are　right；　he　replied；　and　I　will　do　as　you　say。







Tell　me；　then；　I　said；　what　you　mean　to　affirm　about　wisdom。







I　mean　to　say　that　wisdom　is　the　only　science　which　is　the　science　of



itself　as　well　as　of　the　other　sciences。







But　the　science　of　science；　I　said；　will　also　be　the　science　of　the　absence



of　science。







Very　true；　he　said。







Then　the　wise　or　temperate　man；　and　he　only；　will　know　himself；　and　be　able



to　examine　what　he　knows　or　does　not　know；　and　to　see　what　others　know　and



think　that　they　know　and　do　really　know；　and　what　they　do　not　know；　and



fancy　that　they　know；　when　they　do　not。　　No　other　person　will　be　able　to　do



this。　　And　this　is　wisdom　and　temperance　and　self…knowledgefor　a　man　to



know　what　he　knows；　and　what　he　does　not　know。　　That　is　your　meaning？







Yes；　he　said。







Now　then；　I　said；　making　an　offering　of　the　third　or　last　argument　to　Zeus



the　Saviour；　let　us　begin　again；　and　ask；　in　the　first　place；　whether　it　is



or　is　not　possible　for　a　person　to　know　that　he　knows　and　does　not　know



what　he　knows　and　does　not　know；　and　in　the　second　place；　whether；　if



perfectly　possible；　such　knowledge　is　of　any　use。







That　is　what　we　have　to　consider；　he　said。







And　here；　Critias；　I　said；　I　hope　that　you　will　find　a　way　out　of　a



difficulty　into　which　I　have　got　myself。　　Shall　I　tell　you　the　nature　of



the　difficulty？







By　all　means；　he　replied。







Does　not　what　you　have　been　saying；　if　true；　amount　to　this：　　that　there



must　be　a　single　science　which　is　wholly　a　science　of　itself　and　of　other



sciences；　and　that　the　same　is　also　the　science　of　the　absence　of　science？







Yes。







But　consider　how　monstrous　this　proposition　is；　my　friend：　　in　any　parallel



case；　the　impossibility　will　be　transparent　to　you。







How　is　that？　and　in　what　cases　do　you　mean？







In　such　cases　as　this：　　Suppose　that　there　is　a　kind　of　vision　which　is　not



like　ordinary　vision；　but　a　vision　of　itself　and　of　other　sorts　of　vision；



and　of　the　defect　of　them；　which　in　seeing　sees　no　colour；　but　only　itself



and　other　sorts　of　vision：　　Do　you　think　that　there　is　such　a　kind　of



vision？







Certainly　not。







Or　is　there　a　kind　of　hearing　which　hears　no　sound　at　all；　but　only　itself



and　other　sorts　of　hearing；　or　the　defects　of　them？







There　is　not。







Or　take　all　the　senses：　　can　you　imagine　that　there　is　any　sense　of　itself



and　of　other　senses；　but　which　is　incapable　of　perceiving　the　objects　of



the　senses？







I　think　not。







Could　there　be　any　desire　which　is　not　the　desire　of　any　pleasure；　but　of



itself；　and　of　all　other　desires？







Certainly　not。







Or　can　you　imagine　a　wish　which　wishes　for　no　good；　but　only　for　itself　and



all　other　wishes？







I　should　answer；　No。







Or　would　you　say　that　there　is　a　love　which　is　not　the　love　of　beauty；　but



of　itself　and　of　other　loves？







I　should　not。







Or　did　you　ever　know　of　a　fear　which　fears　itself　or　other　fears；　but　has



no　object　of　fear？







I　never　did；　he　said。







Or　of　an　opinion　which　is　an　opinion　of　itself　and　of　other　opinions；　and



which　has　no　opinion　on　the　subjects　of　opinion　in　general？







Certainly　not。







But　surely　we　are　assuming　a　science　of　this　kind；　which；　having　no



subject…matter；　is　a　science　of　itself　and　of　the　other　sciences？







Yes；　that　is　what　is　affirmed。







But　how　strange　is　this；　if　it　be　indeed　true：　　we　must　not　however　as　yet



absolutely　deny　the　possibility　of　such　a　science；　let　us　rather　consider



the　matter。







You　are　quite　right。







Well　then；　this　science　of　which　we　are　speaking　is　a　science　of　something；



and　is　of　a　nature　to　be　a　science　of　something？







Yes。







Just　as　that　which　is　greater　is　of　a　nature　to　be　greater　than　something



else？　　（Socrates　is　intending　to　show　that　science　differs　from　the　object



of　science；　as　any　other　relative　differs　from　the　object　of　relation。　　But



where　there　is　comparisongreater；　less；　heavier；　lighter；　and　the　likea



relation　to　self　as　well　as　to　other　things　involves　an　absolute



contradiction；　and　in　other　cases；　as　in　the　case　of　the　senses；　is　hardly



conceivable。　　The　use　of　the　genitive　after　the　comparative　in　Greek；



（Greek）；　creates　an　unavoidable　obscurity　in　the　translation。）







Yes。







Which　is　less；　if　the　other　is　conceived　to　be　greater？







To　be　sure。







And　if　we　could　find　something　which　is　at　once　greater　than　itself；　and



greater　than　ot